Relativism

a) meaning of relativism Relativism is the doctrine of those who deny that the human mind can know absolute, necessary, changeless truth, and who assert that truth changes for times and persons and places. Hence a thing is true only in relation to its temporal, personal, or local circumstances.

The term relativism is indefinite, and may be used in a variety of meanings. Thus the Agnostic is a sort of relativist when he asserts that we can have certitude only in relation to, or relative to, a limited field, viz., sense-findings or conscious states. Thus Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and his followers are relativistic, inasmuch as they teach that we cannot know things, but only appearances of things which filter into the mind through mental molds that shape and qualify them; truth is relative to the constitution of the mind. Thus the ancient Protagoras (5 century b. c.), who taught that “man is the measure of all,” is a relativist, inasmuch as he makes truth relative to the individual judging things as he apprehends them. We employ the term Relativism in our present study as the doctrine defined in the first sentence of this article. Relativism denies that there can be any knowledge, any certitude, that is everlastingly true. Even the truth that two and two make four may not have been always so, may not be so in future, may not be so even now in places other than this earth.

Perhaps the spread of Relativism may be attributed to the general favor which has been extended to an all-embracing theory of evolution. Evolution means growth, expansion, improvement, progress. Truth itself cannot have been stagnant in this gloriously progressive world. Such is the gratuitous assumption that is present, consciously or not, in many modern minds when they come to the consideration of any problem whatever. Now the theory of Evolution, or more properly, of Transformism, has not been proved, even for biology; certainly it can have no significance, proved or unproved, in the field of mental philosophy.

Another source of the favor with which Relativism has been received is doubtless to be found in the welter of doctrines that have come to be known collectively as Modernism> and which have for their core and centre the notion that all things must be “brought up to date” and “expressed in terms consonant with modern progress and modern advance in science.” Thus, truth itself is to have a continuously renewed “restatement,” which means that truth is growing and changing. One modern theory of such growth and change is Pragmatism, chief exponent of which was William James (1842-1910), American psychologist and philosopher. Pragmatism (sometimes called Humanism> although not to be confused with the earlier Humanism of the Renaissance, nor with the new Humanism of More and Eliot) teaches that truth is determined by its consequences for human life and action, and that that is true “which works.” But that which “works” for one may not “work” for another; and that which “works” to-day may not have “worked” yesterday, and may not “work” to-morrow. Hence Pragmatism proposes truth as relative.

Now there is a true sense in which truth may be called relative. It is relative, inasmuch as one may learn more and more of it, and hence may progress, i8o CERTITUDE and grow, and change in one’s mental equipment. But this is not saying that what is true can become false, or what is false can become true, or what is known with metaphysical certitude as an absolute truth can ever have been different or can ever become different.

This is not a growth in truth, but a growth in knowledge of truth.

Criticism of Relativism

Relativism is wholly inadmissible, and this upon three counts: it is self-contradictory; it stands in conflict with reason; its arguments are not sound.

1. Relativism is self-contradictory. Relativism is offered as a true philosophical doctrine. But Relativism is a doctrine that maintains that all truth changes. Hence, Relativism itself must change. It may cease to be true; it may have long since ceased to be true; certainly some day it will cease to be true.

Hence, Relativism is a theory that destroys itself.

If the Relativist insists that his doctrine is constant and absolute, then he is no longer a Relativist, for he has admitted the unchanging character of at least one truth—something that Relativism, will not allow him to do. We, therefore, reject Relativism as selfcontradictory in teachirig as an unchangingly true doctrine that all truth changes. 2. Relativism conflicts with reason. Indeed, reasoning becomes impossible if Relativism is admitted.

For reasoning depends upon the constant and unEXISTENCE OF CERTITUDE 181 changing value of ideas, of mental terms. Unless I know what “truth” means, and must always mean, how can I discuss the relativity of truth? How can I even assert that truth changes, if I have no constant and unchanging idea of what it is that changes? And how can I talk of “change,” unless I know the absolute meaning of the verb “to change” ? How can I say that what was false may become true, if I have no unchanging concept of what is meant by false and true? And if I do not know the absolute and unchanging meaning of good and evil, how can I speak of one changing into the other ?

Again, there are truths which the mind recognizes and expresses in judgments that are absolute, necessary, unchanging. In the ideal order, we have judgments such as, “The whole is greater than its part”; “A thing cannot be at once existent and nonexistent” ; “An effect demands an adequate cause or sum of causes.” In these judgments reason apprehends the predicate as something demanded by the very nature of the subject, and hence as something always predicable of that subject, and of unchanging necessity predicable of that subject. Yet this manifest requirement of reason is contradicted by Relativism.

In the order of concrete fact there are judgments such as “This is a hot day,” or “The fire burns brightly,” in which the predicate is exacted by the subject by necessity of fact. That the day grows cooler towards evening, that the fire presently burns low, does not give the lie to the fact that, at the moment of actual and justifiable predication, the fire does burn brightly, and the day is hot. Such judgments, if true at all, are hypothetically changeless, that is, they are changeless in the actual circumstances of the predication. Thus, if to-day is hot, it will be forever and forever true that to-day was hot. A short time ago I could have said with truth, “Herbert Hoover is President of the United States/’ At the present time I cannot make the same statement with truth. Does this mean that truth changes ? Not at all. It only means that concrete facts—and Presidents—change. The statement was true when made, and it will be forever true, given the conditions at the time of its utterance. The statement really means: “At a point of tirtte (which is now for the speaker, to come for ages past, and then for subsequent times) Herbert Hoover is President.” No one denies that there is change in things; indeed, there is nothing in this world of concrete contingent realities that does not change; all things,in our bodily universe have their origin, their cessation; their time of waxing and of waning; their exits and their entrances. But there is no change, the^e can be no change, in truth. Once true, forever true. Relativism stands in contradiction to this doctrine; this doctrine is a requirement of reason; therefore, Relativism stands in opposition to reason, and is inadmissible. 3. Relativism rests upon unsounfy arguments.

Some of these arguments have been considered in the preceding paragraph. Relativists aver that such a judgment as “This is a hot day” is true for the speaker at the moment it is uttered, but is not true for him very long, for the day grows cooler; nor is it true for all men, for some men live in cold regions.

We have seen the invalid character of this argument.

The statement is true by necessity of fact, and the fact is determined by the circumstances and material conditions of the moment the judgment is uttered.

The change in these circumstances, and the contemporaneous existence of different circumstances, make no difference at all in the changeless truth that “here and now, it is a hot day.” Again, Relativism illogically assumes that truth is an evolutionary development.

We have seen that truth is conformity of things (in changeless essence or in hypothetically changeless concrete fact) with the unerring Divine Mind (ontological truth}, and in the conformity of the created mind with things in their changeless essence or hypothetically changeless fact (logical truth}. There is no room in the concept of truth for evolutionary development and change. The arguments of Relativism are in conflict with reason, in conflict with fact, and based on unwarranted assumptions. Therefore, Relativism is to be rejected as inadmissible.

The special form of Relativism called Pragmatism has a peculiar interest for the student of Criteriology.

Pragmatism makes the truth of matters of morality and religion depend upon their utility in relation to life and its requirements and conveniences. Such a doctrine is not only unscientific, but subversive of all order and decency, of all virtue and peace. Pragmatism as a theory stands refuted with Relativism, and we need no further arguments to disprove it. But we do need to notice it. We need to be on guard against its horrible and insidious influence on our own lives.

Let us keep clear minds; let us realize that truth is changeless, “the eternal years of God are hers,” and that duty does not die. What is right and good now, has always been right and good, and always will be right and good. What is wrong now, has always been wrong, and always will be wrong. The Relativist, the Pragmatist, the Modernist, the Evolutionist, are preaching to us, and writing for us, and shouting at us, that certain things are needed “in our times,” and that it is right and moral and good to practice birthcontrol, to advocate sterilization of criminals, to ease the burden of the marriage bond. They tell us that these things are required by “society” of the present day; that the religion and morality suitable to our times has freed itself of “outworn dogmas” and is being adapted to “the newest discoveries of science.” All this is fundamentally false, and its acceptance is working untold evil in the world to-day, even among many that call themselves Catholics. The Catholic student must be equipped to destroy these faulty and futile arguments and to drive their protagonists from their false position. Truth in morality and religion is one and the same for all ages; it is forever and forever true. It depends on no necessity of concrete fact, but has the unchanging necessity of necessary judgments of the ideal order. As such, it is to be defended against the degraded attacks of the Relativist under whatever name he may present himself—Indifferentist, Modernist, Social Scientist, Humanitarian, or what you will.

There is another point of signal importance to be noted here. There is a good deal of befuddled and dangerous thinking that arises from the relativistic notion that one’s own viewpoint makes a difference in objective truth. How often do we hear such expressions as, “I don’t look at it in that way,” or “I can’t see that at all.” Now, where certitude is available, one’s opinion (that is to say, one’s “view”) makes no difference at all; it counts not a fig, not a farthing.

The question that should concern the sincere thinker is not a question of mere “viewpoint,” but of truth.

One should not be wedded to a point of view, but to a point of fact, or rather, to a point of truth.

Summary Of The Article

In this article we have defined Relativism, and have indicated the forms in which Relativism may appear in philosophy: Modernism, Humanism, Pragmatism.

We have indicated the sense in which truth may be said to be relative, and have shown how far removed Relativism is from this reasonable position. We have examined the tenets of Relativism and have found them in conflict with reason. We have mentioned the prevalence of Pragmatism on matters of morality and religion, and have seen that this is a great evil that the student of Criteriology must steadily combat.