The Argument from Cause

a) Doctrine of Causality

A cause is that which contributes in any manner whatever to the production of a thing. The thing produced is called an effect. The relation of a cause towards its effect is called causality. The world around us is a tissue of the cause-and-effect relation, i.e., of causality. The movement of the earth and the heavenly bodies is the cause of recurrent night and day and of the change of seasons. The laws of Nature are but formulas which express the existence and relations of causes and effects, Plants, brutes, and men live and grow by the causal activity of an inner life-principle and by the supplementary causes of light, heat, air, moisture, food, which enable this life-principle to function. Everywhere we see causes at work producing effects, and we see effects, in their turn, becoming causes of further effects. The sun, for example, is the cause of sunlight; sunlight is the cause of sunburn; sunburn is the cause of pain; pain is the cause of sleeplessness, etc.—the example may be extended indefinitely. We need no further example, however, to convince us of these facts: (1) Causality exists in the world. (2) The effect of one cause may become the cause of further effects. (3) The chains of cause and effect may be crossed and interwoven at innumerable points, so that many causes may converge to produce one effect, and the influence of one cause may be found in various effects. So obvious is the existence of causality in the world that it appears unthinkable that anyone should deny it. Yet men have denied it. There have been, and still are, those who assert that we can know nothing of the relation of objects and Events except an association and succession) which we have no right to call the relation of cause and effect. This means, for example, that when a piece of dry wood is thrown into a roaring fire, the fire is not to be called the cause, and the decomposition of the wood the effect, of the burning. Now, a treatise on Apologetics has neither the space nor the right to discuss this curious doctrine in detail. Only a general criticism of it can be offered to show that it is contradictory in theory and pernicious in its practical results. First of all, it must be said that the existence of the cause-and-effect relation in the world is as evident as the existence of the world itself. Causality is understood by a direct and irresistible intuition of the mind, even as the bodily world is perceived by a direct grasp of the senses and of consciousness. All activity, all thought, goes forward upon the solid roadway of the recognition of the obvious fact of causality. The scientist in the laboratory, the surgeon in the operating-room, the physician at his work of diagnosis, the teacher in the classroom, the salesman dealing with a prospective buyer, the mechanic at work upon an automobile, the business man, the economist, the sociologist, the lawyer, the director of souls—all are seeking to know causes, or to produce effects, or to prevent undesirable effects. Everywhere and in everything we find causality showing itself inevitably in the activities of practical and intellectual life. The man who denies causality denies all things; he must lapse into the endless silence of universal skepticism. Such a man has no right to take medicine for the relief of an ailment, nor to eat food to appease his hunger; to do these things would be to admit that the medicine could cause relief, and that the food could cause satisfaction of appetite. Nor has such a man even the right to defend his theory that there is no causality; for were he to offer argument, he would show that he believed argument capable of causing others to agree with him, and certainly such argument would reveal the reasons which cause him to hold his theory. Thus, the denial of causality is shown to be contradictory in theory. If the man who denies causality objects to this, if he says, “Between food and satisfied appetite, between medicine and the relief of sickness, between argument and mental conviction, there is only a relation of succession, albeit necessary succession,” we answer, “Very well. You choose to call it a necessary relation; we call it cause; there is a difference in our terms, but not in the thing we mean.’As a fact, those that deny causality dislike the word; they call it by another name; but they do not destroy the reality. If there be no causality in the world, then the murderer is not the cause of his victim’s death; the lazy student is not responsible for his failure in examinations; the good man deserves no praise for his virtues; the weakling is not to be encouraged, for he can in no wise amend his efforts. Thus the denial of causality is the denial of all practical morality. Hence, on grounds both speculative and practical, we reject the denial of causality as a contradictory and pernicious thing. Causality, then, exists. There are really causes which contribute to the production of effects. Indeed, every object, every event in this finite world must have its cause or causes, and these must be adequate, i.e., sufficient to account fully for all the positive being or perfection of the effect. To limit our study to bodily objects—for our argument is to deal with this bodily or material world—we find that four causes regularly converge to produce a material or bodily thing. These causes are called, respectively, the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final cause. We shall study these as they are exhibited in a pertinent illustration: 1. I have on my desk a small marble statue of the Blessed Virgin Mary. This statue is neither infinite nor eternal, and hence it must have its causes; it is not a thing which must exist, but it has received existence from its causes. When I ask what these causes are, the first answer is obviously: the material, the stuff, out of which the statue is made. This is its material cause. It is a true cause, for without it the statue could not exist. The material cause of this statue is marble. 2. Now the statue might be made of wood, of plaster, of metal, or of other substance; but, as a matter of fact, it is made of none of these things, but of marble. There is something that makes this substance the precise thing that it is; there is something that makes marble marble. This is a cause of the statue, for without it the statue would not be the precise kind of substantial thing that it is. This is the substantial formal cause of the statue.—Further, the statue has its outward shape, figure, or form. This is also a cause of the statue, for without it the statue would not be just what it is. This is the accidental formal cause of the statue. We use the term accidental to signify that which happens to be present as an extrinsic determination of the effect, although the effect would be essentially the same were this determination different. Thus, the statue would be a statue and a marble statue, even if it were of a different figure, or were made to represent some other personage than the Blessed Virgin Mary. 3. The statue has had a maker. The artist who produced it is its true cause. He is the efficient cause of the statue, for by his own activity he effectively produced it as this statue, using the material substance called marble to work upon.—The tools used by the artist in making the statue are also causes of the statue, for without them it could not have been made. These are instrumental causes of the statue. Instrumental causes are not major, but minor causes, for they subserve the action of the efficient cause.

