Dogmatism

Meaning of Dogmatism

Dogmatism is the doctrine of those who make an unqualified affirmation of the existence of certitude.

It is the doctrine that truth can be known with certitude.

The term dogmatism, and its cognates dogma and dogmatic, are derived from the Greek verb dokein, which means “to think.” Thus it appears that there is no etymological ground for the repulsive meaning which attaches to these terms as used in modern casual speech. Most persons of our day think that a dogma is a declaration, defiant and somewhat brutal, which docile persons are expected to accept as truth, without asking for evidence. And a dogmatist, or dogmatic person is currently understood to be a hard-headed (and thick-skulled) individual, equipped with a set of ready-made judgments that are warranted to resist the action of reason. It would come as a surprise, and perhaps as a shock, to the modern mind to find that the hated word dogma is a very mild synonym for thought, and that a dogmatist or dogmatic person is merely a person who thinks. But thought and thinker are the literal translations of dogma and dogmatist. And thought may be true and certain thought, and a thinker may think rightly and validly. So we employ the term dogma to mean a true and certain thought, or, more precisely, that which may be known by true and certain thought as a self-evident truth. And a dogmatist, in our use of the term, is a philosopher who professes the doctrine that certitude is achievable by the human mind.

A dogma is a self-evident truth. That is the meanizing of the term as used in philosophy. In religion, a dogma is an official pronouncement of what belongs to the body of truths and laws delivered by Christ to His Church for the acceptance and belief of all His followers. But for Criteriology, a dogma is a selfevident truth. And dogmatism is the doctrine which maintains that all certitudes are built up upon the ultimate basis of self-evident truths.

Exaggerated and Qualified Dogmatism

I. Exaggerated Dogmatism maintains that it is necessary to begin our study of the possibility and existence of certitude with the assertion of fundamental truths. These truths are self-evident, and hence incapable of demonstration. For demonstration is a proof which manifests a truth by analyzing it and showing it in more simple and elemental terms than those of its complete expression. Demonstration is the setting forth in more evident terms of that which is in itself less evident. But self-evident truths are simple; they cannot be analyzed into terms that are less complex than themselves, for they have no complexity in themselves. There can be nothing more evident than what is self-evident. Hence self-evident truths are incapable of demonstration. A demonstrable truth is one that is not self-evident, but is to be evidenced by demonstration. Thus the truth that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is capable of demonstration, and it is demonstrated by the schoolboy as he works out the theorem step by step and exhibits a detailed proof. His proof is the “demonstration”; it is the detailed analysis of a truth that is not self-evident. A self-evident truth cannot be demonstrated, and it does not need demonstration, for it contains in itself the light of truth which evidences it to the mind. Such a truth needs only to be known, and the knowing mind, in its very act of knowing the truth, sees that it must be so and cannot be otherwise.

The fundamental truths which are necessarily to be accepted before any beginning of the study of certitude can be made, are three, and only three. These truths are: (a) The First Fact, “I exist”; the existence of the thinker must be admitted before we can raise the question as to the value or validity of his thought, (b) The First Principle, “A thing cannot be at one and the same time existent and non-existent.” This is called the Principle of Contradiction.

Unless it be admitted, of what use could our study of certitude be? We might find certitude an existent thing, but, unless we employ the principle of contradiction, it might be non-existent at the same time, and our study would be futile. Unless the principle of contradiction be admitted, no thought has any value, and science perishes, (c) The First Condition> “I can know truth; I can reason validly.” Unless this condition be admitted, our inquiry is fatuous from the start. Of what use will my studies into this quesiztion be, if my studies themselves are without value?

The three primary truths, the three fundamental dogmas, are self-evident truths. Nay, such is their self-evidence that they cannot be denied without being implicitly asserted. If I should say, “I deny the first fact; I deny that I exist,” I should contradict myself and assert my existence, for my statement amounts to this, “I (who am here to make a statement) do not exist (I am really not here).” If I do not exist, how can I make any statement? To deny my existence is to assert it, for I assert myself as existing to make a real denial. Similarly, to deny the principle of contradiction is to assert it. For if I deny that “a thing cannot be at one and the same time existent and non-existent,” I must mean that this state of affairs indicated by my denial is so and not otherwise; I contradict myself; my denial turns into an affirmation of what I deny. Again, to deny the validity of thought is to assert it. For if I say, “I cannot know truth; thought is not valid,” I present that very statement as true and as the expression of valid thought.

