The Ultimate End of Human Acts

a) The Objective Ultimate End of Human Acts

A human act is a deliberate and knowing act; it is an act performed by the knowing agent who wills to perform it. And why does he will to perform it? Because he has a motive, a reason, a final cause sufficiently attractive to induce him to perform it. And this reason, motive, or final cause amounts to this: it appears good to the agent to perform the act and attain its end. Even when the human act is difficult or undesirable in itself, it becomes desirable in view of a further end to which it is directed as a means. Thus, a man freely consenting to a serious operation, wills the operation, and his will-act is a human act. But the operation is not willed for itself, but in view of relief from affliction or in the hope of prolonging life, and in this aspect it is desirable and good, no matter how dangerous and fearsome it may be in itself. Now, it may be that the man who submits to the dangerous operation is a poor man; it may be that the prospect of prolonged life which the operation affords is also the prospect of a hard and even destitute life; it may be that the life to which the patient looks forward is a life inevitably filled with woes and miseries. And yet he wants it, he wills it as an end. Why? Because he apprehends life with all its hardships as a greater good than the loss of life. Again, the suicide (supposing him sane when he penforms his horrible act) destroys life by a human act. He does so because he apprehends the cessation of life as a greater good than the continuance of life with its miseries. Thus it clearly appears that human acts are always done for an end apprehended as good, and as the greater good when there is question of sacrificing one thing in view of another. More: the driving power back of human acts viewed all together—or, more accurately, the power of attraction that calls human acts into being—is not only the good, or the greater good, but the greatest good, the absolutely illimitable, all-inclusive, and allperfect good. This is the summum bonum, which, considered in itself, we call the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts. It will not be difficult to prove this assertion. Man seeks happiness. Whether he seeks it in riches, in pleasures, in power, in prominence, in honors attained, or even in license and sin, the fact remains that what he is seeking is that which will please him, that which will satisfy his wants and desires, that, in one word, which will make him happy. This quest of happiness is a tendency of man’s very nature of which he finds it utterly impossible to free himself. Man is free in his choice of objects in which he hopes to find happiness, and we call this the freedom of the will, or the freedom of choice; but man is not free to seek unhappiness for its own sake. Even the “cantankerous” individual who does mean things in a mean way, and hurts himself in doing them, and, so to speak, cuts off his nose to spite his face, is nevertheless doing what he wants to do, and in the achieving of that want he apprehends some satisfaction; otherwise, there could be no conceivable motive for the acts, and motive there must be, for the acts exist. Now, there is an object towards which the whole tendency of human action is ever directed; an object that will satisfy all tendency, fill up all capacity for desire, leave nothing further that can be the end of human acts. And this we call the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts. We may define this end as that object, the possession of which will give perfect happiness to man by completely filling up his capacity for desire, and leaving nothing unpossessed toward which man could, by any possibility, continue to tend as towards an end. This absolutely ultimate objective end must be one, must be a single object. For consider: this end is so perfect a good that nothing beyond it can be desired. Therefore, it must be the infinite good. Nothing finite could meet the requirements of such an end. The greatest happiness thinkable, short of the possession of the infinite good, is imperfect and fleeting. The largest fortune might still be larger; the serenest peace of life must quickly give place to care or be lost in death; the highest honors man may achieve leave other honors still unwon. And over all human achievements, over the bliss of abounding health and the rapture of the presence of loved ones, over fame attained and glory worthily won, over ambition fulfilled and high hope realized—over all that is finite hangs a cloud, a menace, a threat that is certainly to be fulfilled: all must pass—and soon! Hence all finite good is imperfect, if only that it will not last always. But it is imperfect also in scope, in extent. A finite thing is, by its very definition, a thing with limits. ‘Can any limited thing satisfy in fullest measure of perfection the unlimited desires of man? No, for these pass all bounds; there is no line that can be drawn to mark the limit of the possibility of desire. Only the infinite good can be the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts. And there can be but one infinite object. For an infinite object contains all possible perfection, and there is, so to speak, no perfection left over for another object to possess. Hence we rightly maintain that the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts is one. Now the infinite good is God. Ethics must leave to the philosophical science of Theodicy (i. e., Natural Theology) the proof of the existence of the one God, infinitely perfect, creator, conserver, and ruler of the universe, the efficient and final