The Argument from the Moral Order

a) Meaning of the Moral Order

By the moral order we mean the department of the world’s activity that is marked with the character of morality, that is, which is right or wrong, good or bad. In a word, the moral order means the free and deliberate activity of human beings. All human conduct which is deliberate and free belongs to the moral order. Man, in his free and deliberate acts, is conscious of an obligation. He inevitably knows that there is a duty upon him and a prohibition: he knows that he must do good and avoid evil. He recognizes an order in things that he is bound to conserve and forbidden to disturb. All men, in a word, feel clearly and know unmistakably that their activities are subject to a law. Now, this is not a physical law like the law of growth or the circulation of the blood, laws which man cannot disobey; this is a law which governs by suasion and not by force or coercion; it is a law which men are physically free to disobey, but which their understanding cannot disregard. This law is called the natural law; it is a moral law which indicates to man whathe ought to do, but does not force him to do it.

We say that a man’s conscience (i.e., reason recognizing and pronouncing upon matters of good and evil, right and wrong) makes him aware of the moral law. This fact is universally true. All men of all times, savages and cultivated peoples, have come to a knowledge of right and good to be done, and of evil and wrong to be avoided, as they come to the “use of reason.” Now, among varied peoples there may be various applications of the moral law, but the law itself is everywhere tad always the same, viz., “Do good; avoid evil.” If at times there exist odd and varying notions of just what is good and what is evil, human weakness and human perversity (evidence of the Fall!) explain the diversities. But there are no diversities among men even in applications of the moral law in obvious matters. No man of any race or tribe ever believed that murder, lies, contempt of parents, are good things; no man ever thought that love of parents, truthfulness, honesty, are evil. It is no objection to this statement to assert that the Roman father believed he had the right of life and death over his children and his slaves, and that he sometimes killed them. This is not saying that the Roman approved of murder; it is only saying that he did not regard as murder the killing of his children or slaves. The Carthagenian mothers who threw their infants into the flames in the horrible worship of Moloch, did not regard murder as good; they regarded sacrifice to

Moloch as no murder. The wrong view of Roman and Carthagenian was a perverse and mistaken application of the moral law; it was not a failure to recognize a moral law at all. Was not the idea of parental authority a recognition of moral law; was not the sorry idea of an obligation to worship Moloch a moral idea? There is a law then which imposes itself upon man’s consciousness, and he feels its obligation even when he does not obey it in action. Whence comes this law ? Man does not make it for himself, for it often forbids whathe wants to do, and commands whathe would be glad to avoid: his wishes make no change in the law, as they certainly would if he were its author. Nor can the moral law be explained by saying that it is a mere outgrowth of custom among men. A custom can be changed; but reason asserts that the moral law cannot be changed. Reason revolts at the idea of murder being made a virtuous act, of men giving thanks for the privilege of having their property stolen, of mothers rejoicing in the shame of their children; and yet reason would have no impulse to reject these things if the view that they are wrong were merely a habitual point of view, a custom. Finally, laws passed by kings and senates—human legislation, in a word—cannot explain the moral law and the knowledge of man that there are things good and things evil. For human laws can be abrogated; new laws can be passed; and if human laws are the source of the moral law, the moral law can be changed. Statute books may come to justify murder and to make theft a virtuous act; but the human mind will never be able to regard murder as good and theft as a virtue. We are forced by the irresistible evidence of reason, of common sense, to reject the idea that the moral law comes from man himself, or from custom, or from human legislation.—The question still remains : Whence comes the moral law? The moral law is, first and foremost, a true law. Hence it must, of necessity, come from a lawgiver. This lawgiver (who is not man himself, nor man’s ancestors) obviously must have the intelligence to frame the moral law, the right and power to impose it, and the wisdom to enforce it. This legislator we call God. It is obvious, of course, that the Supreme Legislator and the First Cause of the world must be one and the same reality. For if the Legislator be distinct from the First Cause, then the Legislator is an effect of the First Cause, proximate or remote, and his intelligence, right, power, come from, and are ultimately to be ascribed to, the First Cause. And, further, it is clear that the First Cause of the world, being supremely intelligent and powerful (as we have proved in another place), must have had a,plan and design that He willed to have carried out; it is obvious that the First Cause has established a course for the attainment of His purpose; and such a course must take the form of coercion or force for lifeless things and for living things devoid of freedom; it must take the form of the moral law for creatures whose activities are under their own control and within their own choice.

b) The Argument

There exists in the consciousness of all men the inevitable knowledge of a universal law, changeless and absolute, which requires the free-will (though it does not compel or force it) to do good and to avoid evil; Now, such a law presupposes the existence of a lawgiver, distinct from and superior to man’s nature and will, who is ultimately identified with the First Cause, God. Therefore, God exists.

c) Discussion of the Argument

The first statement is evident in view of what has been said in discussing the moral order. The moment a man ceases to be an infant, the momenthe “comes to the use of reason,” as the saying is, that momenthe recognizes certain things as good and certain things as evil; and he realizes an obligation incumbent upon him of doing the good and avoiding the evil things. Not all things, indeed, but certain things are clearly known as good in themselves (and so to be done or at least permitted), and other things are known as evil in themselves (and hence forbidden). The coming “to the use of reason” is not a sudden recognition of these things, but a gradually clarifying knowledge of some of these things; and as life and experience continue, the actual number of such things normally increases in one’s knowledge; but the moral law itself (i.e., “Do good; avoid evil”) is clearly known from the moment a person “becomes responsible” for his conduct. This is a requirement of rational nature: hence the moral law is truly universal: it is recognized by all normal men of all times. And, further, the moral law is changeless, as we have amply shown above. Finally, the moral law is absolute, as human consciousness and experience testify. “Absolute” means “unconditional.” Conscience does not say, “Do good, if you like; avoid evil, if you please.” Conscience says simply, “Do good; avoid evil,” without reference to human likes or pleasures. Similarly, in its individual mandates or applications, the moral law is absolute. Conscience says, “Do this; shun that”; it does not say, “Do this, if you find it convenient; avoid that, unless you dislike doing it.” There is no condition or qualifier attached to the mandates of the moral law; it is absolute. The second statement of the Argument is a simple requisite of reason. Effect demands an adequate cause; if there is a law, there is a lawgiver. That the lawgiver is distinct from man’s own nature, man’s will, is obvious; else man could change the moral law and free himself of its obligation without any sense of guilt. That the lawgiver is superior to man’s nature and will, is obvious from the fact that man is constrained to recognize himself as the subject oi the law, as under the direction of the lawgiver. The conclusion follows logically from the premisses.

Summary of the Article

In this Article we have seen that there exists a moral order, an inevitable classification of free human acts as good and evil. We have indicated the existence of the moral law, which demands the performance of good acts and forbids those that are evil. All men are forced by their rational nature to admit both that the moral law exists and that they are subject to it. We have seen that the moral law cannot come from man himself, nor from long-established custom, nor from human legislation: in a word, this law cannot come from any merely human source. Men are subject to this law; it must, therefore, come from a superhuman source. We conclude that there is an original Lawgiver (who is God Himself, the First Cause), independent of and superior to man’s will.