Upon the firm basis of the three primary and fundamental truths the philosophy of certitude is built up. True, the existence of certitude cannot be demonstrated without “begging the question,” but it can be proved indirectly by: (a) The fact that all men admit perforce the primary certitudes; (b) The natural tendency of the mind to grasp things with unwaverEXISTENCE OF CERTITUDE 159 ing assent; (c) The requirements of individual and social life which cannot be conducted rationally without recognition of certain facts, certain duties, certain obligations. 2. Qualified Dogmatism does not begin its theory of certitude by asserting incontrovertible truths. It refrains from considering them at the outset, and merely engages in a close study of the acts of the mind, that is to say, those acts that can express truth if it be attainable, vis,, judgments. If the judgments of the mind are found to square with reality, then the validity of thought is inferred from this agreement, this “squaring with facts.” As Cardinal Mercier puts it, “To use a homely comparison, a good digestion is the only proof of the stomach’s ability to digest properly.” So the squaring of the mind’s judgments with reality is the only proof of the mind’s ability to think validly. The mind makes some spontaneous and necessary assents; it is the part of philosophy to examine these assents, to reflect upon them, and to find what force or power is in them to win the unwavering adherence of mind. Reflection will show that certain spontaneous assents are due to the fact that the propositions which express them are identical in subject and predicate, or, subject and predicate are such as to require conjunction. Such propositions (that is, expressions of judgments) are seen by the reflecting mind to be necessary and certain; they are seen to be true; the light of truth is in them and it draws and compels the assent of the mind. In a word, such propositions or judgments are self-evident. Other true and certain judgments that are not spontaneously or necessarily known as such, require demonstration, and demonstration will ultimately show them to be based upon self-evident certitudes.

Whether one favors Exaggerated Dogmatism or Qualified Dogmatism, one sees that the basis of certitude in each system is the same, to wit, evidence, and that the roots of demonstration are the same, viz., self-evident truths.

Of the two systems, Exaggerated Dogmatism (called so by its enemies rather than by those who follow it) seems to be the more forthright and scientific. It begins with a plain assertion of indemonstrable truths, but its assertion is not blind or unwarranted; it is a wholly reasonable assertion. It is the recognition of something that is there, and so undeniably there that denial means assertion. It does not reject, but asserts the need of reflecting upon one’s judgments to discover their motive and objective value. On the other hand, Qualified Dogmatism starts with a great profession of fairness, of neutrality with regard to the primary truths. Yet it assumes them at the outset, no matter how warily it moves to avoid the assumption. If (as in Cardinal Mercier’s “homely example”) a good digestion is the only proof of the stomach’s ability to digest properly, it may be pointed out that there can be no question of digestion or ability to digest unless the existence of the stomach is admitted to begin with, and the possibility of getting food into it. Nor will reflection upon the mind’s acts bring any valuable conclusion, unless the principle of contradiction be tacitly assumed. Nor will it avail to assert the need of reflection if the value and validity of reflection be questioned. The “neutrality” of the Qualified Dogmatist quickly disappears. Indeed, it must be so. Neutrality in this matter is impossible. To be neutral is to be caught “on dead centre.” To be neutral is to render oneself incapable of making a start. To be neutral is to paralyze one’s powers at the outset. And, for the matter of that, to assert neutrality, to say, “One must have no positive position as to the primary truths,” is to make a very definite and positive declaration of position. The exponents of Qualified Dogmatism speak of Exaggerated Dogmatism in a very unfair manner.

They seem to think that the assertion of the primary truths is a piece of unwarranted theorizing divorced from experience. They seem to think that the assertion of the fact of existence is like the assertion of the existence of the stomach by one who has never digested a morsel of food. They appear to regard the assertion of man’s capacity for valid thought as on a par with the assertion of the ability to walk by one who has never used his legs. Nothing could be more unjust; nothing could be less truly critical of the position of Exaggerated Dogmatism.

The Procedure of Dogmatism

A dogma is, as we have said, a self-evident truth.

It is a truth too simple to be further analyzed, and hence it is indemonstrable. But to say that such a truth cannot be demonstrated is not to say that it cannot be proved. It may be proved (but not demonstrated) in two ways. First, by its own luminosity, its own light of truth, which draws and compels the assent of the normal mind. Secondly, it may be proved by the absurdities that follow its denial. Obviously, in studying the truths, it is wise to begin with simple self-evident truths. This procedure does not “beg the question” (that is, does not assume as proved at the outset the very thing to be proved). It is a justified procedure, for it recognizes the requirements of rational life that must be taken into account before we can even begin to study the question of certitude. Even the skeptic who denies the existence of scientific or philosophical certitude admits the existence of common or vulgar certitude by which one is aware of one’s own existence and of the ordinary facts and experiences of life. The skeptic denies, however, that this common or vulgar certitude has the character of true certitude, and he reduces it to a mere working probability. It is precisely here that the Scholastic (the Dogmatist) differs from the skeptic. The Scholastic asserts that in many instances vulgar certitude has the right to the name of true certitude. He argues that it is wholly inconsistent and unscientific to deny the character of scientific certitude to that which is so simple that it cannot be demonstrated by analysis into elements more simple than itself. Surely, the whole drive and effort of proof is towards laying bare the solid foundations of knowledge. And surely the quest for detailed proof leads at the last to that which is not resolvable into further details. We begin with self-evident truths. We assert that these are true certitudes. We base our assertion upon the argument that such truths are seen by the reflecting mind to be inevitable, that they contain in themselves the light of objective truth, which compels the assent of the mind, which makes the mind see them. We base our assertion upon the further argument that it is impossible to deny such truths, for the very denial amounts to an affirmation.

Some certitudes, then, are self-evident and inevitable. But most certitudes are not of this character.

Sometimes the evidence is truly in the truth or certitude, but requires analysis and demonstration to bring it to view. So, in addition to the truths that are immediately self-evident, we have a second class of truths whose evidence is mediate, but still internal to the truths. Such a truth is well exampled by our familiar mathematical theorem, viz., the angles of a triangle are equal to 180°. The young student of geometry does not see the necessary truth of this theorem at the outset. He must work it out; he must prove it, moving with careful and connected steps; in a word, he must demonstrate it. Once the demonstration is made and fully understood, it is impossible for the mind to withhold its assent. And it is obvious that the mind does not yield its assent by reason of the authority of teacher or text-book; it is equally clear that the mind is not merely following a bent or bias. The mind yields its assent to the truth because it sees that the truth is there. It yields its assent in a true certitude-judgment, because it has objective evidence, evidence which not only invites, but compels its assent. The mind sees the objective truth just as truly as one sees the contents of a wrapped-up parcel that is opened and cleared of its wrappings in daylight.

In self-evident truths, and in truths which are demonstrated by the laying bare of their internal evidence through demonstration, the mind yields an assent that it is impossible to withhold. Now, to deny value to this necessity of our rational nature, this necessity of assenting to what is intellectually apprehended as objectively true, would be to destroy all possibility of discussing this or any other question. All science, and all scientific inquiry, rest squarely upon the fact of the consistency of nature, a consistency not blindly asserted, but hourly expeEXISTENCE OF CERTITUDE 165 rienced as a fact. And nature would be utterly inconsistent if she imposed upon us the necessity of living a rational life and at the same time imposed the further necessity of assenting irrationally to falsity and illusion in the guise of certitude.

To proceed. Some certitudes are neither self-evident truths nor truths demonstrable by laying bare of mediate but internal evidence. Some certitudes are the fruit of external evidence. When we assent with certitude to a historical fact, such as the discovery of America by Columbus in 1492, we do so by reason of objective but external evidence. There is nothing in the statement, “America was discovered by Columbus in 1492,” to warrant or require our immediate assent. Nor will any analysis of the proposition show it to be the expression of objective truth. This is something that we accept on authority; upon testimony, But where is the evidence of authority? We can accept nothing as a certitude without evidence, and evidence does not consist in the fact that somebody or anybody has said that a thing is so. No, the evidence is found in the bases of the authority. If it can be known that this statement, “America was discovered by Columbus in 1492,” is made by one who: (a) knows whereof he speaks; (b) is a truth-teller; (c) has no present motive to depart from his truthfulness and deceive us; (d) has expressed himself in a plain and unmistakable manner, then the mind can assent confidently and can have true certitude.