cause of all. Ethics assumes the existence and attributes of God as proved. We assert that the infinite good is God; that God is the only object, the possession of which will give perfect happiness to man by completely filling up his capacity for desire, and leaving nothing unpossessed toward which man could, by any possibility, continue to tend as towards an end. Hence we see that St. Augustine enunciated a solid philosophical truth, and not a mere pious sentiment, when he wrote: “O God, Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is not at rest until it rests in Thee.” But, you object, there is such a thing as sin, and such a thing as sinful desire. Does the sinner tend in his human act of sin toward God? Is sinful desire to find perfect fulfillment in the possession of the All-Perfect? Of course, the sinner does not tend towards God, nor is sinful desire as such satisfied with possession of the All-Perfect—to say so would be foulest blasphemy. Yet the sinner, in his human act of sin, does not exhibit a tendency away from what is apprehended as good; on the contrary, the very sin is a tendency toward that which is, through perversion of reason, adjudged as good, as satisfying. The sinner knows that his act is evil; but passion invites, immediate satisfaction is promised, the fleeting pleasure of his act is ready at hand; the true good is not perceived as ready, prompt, present; it is farther off; it presents certain difficulties, not only in the matter of waiting longer for its satisfaction, but also in the effort required to put down the present allurement which draws to sin. And so the matter is put to the judgment of the agent; and, judging freely that the present satisfaction outweighs the remote real satisfaction, he sins. Of course the judgment is perverse; but the point here is that the sinner does not tend away from the good—and the ultimate good —as such, but wrongly judges that the present object is good. And he is responsible for this judgment, and so sin is no mere mistake. Remember that the tendency of the human agent is towards the good, and the infinite good, in general; but the agent may make perverse judgments about what is good in particular. Psychology clears up this matter in its thesis that “Man is capable of objectively indifferent judgments,” i. e., man can view what is really evil under the aspect of good, and can view what is truly good under the aspect of evil. Thus sin which is foul promises a present pleasure, and in so far may be judged as good; while virtue inasmuch as it is difficult to acquire, may be adjudged as evil. An example will help to clarify the whole matter: Esau, returning hungry from the hunt, and finding himself a long way from home, was able to judge a present dinner as most desirable and good, even though the eating involved the loss of a great and valuable patrimony. He knew the value of his inheritance; he knew that the present dish of paltry food was not to be compared in real value to the smallest part of that inheritance; and still he gave up the patrimony for the food. Why? Because the food was ready, present, alluring, promising satisfaction. By perverse judgment he was able to focus his consideration upon the desirability of that which was present to satisfy bodily appetite, and to turn his mind away from the consideration of the surpassing value of the inheritance that would be his if he denied that appetite. His judgment was wrong, was perverse; yet it was his own fault. And so it was no mere mistake for which he was not responsible. He was fully responsible, as all will admit. While following the inevitable human tendency towards what is good in general, he perversely allowed his attention to dwell upon the attractiveness of what was offered to please and flatter a bodily appetite, and kept his mind from the consideration of the true attractiveness of what was really good, and thus a perverse and culpable judgment fixed upon that as good which was relatively evil, and upon that as evil which was really worth while. Men may set various ends as ultimate by perverse judgment. Some look for the ultimate good in wealth, some in honor, some in pleasure, some in the mere adapting of oneself to one’s environment; and thus there are many objects set up by personal preference (and by wrong judgment) as the really ultimate end towards which all human action tends or should tend. But in all these objects we perceive that it is their good which is attractive, viz., that which is adjudged as good, as satisfying, as ultimately desirable. And hence, while there may be many philosophies of life, many theories about what is the best thing towards which man should bend his efforts, there is, none the less, no disagreement in point of fact: man inevitably tends towards the illimitable good. And in itself, as we have seen, this object is God. When men do not live in accordance with reason, they are perverse; and perversely they set up false gods. Scripture is philosophical and scientific when it declares that those who live for the pleasure of fleshly appetites have made a god of their belly. To sum up: The objective ultimate end of human acts is that which really in itself is the crowning and perfect fulfillment of rational desire; it is the limitless good; it is God. Towards good in general all human action, even sinful human action, tends. But action is sinful by reason of man’s abuse of free will; and sinful action is possible because man may freely focus his attention upon the desirability of that which satisfies minor or inordinate appetites, to the exclusion of that which is supremely desirable and infinitely good in itself.