—Further, the artist made the statue according to some plan or model (person, picture, sketch, image in his imagination, other statue, or the like), and this is also a cause of the statue, for without it the work of the efficient cause would not have been guided to produce just this statue. This is called the exemplary cause. Like the instrumental cause, the exemplary cause is a minor cause and subserves the action of the efficient cause. 4. The artist must have had some purpose, some end in view, in making the statue. Perhaps he made it to sell for money, perhaps he made it to express his devotion to the Blessed Mother, perhaps he merely wished to exhibit his skill, perhaps he only wanted to do something to pass away the time, perhaps he found pleasure in the work, perhaps several or all of these motives, or others, had a place in the work. In any case, the artist was moved to make the statue by some end in view which was recognized as desirable to achieve. Now, this end in view, or simply end, is a cause of the statue, for without it the efficient cause would not be stirred to make the statue. It is called the final cause of the statue (from the Latin finis, “end”). We see that of the four major causes two belong to the very being of the effect; they are intrinsic to the effect as such: these are the material and the formal cause. The other two causes, viz., the efficient and the final cause, are not part and parcel of the effect, but are extrinsic to it.

In the argument which we are to offer presently we shall be concerned, first and foremost, with the necessity of admitting the existence of an efficient cause of the world. But first we have to considerder another matter, one closely related to the question of efficient causality—indeed, it is a part of that question. Everything that exists must have a sufficient explanation of its existence. Nothing can exist without a sufficient reason for its existence, Now, obviously this sufficient reason must be found either in the existing thing itself, or in that which gave it existence. To put the matter in another way: if a thing exists, then either (1) it is so perfect that it must exist and cannot be non-existent, or (2) it has received existence by the action of some efficient cause. Now, if a thing be so perfect that it must exist and cannot be non-existent, it is self-existent. Such a thing contains in itself the sufficient reason for its existence. And since it must exist by reason of its own essential perfection, it has had no cause; it is eternal; it is necessary being (i.e., it necessarily exists), and not contingent upon the action of any producing cause. If a being has received existence by the action of some efficient cause, it is not a necessary, but a contingent being, for it depends upon, is contingent upon, the action of its producing efficient cause. Thus there are only two kinds of being possible: (1) eternal, uncaused, necessary being, and (2) contingent being, which is efficiently caused. Further: contingent things, things efficiently caused, must be traced back to a first efficient cause, which is itself necessary and uncaused being. For consider: a contingent thing is a caused thing, its cause produced it. If its cause is also produced, something produced that cause, and so on. If A comes from B, and B from C, and C from D, and D from E, and E from F, and so on, then somewhere and sometime we must come to a first cause which is itself uncaused, which is necessary being. One cannot trace back the chain of causation indefinitely nor to infinity ; one must really reach the beginning, one must really attain the knowledge of a necessary first cause. To say that the series is indefinitely long and to leave the matter there, is to make an intellectual surrender of the whole question, an unworthy surrender, which leaves the mind in precisely the same state as if no cause at all had been traced. Such a surrender is simply a refusal to face facts. On the other hand, to say that the series of causes is infinitely long (i.e., has no beginning) is to assert an absurdity. For an infinite number of finite causes is impossible; finite added to finite can never equal infinite. Reason forces us to the conclusion that contingent things involve of necessity the existence of an uncaused and necessary first cause. Now, can there be many uncaused and necessary first causes? Can various chains of causation be traced back to various first causes? Or is the first cause necessarily one cause? We assert that the first cause is one and only one. For a being that is so perfect that it must exist must have the fulness of perfection, it must have perfection in a wholly unlimited manner. Why ? Because such a being is self-existent and wholly independent of causes. Now causes do two things: they make an effect what it is, and they limit the effect so as to mark off its perfections from those of other things. Hence a being that is independent of causes, as a necessary being is, is independent of the limitation which causes impose. Thus the first cause is free from limitation; in other words, it is infinite. Now, an infinite being is unique; there simply cannot be more than one such being. For, if there were more than one, there would be a distinction of being between or among them; this distinction would be itself a limitation, and none would be infinite. Suppose, for example, that there are two infinite beings, A and B. A has its own perfections in an unlimited degree; B has its own perfections, similarly unlimited. Now, if A and B are not identical (and thus one) there is a defect and a limitation in A, inasmuch as it has not the perfections that are properly B’s. In like manner there is a defect and a limitation in B, inasmuch as B has not the perfections that are properly A’s. Thus, unless A and B are identical and one, neither is infinite. We conclude that there can be only one necessary being, because a necessary being is infinite. Hence, the necessary first cause must be one and infinite.

