Rights

a) Definition of Right

A right, considered in general, is that which is just, whether this be a just law, a just deed, a just debt, or a just claim. Our use of the adjective right may show all these senses. Thus, we say that a law, a deed, a debt, or a claim is “right,” or, colloquially, “all right,” or “just right.” Taking the word right as a substantive, we may view it objectively, or as a thing, as when we say, “This is my right;” “That is his right;” “The wise man will see that he gets his rights.” In this sense, right is defined as that which is owed or that which is due. Again, we may view the term right subjectively, i. e., as residing in the one who possesses it (its subject), and thus considered, it is a moral power residing in a person,—a power which all others are bound to respect—of doing, possessing, or requiring something. It is in this subjective sense that we use the term right in Ethics. Right is founded upon law. For the existence of a right in one person involves an obligation in all others of not impeding or violating the right. Now, it is only law that can impose such an obligation. And wdiether this law, upon which right is based, be the natural law or positive law, it is (as all true law) founded ultimately upon the Eternal Law. Hence, the ultimate basis of right is the Eternal Law.

b) Division of Right

L Right is natural or positive according as it is founded upon the natural law or positive law. Again, as positive law is both divine and human, we distinguish divine right and human right. Further, according to the division of human law, we have ecclesiastical right and civil right. The right to preserve one’s life is a natural right; the right of the Church to teach is a divine right; the rights established by Canon Law are ecclesiastical rights; the right of citizens to vote is a civil right. ii. Right is also distinguished as right of property (or possession) and right of jurisdiction. The right of property is the power one has of disposing of a thing possessed according to one’s own wish or benefit: to sell, to keep, to lend, to change, to give away. The right of property is called a right in property or possession when goods are actually in hand; while the same right is called a right to property or possession when goods are owned, but not in hand. Thus, my right to my books is a right in property; while my right to books bought and paid for, but not yet delivered to me, is a right to property.—The right of jurisdiction is the lawful power of a duly constituted superior to make laws and to govern his subjects. iii. Right is alienable when its subject (i. e., its possessor) may lawfully cede or renounce it. Thus, I may renounce my right of eating meat on a nonabstinence day; thus, too, I may renounce my right in property by giving it away.—Right is inalienable when its subject is not free to renounce, but must retain it. Such is my right to life. iv. Right is juridical (or perfect) when it is a legal right, a right strictly enjoined by law, natural or positive. In other words, it is a right which must be respected, allowed, fulfilled, as a matter of strict justice. Thus, the right of my grocer to the amount I owe him is a perfect or juridical right; so also is the right of parents to the respect of their children.— Right is non-juridical (or imperfect, or moral, or “a claim”) when it is founded on a virtue other than justice. Such a right is very often founded upon the virtue of charity. Thus, the right of a benefactor to gratitude, or the right of a poor man to alms, is an imperfect or moral right, or a claim. The things that are required by seemliness or the fitness of things are the object of imperfect right. Thus, it is seemly and fitting that we be liberal and kindly in our dealings with others: and we say that others have an imperfect right, a claim, to such conduct on our part.

c) Properties of Right

Since right is an inviolable moral power by its very definition—for we have defined right as a moral power which all are bound to respect—we do not list inviolability as one of the properties of right. Inviolability belongs to the essence of right as such. We list three properties of right, as follows: coaction, limitation, collision. i. Coaction is the power which right enjoys of forcefully preventing its violation, and of exacting redress for unjust violation. Ordinarily the moral power called coaction must be exercised through process of law. Between man and man (not between man and society) coaction may be exercised by personal force or violence only when all other means have failed.

ii. vLimitation is the natural terminus of right, beyond which it cannot be exercised without violating the right of another. A right ceases to be a right at the point where it impinges injuriously upon another’s right. If I wish to remove my old house and to build a better one in its place, I may not burn my present house, though that would be the easiest way to get rid ©f old and useless lumber; such an action would endanger the houses of my neighbors, that is/such an action would violate my neighbors’ right to the secure and unmenaced possession of their property. iii. Collision is the apparent conflict of two rights in such wise that one cannot be exercised without violation of the other. We say it is an “apparent” conflict; for a real conflict of rights cannot exist; when rights collide, the greater prevails and the lesser ceases to be a right. All right is founded on law; all law is an ordinance of reason (when it is strictly and truly law); and there can be no conflict between the ordinances of reason, for “it would not be reasonable for reason to contradict itself.” In apparent collision of rights, that is the prevailing right, to which the other cedes (or in face of which the other disappears), which: (1) belongs to the more universal order; or (2) is concerned with the graver matter; or (3) is founded upon the stronger title or claim. Thus, a soldier may place the welfare of his country ahead of his private right to life; thus, the right to life which belongs to a man trespassing on my grounds is a greater right than my right to privacy, and I may not take his life for the act of trespass; thus, the claim upon my charity possessed by poor relatives is stronger then the claim possessed by other poor persons.

d) The Subject of Right

By the subject of right we mean the person who possesses right. The subject of right is a person. It is not an irrational creature. For right is a moral power, and belongs only to those that can exercise moral acts. Therefore brute animals have no rights. Again, we may argue, creatures that have rights have obligations ; and no creature can have rights which is incapable of assuming and discharging obligations. But animals have no capacity of assuming or discharging obligations (i. e., moral obligations, duties). Therefore, animals have no rights. What of cruel treatment of animals? Such treatment is immoral, not because it violates any rights that animals may have, but because it outrages reason. Cruelty is not in accord with the dictates of reason. Cruelty to animals does not square with the right and reasonable order of things which reason (and ultimately the moral law) demands. For this reason cruelty to animals is immoral and evil. What of vivisection? Animals are created to man’s use. Now it is a most valuable use of animals to employ them for the furtherance of biological knowledge. Hence, vivisection is not illicit in itself. But to inflict injury or pain upon animals where no necessity or use is served, is not reasonable; nay, it is contrary to reason; and hence is evil. As to sentiment about animals, especially pet animals, it is to be said that the sane treatment of them, the treatment required by reason, is ordinary care for their needs; and with this may be associated a certain pleasure and amusement in having them about. Two extremes are unreasonable and hence evil: the extreme of cruelty on the one hand, and the extreme of excessive care or consideration for animals, on the other. The subject of rights, we have said, must be capable of assuming and discharging obligations, i. e., duties. This is true in the order of creatures. God, the All- Perfect Creator has perfect rights, but He has no obligations, for He made all creatures and all they have is His: He owes them nothing. But God’s rational creatures have rights and duties; and His rational creatures are men and angels. But in Ethics, the science of human acts, we consider man as the person who is the subject of rights; and, indirectly, we must consider God as the subject of rights when we come to consider man as having duties towards God.

Summary of the Article

We have learned in this Article the nature of right, have studied it subjectively as a moral power residing in a person, and have seen that its basis is law, and ultimately the Eternal Law. We have divided rights as natural, positive, divine, human, ecclesiastical, civil; as right of property and right of jurisdiction; as alienable and inalienable; as juridical and non-juridical. We have studied the properties of right, viz., coaction, limitation, and collision, and have discussed, under the last named subject, the solution of an apparent conflict of rights. We have expressed and justified the true doctrine of the subject of right, and have seen that this must be a person, and only a person.