b) The Subjective Ultimate End of Human Acts

We have learned that the subjective end of an act consists in the possession of the objective end. The name subjective is given to this end to indicate its possession by a subject, that is, by the person who has it or strives to have it. The absolutely ultimate end of human acts, considered in itself or objectively, is the limitless good. The absolutely ultimate end of human acts, considered with reference to the person who strives to possess it (that is, considered with reference to its subject), is the perfect happiness which consists in the possession of the limitless good. In a word, the absolutely ultimate subjective end of human acts is happiness. In considering the objective end of human acts we found it necessary to speak much of happiness. We saw that man acts for happiness in acting for the limitless good which is the objective ultimate end of human action. Here we are to consider happiness more directly, and to discuss the kinds of happiness, the nature of desire for happiness, and the manner in which happiness is to be possessed. But first we must face an obvious difficulty.

The difficulty is this: man, acting in a human manner, is seldom conscious of the fact that he is acting for happiness. The upright man acts virtuously, the sinner acts viciously, the ordinary man lives his ordinary life, without thinking directly of happiness as an end to be attained. How is it possible then to say that man always acts for happiness? We must recall our distinction, made in an earlier chapter, between an actual and a virtual intention. An actual intention is an intention elicited here and now with direct consciousness of that which is intended. Happiness is seldom the object of such an intention; a man seldom, if ever, says to himself: “In this action I intend to achieve happiness.” But a man always acts for happiness, at least by a virtual intention. A virtual intention is an intention which exists in an act performed in virtue of a formerly elicited actual intention. We have seen that man always tends towards the good in general; and his connatural bent of will for the good involves a virtual intention for that good. And as the possession of good means happiness, we conclude that man acts for happiness by a virtual intention. But, it may be said, this sort of virtual intention does not exist by reason of an actual intention formerly elicited. It does, if we consider that an actual intention may be implicit as well as explicit. A man who shoots at a rabbit does not, in order to have an actual intention, require a moment’s pause in which to elicit the will-act of actual intention; he may not be aware of his intention as an intention; he simply does what he wants to do; he simply raises his gun and fires; but we say, and rightly, that his actual intention is implied in his action. And similarly we declare that a man, in his more serious and deliberate actions of life, makes up his mind to do what he adverts to as best, and here, at least implicitly, we have an actual intention to act for good (objective end) and for the possession of the good (subjective end, i. e., happiness). Then, in the less thoughtful acts of life, the virtue of this implicit actual intention endures, and a man’s acts are, in consequence, performed for happiness.

Now we must consider: i. Kinds of happiness; ii. The nature of man’s desire for happiness; iii. The manner in which happiness is to be possessed.

i. Kinds of Happiness—Happiness is natural when it comes of man’s possession of that which he finds achievable by his unaided natural powers, or which is not beyond the reach of his nature. Thus, a man’s happiness in the possession of sound health is natural happiness. Happiness is supernatural when it consists in the possession of that which is of a value surpassing all that natural powers can achieve unaided. Thus, man’s happiness in possessing the grace of God is supernatural. Now, man tends toward the limitless good, and since this is infinite,—and hence beyond man’s finite powers,—man tends toward something which is beyond the reach of unaided nature. Man tends towards supernatural, eternal happiness. The appetite of man’s very nature is for the supernatural. Still, this tendency and appetite for the supernatural is only indicated in Ethics. As a purely rational science, independent of divine revelation, Ethics cannot investigate the matter of supernatural happiness, nor describe the manner in which it is to be attained. But this science can and does show that man’s tendency is to the limitless good, the infinite good, and we know that natural powers can achieve only limited things. Yet, to confine our study within its proper limits, we must consider the limitless good, and happiness in its possession only in so far as this is achievable by natural powers, that is, by the perfect natural life, by a life which fully agrees with the dictates of right reason. ii. The Nature of Man’s Desire for Happiness.— Man’s desire for limitless good, and consequently for perfect happiness, is not illusory; it is not a deceitful and vain desire. It is a desire capable of fulfillment; it is realisable. We may, with St. Thomas, reason to this conclusion in the following manner: Nature does nothing in vain. Now, nature has implanted in man the desire for perfect happiness. Therefore, this desire is not vain; in other words, this desire is realizable.—Again, Ethics may prove the same truth by assuming as demonstrated the facts which are scientifically evidenced in the science of Theodicy. Now,

