Nature

The term nature is used in a great variety of meanings. Sometimes it is used to designate the material universe ; thus, when we speak of a thing “existing in nature,” we mean that it is to be found in the bodily world around us. Again, nature is often used to designate all bodily beings except man, and in contrast with man; and here, in special, it means living

creatures, although it does not exclude things lifeless. 288

Thus, when we hear of the “beauties of nature,” we think, first of all, of living things, such as blossoming flowers, singing birds, frost-touched forests; afterwards we think of the floating cloud, the purling stream, the sparkling snow; but we do not think of human beings. Again, nature is used to designate man as contrasted with other bodily things; it is used in the sense of human nature; thus, for example, we say, “’Tis not in nature to command success.” Still again, nature may merely suggest one or more of the tendencies, appetites, or passions of man; the term is used so in the famous line of Horace, Naturam ex pellas furca, tamen usque redibit, “You may drive out nature with a pitchfork, but she will always come back.”

Our use of the term nature (as we shall see when we come to define it accurately) is not altogether alien to all these loose interpretations or applications of the word, but we hold it more strictly in line with the literal and etymological meaning which examination of the term will reveal. For nature is derived from the Latin participle natus “born,” a form of the verb nasci “to be born.” And the nature of a thing suggests what the thing is born for; what it is originated to do; what it exists to accomplish. The nature of a thing is its reality or being considered as equipment for action or operation.

The essence of a thing makes the thing what it ts in its inmost self or constitution. The nature of a thing is this same essence considered as the principle or source of its due and proportionate operations and functions. Nature may be called essence viewed dynamically. When we ask what a thing is, we ask for its essence; when we ask what a thing does or is to do, we ask about its nature. To say that man is a creature composed of body and soul, is to express man’s essence; to say that man is a being that can think and will, see and feel, take nourishment and grow, is to say something of the nature of man. There is a point to remember when we contrast the terms essence and nature. An essence is an absolute thing; it either exists or does not exist, and there an end. But a nature can exist in full and rounded perfection, or in partial perfection only. Thus, a man who is lame and blind has a full and complete human essence, for essence is always full and complete when it exists at all. But the afflicted man has a hampered or defective nature. That is to say, some of his connatural functions cannot be exercised. Still, the nature of a thing is always present (even though hampered in what philosophers call the actus exercitus or “functioning actuality”) as long as its essence is present. In other words, the essence is the fundamental nature, the root-nature, and it is thus the actual source or principle of operations proper to that essence, even when something prevents the actual exercise of such operations. It is a liberty of language which permits us to speak of a hampered or defective nature ; but no such liberty will permit us to speak of a hampered or defective essence.

Things in the material world exist as individuals. Each individual thing has its essence (which makes it what it is) and this essence is the root-principle or basic source of its normal activities (of what it can do) and is, under this aspect, called its nature. Hence, the world is made up of individual natures. But we may speak of bodily individuals (individual essences ; individual natures) in the group, or collectively, and we are justified in this view since there is a great cosmic tendency in which all bodily things harmonize. So viewed, nature takes in the whole material universe, and here nature is not individual but general or universal. Thus we shall have to define nature as individual nature and as general nature.

b) DEFINITION OF NATURE

I. The nature of an individual thing is the first or basic intrinsic principle of its rest and movement. The definition calls for study of each term and phrase.

a) The nature of an individual thing (we may as well say at once, of an individual body) is the first principle of its rest and movement. That is, it is the basic, the radical, the fundamental principle of rest and movement in the body. A body is normally equipped with powers or faculties by means of which it operates or acts and is acted upon. These powers or faculties are the proximate principles of the operations. We call nature the first principle, the remote and radical principle of operation, to distinguish it from these proximate principles. To illustrate: a man walks and sees, fundamentally or in the first place, because he is an essence equipped for such function, that is, because he ts a nature that can exercise these operations. Proximately, however, the act of walking and the act of seeing are exercised by means of the powers with which man’s essence or nature is furnished. Radically, it is the man who walks and sees; proximately, the walking power and the seeing faculty are exercised. A man’s activity comes from the man remotely and fundamentally ; it comes from the man’s powers proximately. Thus, nature has powers and operates by means of powers; it is the first principle of the activity which proceeds from the powers as from proximate principles.

a) The nature of an individual thing (we may as well say at once, of an individual body) is the first principle of its rest and movement. That is, it is the basic, the radical, the fundamental principle of rest and movement in the body. A body is normally equipped with powers or faculties by means of which it operates or acts and is acted upon. These powers or faculties are the proximate principles of the operations. We call nature the first principle, the remote and radical principle of operation, to distinguish it from these proximate principles. To illustrate: a man walks and sees, fundamentally or in the first place, because he is an essence equipped for such function, that is, because he ts a nature that can exercise these operations. Proximately, however, the act of walking and the act of seeing are exercised by means of the powers with which man’s essence or nature is furnished. Radically, it is the man who walks and sees; proximately, the walking power and the seeing faculty are exercised. A man’s activity comes from the man remotely and fundamentally ; it comes from the man’s powers proximately. Thus, nature has powers and operates by means of powers; it is the first principle of the activity which proceeds from the powers as from proximate principles.

b) The nature ofan individual body is the fundamental intrinsic principle of its rest and movement. Its “rest and movement” are its acting and being acted upon. Thus, the nature of a body is the radical principle or source of its operations, of its continuance in a state or condition, of its change to new state or condition. In a word, nature is the rootsource of the activity of a body, and of its operative passivity (that is, its reactive capacity) as well.

