The Voluntariness of Human Acts

a) Kinds or Degrees of Voluntariness

i. Perfect and Imperfect—Perfect voluntariness is present in the human act when the agent (i. e., the doer, performer, actor) fully knows and fully intends the act. Imperfect voluntariness is present when there is some defect in the agent’s knowledge, intention, or in both. Thus, a deliberate lie is a perfectly voluntary act; while a lie of exaggeration in a lively narrative, in which the narrator, full of the story, adverts only partly, or in passing, to the fact that he may be stretching matters a little, is a human act imperfectly voluntary. ii. Simple and Conditional.—Simple voluntariness is present in a human act performed, whether the agent likes or dislikes doing it. Conditional voluntariness is present in the agent’s wish to do something other than that which he is actually doing, but doing with repugnance or dislike. Example: The commander of a distressed vessel lightens cargo by throwing valuable merchandise overboard. He wills to do it, and does it, and the act is simply voluntary. Still, he dislikes doing it, and would not do it if there were any other way of escaping shipwreck. He wishes to keep the goods, but the wish is an inefficacious will-act, for, as a matter of fact, he does not keep the goods, but throws them away. In this inefficacious will-act, there is conditional voluntariness. Inasmuch as the inefficacious will-act influences the efficacious act, the latter is said to be involuntary. Hence, the act of throwing away valuable goods is simply voluntary and conditionally involuntary. iii. Direct and Indirect.—Direct voluntariness is present in a human act willed in itself. Indirect voluntariness is present in that human act which is the foreseen result (or a result that coidd and should have been foreseen) of another act directly willed. Exam-’ pie: A man kills a rabbit for dinner. He directly wills the act of killing as a means to an end to be achieved, viz., the dinner. He also directly wills the dinner as the end to be achieved by this means. We have direct voluntariness in each aspect of the act. Now suppose the rabbit was a tame animal that had played about the man’s grounds and had given his children pleasure. The man knows that by killing the rabbit he will deprive his children of pleasure and cause them sorrow. This, indeed, he does not directly will, but, inasmuch as this is the foreseen consequence of his directly willed act, he wills it indirectly, or in its cause. In other words, he directly wills the cause of his children’s sorrow, and thus indirectly wills the sorrow itself. A human act that is directly willed is called voluntary in se (i. e., in itself), while a human act that is indirectly willed is called voluntary in causa (i. e., in its cause). Indirect voluntariness is a subject of first importance, and we shall study it in detail in the second section of this present Article. iv. Positive and Negative.—Positive voluntariness is present in a human act of doing, performing. Negative voluntariness is present in a human act of omitting, refraining from doing. Examples: A Catholic goes to Mass on Sunday (positive voluntariness). A Catholic deliberately misses Mass on Sunday (negative voluntariness).—Of course, when a person omits an act, he must really be doing something positive. But the special positive thing that he does is not of the essence of the omission as such. Thus, the man who remains away from Mass on Sunday omits a duty; but, while remaining away from Mass, he must really be doing something—lying abed, reading the morning paper, walking about, playing a game, eating his breakfast, or doing any one of an indefinite number of possible things. But the point is that no special and particular positive act, or series of acts, enters into the essence of the omission, for this consists simply in willing not to do an act. v. Actual, Virtual, Habitual, and Interpretative.— iActual voluntariness (or actual intention) is present in a human act willed here and now. Virtual voluntariness (or virtual intention) is present in a human act done as a result of (or in virtue of) a formerly elicited actual intention, even if that intention be here and now forgotten. Habitual voluntariness (or habitual intention) is present in a human ac.t done in harmony with, but not as a result of, a formerly elicited and unrevoked actual intention. Interpretative voluntariness (or interpretative intention) is that voluntariness which, in the judgment of prudence and common-sense, would be actually present if opportunity or ability for it were given. Examples:

(a) A man makes the morning offering. He actually, here and now, intends to live for God, and to serve Him in all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the day. The act of offering is an actual intention; it is a will-act in which there is actual voluntariness.

(b) A man makes the morning offering, but during the day he completely forgets it. Nevertheless his day is without sin which would contradict his pious intention, and we say that the power or virtue of the intention endures, and that, as a result of the intention, all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the day are really done for God. The man takes breakfast, goes to work, attends to business duties, spends time in recreation, etc. In all these acts he has no actual (“here and now” ) intention of doing them for God, but he has the virtual intention of so doing them. Hence all the acts that the man performs throughout the day—even those that are in themselves acts of man—are human acts of service by reason of their virtual voluntariness.