Theodicy proves that there is one God, the Creator, who is all-wise, and all-good. But an all-wise Creator could not implant in His rational creature a fine and worthy desire that cannot be realized; else the all-wise God would be the author of a futility. Nor could the all-good God mock man by causing him inevitably to desire the unattainable. Hence, we conclude that man’s desire for perfect happiness is not illusory, but is realizable in very fact. We cannot assert that each man will actually attain to perfect happiness; we only declare the scientific truth that each man may attain that happiness. Certainly, this perfect happiness is not attainable in this world here and now; then— since its attainment has been shown possible—it must be attainable in another world hereafter. iii. The Manner in which Happiness is to he Possessed.—Man’s absolutely ultimate subjective end is the act of perfect happiness. Powers or faculties are that by which action is accomplished; the act is the crowning fact, the perfection of the faculty. Now, how is the act of happiness to be exercised ? Man has the following faculties: the senses, intellect, will. The senses are not man’s highest faculties, but serve the intellect during bodily life. All knowledge begins somehow in sensation (i. e., in the act of the senses) for man in bodily life; but sensation is not, in itself, essential to intellectual knowledge as such. Obviously, perfect happiness, as an act, is the act of man’s highest and best faculties. Hence, the essential act of happiness (which, of course, will eventually and in proper measure include the satisfaction of the senses) is not an act of sensation. Nor is it an act of will: for the will either tends towards an end (and then the end is not yet attained) or, by fruition, delights in the end (and then the end is already attained). The act of attainment, the act of happiness, is, in consequence, neither a sense-act nor a will-act. It remains that it must be an act of intellect. But here again we must consider a twofold act of intellect: the intellect either knows a thing to do (practical intellect) and this must be knowledge that leads to an end to be achieved; or the intellect knows a thing to hold in contemplation (speculative intellect). This latter act is the crowning perfection of man’s highest faculty of knowledge. We assert, then, that the ultimate act of perfect happiness is an act of the speculative intellect, it is an act of contemplation of the limitless good; and this act of the intellect willl be accompanied by the delight of the will, and by the perfect satisfaction of the senses according to their proper place, order, and capacity.

Summary of the Article

We have seen in this article that man acts for the attainment of an absolutely ultimate end, and that this end is, objectively, the infinite good or God, and, subjectively, the possession of the limitless good, the possession of God, and that the act of possession is an act of perfect happiness. We have established the truth that man, in every human act, acts for perfect happiness, by at least a virtual intention. We have defined two kinds of happiness, have seen that man’s desire for perfect happiness is not a futile, vain, illusory desire, but is realizable in fact by an act of the speculative intellect accompanied by the act of full fruition on the part of the will, and by fulness of sense-satisfaction in so far as the senses can have a part in the attainment of man’s end.

Let us view man as a traveler standing at a point where many roads converge. The traveler wishes to reach the City of Limitless Good. This city is the goal toward which the traveler tends by a connatural and inevitable bent of his will. Now, the tendency of the traveler will remain the same, even if he should choose a wrong road. In other words, man, the traveler, will choose a road for the purpose of reaching the City of Limitless Good, even if, as a fact, the chosen road leads away from his goal. It is obvious, then, that the traveler needs guidance; he needs direction, lest perverse and mistaken judgment thwart his purpose and render impossible the attainment of his goal. In a word, the traveler needs a map. More: he requires ability to read the map, and to interpret it rightly where the road seems to fork or byways open invitingly. Now, the map, the guiding direction, is supplied to man, the traveler, by law; and the application of law in individual acts—the reading and interpreting of the map at particular curves and corners— is achieved by conscience. Human acts are directed to their true end by law, and law is applied by conscience. Hence law and conscience are the directives or norms of human acts. The present Chapter treats of these matters in two Articles, as follows: