Monism

This Chapter discusses the essential constitution of bodies. It asks what makes any natural body a body, and what makes it an actual or existing body of its definite specific kind. Theories on the ultimate constitution of matter,—that is, of bodies and of the material universe,—may be listed under three heads, viz., atomism, dynamism, and hylomorphism. Before studying these systems and weighing their value, it will be well to consider the doctrine called monism which is hardly deserving of the name of a distinct philosophy of matter, but is rather a foggy theory of unreality which sometimes enwraps doctrines which are otherwise atomistic or dynamistic. The present Chapter discusses monism and the three philosophies of matter in the following Articles:

a) MEANING OF MONISM

Monism is a term derived from the Greek adjective monos, which means “single” or “alone.” By its etymology, therefore, monism means a theory of a 137 world which is “all of a piece,” a single substance or a single cloud of unsubstantiality ; it stands opposed to diversity, real plurality, and real variety.

In this world of bodies, we are aware of multitude or number; that is, we see that there are many bodily objects round about. And we are aware of diversity in kind or specific nature, and of variety. That is, we see that bodies are not only numerous, but that they are of different fundamental kinds, and that there are many differences in externals among bodies of the same fundamental kind. We agree that all bodies are at one in point of bodiliness, but we do not find in bodiliness alone a complete or existible essence; a body cannot exist merely as a body and nothing else; it must be a body of a definite specific or essential kind, and, indeed, it must, to exist, be an individual body of that kind. Men and brutes and trees and stones are different, not only in point of individuality or number, but of essential kind; and within the limits of each kind we find great variety in size, color, shape, and so on; and we notice that variety extends into the most trivial of accidental differences among distinct individuals of each kind. Now, monism will not admit the actuality of fundamental diversity ; it admits no kinds of matter, but only matter which is one kind. It explains the world we live in, either as illusory, or as presenting only an apparent diversity ; at most, it will never concede that diversity is fundamental, that is, specific or essential.

b) TENETS OF MONISM

There exists only one actuality, one existing kind of reality. What this reality is, is variously explained by monists. The materialists call it matter, and the cruder materialists understand by matter a threedimensional (or, modernly, a four-dimensional) substance,—the bodily world of our experience. They say that the world is one great lump of stuff out of which various things are shaped; this stuff is “all there is”; there is nothing non-material in existence, nothing but a matter-world accidentally differentiated. In a word, the world is one pan of dough; the different things in the world are merely differentlyshaped biscuits, but all are of the same dough. More: there is no cook or baker. The dough is self-shaping. In last analysis, then, the solely existing matter must be the Necessary Being or God. Thus, materialistic monism is always pantheism. Indeed, all types of monism are more or less perfectly pantheistic.

Monism has a great variety of expressions, even though it is in itself the foe of real variety. The one actuality is called substance by Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), and it is endowed with infinity of extension and of thought. Fichte (1762-1814) said that the one existing reality is the “Absolute Ego,” or universal J-ness, which becomes aware of its dreams or thoughts or mental images (and these are our bodily world) and then realizes that, after all, these are not different or distinct from itself. Follow- ing upon this vague (and pantheistic) doctrine, von Schelling (1775-1854) made the one actuality a universal reason, and Hegel (1770-1831) made it an indeterminate universal idea. Schopenhauer (1788- 1860) explains the universe as “Will” unfolding and manifesting itself in individual things. Von Hartmann (1842-1906) says the one reality is “The Unconscious” which gradually comes to awareness by “will” and “idea,” and projects the image-individuals which we call the various world. Bergson (1859- ) says the only reality is “becoming” or “duration” and this is brought into actuality by an inner “vital impulse” (élan vital). Spencer (1820-1903) holds that the one reality is “The Absolute” which is also ‘‘The Unknowable,” and reduces the fields of science and philosophy to apparent happenings (phenomena) which reveal themselves as subject to a universal law of evolution.

c) ESTIMATE OF MONISM

It is manifest that the monistic theories mentioned above are, with the exception of crude materialism, theories of unreality. They explain the world by explaining it away. Only the materialists come to grips with a bodily world which is ‘fon its own,” which is actually here in something of the manner in which normal consciousness apprehends it. Of course, materialism cannot stand, for, as we have seen, a bodily reality cannot be self-existing or necessary; it de- mands its causes; it is ens ab alio, not ens a se. And the First Being is necessarily infinite, whereas matter is necessarily finite. For the rest, Spinoza makes matter infinite, and adds to this absurdity a second one, viz., the existence of thought in matter. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and the others, deny the actuality of the world they attempt to explain. They are like the man who should say, “What you see doesn’t exist, but I’ll tell you what it is.”

Monism is an unjustified over-simplification of the problem of reality. It does not come to grips with the problem; it makes solution impossible by denying the terms of the problem. It does not explain; it explains away. Thus it is unreasonable, and therefore unacceptable to scientist or philosopher.

Monism is not only in conflict with reason, but with the data of direct experience which are the foundation of all our knowledge. Any theory that denies the trustworthiness of consciousness and sensation, in their direct and simple findings, cuts all basis from human certitude and leaves us to the insane silence of skepticism.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this brief Article we have defined the term monism and have learned what monists hold to be true about the bodily world which is the material object of cosmology, and the first field of all our knowl-