(c) A man makes the actual intention of becoming a Catholic. Years pass, and he does not carry out the intention; neither does he revoke it. He is taken suddenly ill, and lies unconscious at death’s door. A priest administers Baptism. Here the act of receiving the sacrament is in agreement with the actual intention once made and unrevoked, and the man is said to have a habitual intention for that act. The act, however, is not the result of the original actual intention, for the virtue or power of that intention cannot reasonably be presumed to endure throughout a long period of neglect and unfulfillment. For, if one makes an intention of doing a thing, and fails to do it throughout years of continuous opportunity for its accomplishment, it is obvious that the virtue or power of the original intention is null. Still, as long as the original intention is not revoked, it remains with its author, and is worn, so to speak, like a forgotten portion of his dress or habit, powerless actively to produce a result, but remaining as the mark or symbol of an attitude of mind. It is a mark of habitual voluntariness.

(d) A person known to be unbaptized is unconscious and in danger of death. No knowledge is available of his habitual inclination or disinclination for the act of receiving the sacrament of Baptism. The sacrament is nevertheless administered. Here the act of receiving ithe sacrament is prudently presumed to be in line with the will of the recipient, so that, if he could but know its great value, he would certainly wish to receive it. Thus is his will interpreted by sound common-sense. In the act of receiving the sacrament the man is said to’ have an interpretative intention. Such an intention, then, is an intention that may be prudently presumed, not indeed as present, but as an intention that would be present if proper knowledge and freedom were available to him in whom it is presumed.—Similarly, infants are baptized, and the receiving of the sacrament is in them a human act, by reason of interpretative voluntariness.—Again, the small boy who has literally to be carried to school and kept there against his will, has an interpretative intention of going to school. For parents and teachers know that, if the lad could but realize the value of schooling, he would certainlv will to attend.

b) Indirect Voluntariness

Indirect voluntariness, or voluntariness in cause, is present in that human act which is an effect, foreseen or foreseeable, of another act directly willed. We have not yet made a detailed study of the moral character of human acts nor of their consequent imputability. But we have seen that human acts are acts under the free control of the will. It is clear that, since the will controls such acts, the will is responsible for them. In other words, human acts are imputable (as worthy of praise or blame, reward or punishment) to their author. Now the moment we bring together the matters of indirect voluntariness and imputability, two supremely important ethical questions present themselves. The questions are: i. When is the agent (doer, actor, performer) responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed? ii. When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, which has two effects, one good, one evil?

i. The First Question: When is an agent responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed?—The agent is responsible for such an effect when three conditions are fulfilled, viz.: (1) The agent must be able to foresee the evil effect, at least in a general way. (2) The agent must be free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil effect. (3) The agent must be morally bound not to do that which is the cause of the evil effect. This is an ethical principle of great moment. Let the student apply it in the following cases:

(a) Michael knows that if he drinks liquor, he will drink to excess, and will use blasphemous language, which will scandalize those that hear it. He declares, and truly enough, that he hates intemperance, and that he dreads the evils of blasphemy and scandal. Nevertheless he drinks liquor, and the foreseen evils occur.

How far is Michael responsible for these evil effects ? When does he incur their guilt?

(b) John says, “If I go to the meeting and hear Jones say sharp things about our party, I know I’ll lose my head and reveal some very damaging facts about Jones’ career that I alone know.” John goes to the meeting; the evil of detraction follows. Determine John’s responsibility, and the moment at which his guilt is imputed to him.

(c) Mary knows that by persistent companykeeping with a non-Catholic she will encourage the weak-willed Jane to a similar course and to the consequent danger of an invalid marriage; for Jane idolizes Mary and imitates her in every way. Mary believes, foolishly but sincerely, that she herself is in no danger, but she is keenly aware of the danger in which Jane is placed through her example. Nevertheless she persists. Jane imitates, and eventually commits the sin of an attempted marriage outside the Church. How far is Mary to blame? Why?

(d) Thomas has been repeatedly warned by prudent persons against attendance at a secular university, and he has been shown that he will there encounter grave dangers to his faith. He declares, in foolish pride, that nothing can shake his faith. He attends the university, gradually loses his fervor, and becomes but a nominal Catholic. At what time does his lapse become imputable to him ? Why ?

(e) Timothy goes to bed on Saturday night, forgetting to set the alarm. Before falling asleep he recalls the omission, but he does not rise to adjust the clock. He knows that he is a very heavy sleeper, and that he will probably not awake in time for Mass on Sunday. This is precisely what happens. When does Timothy incur the guilt of missing Mass? Why?

(f) The same Timothy deliberately neglects the clock on another Saturday night. But, contrary to all his experience, he awakes in time for Mass on Sunday morning, and he attends very devoutly. Does Timothy have any fault in the matter ? Why ?

(g) Again, Timothy deliberately neglects to set the alarm on Saturday night. Again, by an almost miraculous repetition of the unexpected, he awakes in time for Mass on Sunday. But, he reasons, since he has already missed Mass in cause, there is now no obligation incumbent upon him of attending. He stays at home and does not hear Mass. —Here Timothy was altogether wrong. He willed an evil in cause, and his will-act stopped there. Through no merit of his own, the cause failed to function as a cause, and he awoke in time for Mass. Now, by a new and direct will-act he wills to miss Mass. Here is a new evil, directly willed.

In the foregoing cases we see that the agent is bound to avoid the cause of the evil effect, and his obligation arises from the very fact that the effect is evil. Why, then, did we list three conditions for the imputability of evil willed in cause? Why not simply say that two conditions are requisite for such imputability, viz., that the agent he able to foresee the evil effect, and that he be free to avoid the cause ? Is not the fact that the effect is evil always a prohibition obliging the agent to refrain from the cause of that evil ? Not always. Sometimes there is a good effect as well as an evil effect proceeding from a single cause. This brings us to the second question:

_ii. The Second Question: When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, from which flow two effects, one good, one evil ? _—One may perform such an act when three conditions are fulfilled, viz.* (i) The evil effect must not precede the good effect. (2) There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect. (3) The intention of the agent must be honest, that is, the agent must directly intend the good effect and merely permit the evil effect as a regrettable incident or “side issue.” To explain these conditions in detail: The evil effect must not precede the good effect. If the evil effect comes ahead of the good effect, then it is a means of achieving the good effect, and is directly willed as such a means. Now it is a fundamental principle of Ethics—a clear dictate of sound reason—that evil may never be willed directly, whether it be a means or an end to be achieved. We cannot do evil that good may come of it. *The end does not justify the means*.

There is no good, however great, that can justify the direct willing of evil, however slight. If a lie—even a “harmless” lie—will save a life—even an innocent life—that lie may not be told. Notice well that the principle here discussed requires that the evil effect do not precede the good effect; we do not say that the good effect must precede the evil, but that the good effect must either precede the evil or occur simultaneously with it. There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect. If this condition be not fulfilled, there is no adequate reason for the act at all, and the act is prohibited in view of its evil effect. The sufficiency of the reason must be determined by the nature, circumstances, and importance of the act in question, and by the proportion this reason bears to the gravity of the evil effect. The intention of the agent must be honest. If the agent really wills the evil effect, there is no possibility of the act being permissible. Direct willing of evil, as we have seen, is always against reason, and hence against the principles of Ethics. But, unless the agent directly wills the good effect, he is really willing the evil effect—else he has no adequate motive for performing the act at all. Let the student consider the following cases in the light of the principle just explained:

(a) The general of an army storms an enemy city. He foresees that many non-combatants will be killed.

Yet to take the city will be a big step towards winning a just war. Is the general’s act allowable? Notice the two effects here: that taking of the city as a step towards ending the war with victory for the just cause —a good effect; and the killing of non-combatants— an evil effect.

(b) The general of an army knows that by laying waste the farms of the enemy’s country, he will seriously inconvenience the enemy by cutting off the source of supplies. At the present time the enemy is well supplied, but destruction of the crops will destroy future supplies. Such destruction will mean present starvation to many a farmer and his family, but ultimately it will help win a just war. May the general lay waste the farm-lands ?

(c) In view of your answer to the foregoing question, would you justify or condemn the havoc wrought by Sherman in his march to the sea ?

(d) A doctor can save a mother’s life by destroying that of her child. May he do so? Why not?

(e) A child’s life can be saved by destroying the life of the mother. May this be done? Why not?

(f) A patient is dying in awful agony. Medical relief there is none. Life cannot last beyond a few hours at most. May a drug be administered to bring death quietly and quickly ? Why not ?

(g) A student of very frail health has been promised a lucrative position upon graduation. He needs the situation to support his aged and impoverished parents. He knows he must study hard, else he will fail in his examinations, lose his degree, and, in consequence, will not secure the promised position. Still, he is aware that earnest study may seriously impair his health. May he study hard and run the risk of permanent infirmity?

Summary of the Article

In this Article we have studied the subject of voluntariness in human acts.’ We have distinguished voluntariness as perfect and imperfect; simple and conditional; direct and indirect; positive and negative; actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. We gave special study to the subject of indirect voluntariness, stating and exemplifying two important ethical principles, viz., i. the Principle of Imputability of Evil Indirectly Willed, and 2. the Principle of Imputability of a Twofold Effect.

By the modifiers of human acts we mean the things that may affect human acts in the essential qualities of knowledge, freedom, voluntariness, and so make them less perfectly human. Such modifiers lessen the moral character of the human act, and consequently diminish the responsibility of the agent. There are five modifiers of human acts that call for