b) The nature ofan individual body is the fundamental intrinsic principle of its rest and movement. Its “rest and movement” are its acting and being acted upon. Thus, the nature of a body is the radical principle or source of its operations, of its continuance in a state or condition, of its change to new state or condition. In a word, nature is the rootsource of the activity of a body, and of its operative passivity (that is, its reactive capacity) as well.

c) The nature of an individual body is the funda- mental intrinsic principle of its rest and movement. The external impulse or impact which sends a stone flying through the air is an extrinsic principle of this movement in space. Yet the stone has a nature which can receive and react to such an impulse, and this capacity for receiving and reacting is indwelling in the body in question; it is intrinsic to the body. That a man can walk is owing to a nature equipped with power for this operation; the movement proceeds from a power or faculty indwelling in the man, or intrinsic to the man. A man bound and dragged along undergoes the action of a principle extrinsic to himself. Yet here, as in the case of the stone, it is intrinsic to the man that he has the capacity to undergo such action, though the action as such proceeds from a principle extrinsic to him. The nature of a body is thus bound up with the very being of the body. It is intrinsic to the body. This is clear from the description of nature already given; for we have seen that the nature of a body is the very essence of the body considered as a source of activity, that is, of “rest and movement.”

c) The nature of an individual body is the funda- mental intrinsic principle of its rest and movement. The external impulse or impact which sends a stone flying through the air is an extrinsic principle of this movement in space. Yet the stone has a nature which can receive and react to such an impulse, and this capacity for receiving and reacting is indwelling in the body in question; it is intrinsic to the body. That a man can walk is owing to a nature equipped with power for this operation; the movement proceeds from a power or faculty indwelling in the man, or intrinsic to the man. A man bound and dragged along undergoes the action of a principle extrinsic to himself. Yet here, as in the case of the stone, it is intrinsic to the man that he has the capacity to undergo such action, though the action as such proceeds from a principle extrinsic to him. The nature of a body is thus bound up with the very being of the body. It is intrinsic to the body. This is clear from the description of nature already given; for we have seen that the nature of a body is the very essence of the body considered as a source of activity, that is, of “rest and movement.”

2. General or universal nature is the whole collection of individual natures. It may be defined as the entire complex group of bodily substances inasmuch as these have powers or capacities to produce or undergo determinate effects.

c) BEINGS NATURAL AND NON-NATURAL

1. We contrast things as natural, preternatural, and supernatural. A thing is called natural in so far as it is something normally constituted and equipped in a world of bodily creatures. Thus the term natural applies to the bodily creature itself, to its normal constitution, to its normal powers, and their exercise. We say that water, for example, is a natural bodily substance, that it is formed naturally by the union of its component gases, that it naturally tends to extinguish fire, that it is natural for water to run down hill.—A body or bodily activity is called preternatural (from the Latin praeter “beyond,” and naturalis “natural”) if the mode or manner of its existence is not normal, and not to be accounted for by its own nature or connatural capacity. Thus, it is natural for a wound to heal gradually; it is preternatural for the wound to heal instantaneously. Nature does act to produce healing, but nature is not equipped to act in this abrupt way.—A thing is supernatural (from the Latin super “above,” and naturalis) when it exceeds, in its being, production, or operation, the entire capacity of creatural things. Thus, the coming to life of a dead man is supernatural. Nature does not only not act to produce such a resurrection suddenly; nature does not act to produce such a resurrection at all. The raising of the dead is wholly outside the powers of nature, and indeed goes contrary to these powers. The super- natural is always attributable to Almighty God, directly acting or acting through the instrumentality of creatures. Extraordinary and non-natural events and activities may be attributable to spiritual creatures, God so permitting, but these phenomena are never supernatural; they are preternatural. The preternatural may also be due to direct intervention of God.

2. We contrast the natural and the artificial. A natural object or activity has its being by reason of the constitution and powers of creatures, apart from the play or influence of human free-choice. In a limited sense, such object or activity is necessitated. Thus, it js natural for a tree to grow, for water to quench fire, for fire to consume dry wood, for the blood to circulate, for eyes open in daylight to see. An artificial object or activity is one produced by human art or skill, and it involves in its making at least a measure of human free-choice. Thus, a baseball or an automobile is an artificial object ; thus, the action of a locomotive is artificial. Thus, a bit of flint is a natural object; the same flint shaped into an arrow-head is, in so far, artificial.

3. We contrast the natural with the compulsory. Here our classification refers to activities considered in their principles or sources. Walking is a natural activity; being dragged along is a forced or compulsory activity. Natural activity proceeds from an intrinsic principle; forced activity, from an extrinsic principle.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this brief Article we have defined nature, after a long approach to the definition through the study of various related uses of the term. We have explained the definition of nature in its individual or particular sense, as well as in its general or universal sense. We have seen that the natural is distingushed from, and contrasted with, the preternatural, the supernatural, the artificial, and the compulsory.

a) MEANING OF Law

a) MEANING OF Law

In its fundamental meaning, a law is a norm or directive instrument to guide the free actions of man.

In this sense it is defined as an ordinance of reason promulgated for the common good by those in charge of a society. It is manifest that, in our treatise on cosmology, we do not speak of law in this original sense; we do not envision, when we talk here of law, the enactment of statutes by kings, parliaments, or councils; we do not treat of directive norms