And if the statement be the enunciation of an important fact, well known to many, and amply warranted by many reliable documents or witnesses, the mind gives assent all the more readily. Yet the certitude is not metaphysical; such a degree is impossible in the case. It is true moral certitude, based upon the objective evidence found in the reliability of the testimony rendered, and in the practical impossibility of deception.

Finally, there are some certitudes in which the unwavering assent of mind is given by a still more indirect sort of evidence than that which lies back of authority. This is the evidence of the imprudence of doubt. In this case the bases of authority are not manifested, but there is sufficient reason shown in the situation and its circumstances to indicate that doubt would be silly, and that the firm assent of mind should be yielded. If you inquire of a passing citizen the way to a public building in his city, it is indeed possible that he should misinform you. Yet you accept his word unhesitatingly, provided he appears to know perfectly what you ask him, and provided his manner is not that of a practical joker, and there appears to be no reasonable motive for trickery or deception. From the situation and its circumstances you conclude that it would be imprudent to doubt, and the normal reaction of your mind to the information given is that of unhesitating assent. Your certitude is, of course, moral certitude. The evidence for your certain judgment is indirect; it is not found in the truth to which you assent; it is not found indirectly in your knowledge of the sound bases of authority which gives testimony; it is found indirectly in the fact that doubt in the circumstances would be imprudent.

In all these cases we have investigated we have seen that the ultimate motive of certitude is evidence, not bias of mind, not slavish acceptance of somebody’s word, but the objective and manifest presence of truth, which is evidence.

What of error, the so-called “false certitude”? We have already instanced the causes of error, and we have found them, in all cases, to be things extrinsic to the mind itself. The mind of man tends towards truth. Man naturally wants to know, and he is not satisfied with any sort of information, but wants truth. The child may be satisfied with the story of Santa Claus as a true story; he may accept his father’s statement that the moon is made of green cheese as a statement of truth. But he would not be satisfied with these mistaken bits of information if he knew them to be mistaken. It is because he accepts them as true that his mind is satisfied. The natural tendency and appetite of the mind is, we repeat, for truth. Hence, when the mind assents unwaveringly to what is not true, the cause of the, error is not to be found in the natural tendency and function of the mind itself, but, as we have seen, in the misuse of the mind, in precipitate judgment, in passions that bias, in confused knowledge, in defective organs of sense, in personal susceptibilities, and so on.

It is clear, then, that our certitudes are based objectively outside the mind (on evidence), and are not due to any beht or bias of the mind, nor to blind acceptance of authority. On the other hand, it is equally clear that mistakes and errors are accounted for by accidentals and circumstances of cognition, and are not ascribable to the native power of the mind itself.

Therefore, Dogmatism is justified in asserting the existence of true certitude. Dogmatism is justified in presenting the following scientific conclusion: The mind has no natural tendency to error, but is capable of achieving true certitude based in all cases on objective evidence.

One final word: Let it not be supposed that Dogmatism holds the mind capable of knowing all truth with certitude. Only the Infinite Mind is capable of that. The question of Criteriology is not: “Can man know everything with certitude?” but: “Can man know anything with certitude?” The answer of Dogmatism is: “Yes, man can know such truths as it is possible for him to know, with certitude.”

Summary Of The Article

In this article we have defined Dogmatism as a philosophical doctrine. We have distinguished ExagEXISTENCE OF CERTITUDE 169 gerated and Qualified Dogmatism. We have outlined the procedure of Dogmatism in arriving at certitude, and have found the procedure justified. In the articles that follow we shall evidence the inadequacy of doctrines opposed to Dogmatism, and we shall find the falsity of these doctrines an indirect argument and proof for the truth of Dogmatism.