b) The Argument

Contingent things demand the existence of one, necessary, infinite first cause; Now, the world, and all things in the world, are contingent things; Therefore, the world, and all things in the world, demand the existence of one, necessary, infinite first cause. This we call God.

c) Discussion of the Argument

The argument is set forth in what is called a syllogism, that is, three propositions so connected that, when the first two are given, the third necessarily follows. The first two propositions are called the premisses of the syllogism; the last proposition is called the conclusion. The first premiss is called the major, and the second is called the minor premiss. From what we have already learned about causality, it is evident that the major premiss is true. The minor premiss asserts that the world and things in the world are contingent. This is not hard to prove. For the world is full of change, and wherever there is change, there is contingency. If things are necessary, if they must be what they are, and not otherwise, then change is impossible. Again, causes are required to produce change, and change is therefore contingent upon the action of such causes. Now, mundane things are subject to change, not only of quantity and quality and place, but of their very substance. Thus there is change from life to lifelessness, as when a living tree becomes a dead tree. There is change from dead matter to living matter, when, for instance, cooked meat is digested and becomes living tissue. Now, where such substantial changes exist, the very substances changed are contingent.—Again, limitation means contingency. For, as we have seen, limitation in being requires a cause, In other words, where being exists at all, it exists either independently of causes in an unlimited degree, or in that limited degree which actual causes give. Now, mundane things are obviously limited in space, in kind, in time or endurance, in quantity, in quality, etc. Hence, mundane things are caused; mundane things are contingent upon the action of causes. It is clear, then, that the minor premiss expresses an obvious truth: the world and all things in the world are contingent. The conclusion of the argument is inevitable in view of the premisses; it follows necessarily from the premisses. There is, therefore, a first cause of the world. From our remarks on causality and from the argument just discussed, we know that this cause is one, necessary, infinite, eternal. This Being, this First Cause, is God. Here the cruder sort of evolutionist arises with a smile at our simplicity. He says, “All this talk of causality is well enough. But you go too far when you insist on having a first efficient cause necessarily existing in itself and acting as the producer of all things outside itself. This wonderful world of ours does not require so naive an explanation, We find a sufficient explanation of the world in the almost incredibly long process by which the cosmic development has been actualized. There was, to begin with, some mass of world-stuff—call it nebula, call it matter, call it the field of force and energy—and as eons rolled away there emerged from this mass forms that began crudely to be differentiated. Time passed, tremendous stretches of it, and forms were more and more clearly developed; the cleavage of form from form was more definitely achieved. Then, as ages upon ages passed, . . Here we interrupt on our own account and ask, “What causes the original nebula or mass of world-stuff? It presents precisely the same problem as the world we see around us to-day. It is contingent, for it changes and develops; it must therefore have its cause, and its first cause; and this first cause must be eternal, one, infinite, necessary. Our argument remains untouched by your remarks, You cannot muddle us with your talk of ages and ages, and eons and eons. What has time to do with the question anyhow? Whether the world was made quickly or slowly cannot change the fact that it was made, that it demands its cause. You take as starting point the world as you think it once was ; we take the world as it is; but we all take the world as starting point. And our argument is that one, eternal, infinite, necessary first cause is required for the world either as it is, or as, perhaps, it was.”

Summary of the Article

We have defined cause, effect, causality. We have seen that causality exists in the world as an indubitable fact. We have defined the four major causes of material things, viz., material, formal, efficient, final, and the minor causes that may subserve the action of the efficient cause, viz., instrumental and exemplary causes. We have centered our attention and framed our argument upon efficient causality in the world. We have seen that things efficiently caused are contingent upon their causes, and that such things demand, as a sufficient reason and explanation of their existence, a necessary being which is the first efficient cause. We have seen that the first efficient cause must be eternal, one, necessary, infinite. This first cause is God.