Plato and the Academies

Article 2. Plato and the Academies

a) Plato; b) The Academies.

a) Plato (427-347 b. c.)

Life: Plato was born at Athens. His father, Aristo, was a descendant of the regal line of Codrus ; and his mother, Peric-tione or Potone, was descended from Dropides, a near relative of Solon. Plato’s real name was Aristocles. It is said that the nick-name “Plato” was given him because of his broad shoulders—the Greek word platos meaning “breadth.” As a youth, Plato studied the arts, particularly poetry, and he wrote some tragedies before he was twenty—works unfortunately lost, for when the author assumed the deep seriousness of a student of philosophy he destroyed them. But, though he burned his plays, Plato remained a poet even when he was most earnestly a philosopher. He began the study of philosophy under Cratylus, a pupil of Heraclitus, and then for eight years sat at the feet of the great Socrates. When his master died, he went to Euclid of Megara, then travelled in Italy, where he heard the more celebrated Pythagoreans, and proceeded to Cyrene to study geometry under Theodorus. It is said that Plato spent several years in Egypt, but this seems unlikely, for his writings do not show any profound knowledge of Egyptian manners and culture; if he went to Egypt at all, he probably remained there but a short time. It appears that Plato made three journeys to Italy, but the time of these is uncertain. He visited Sicily also, and there incurred the displeasure of the Tyrant Dionysius the Elder, and was sold as a slave; but he was quickly rescued by Anniceris, a generous nobleman. He returned to Athens and opened his School in the grove of Academus, from which it took the name, “The Academy.” Plato died in Athens at the age of eighty years.

Works: Plato is the first Greek philosopher whose works have all endured to our time. Some of the thirty-five dialogues attributed to him are of doubtful genuinity and some are certainly spurious. Of the works commonly admitted as genuine, the following are important: Gorgias, The Banquet, Phaedo, Phaedrus, The Republic, Timaeus, Lazos, Letters (except the first), and Theaetetus. Plato wrote in dialogue form in a style elevated, elegant, and sometimes sublime. He is often poetic and even dramatic. St. Thomas (de Anima, 8) says of him : “Plato had a bad way of teaching, for he spoke in figure and symbol, intending some-thing by his words which these of themselves do not signify.” Some critics think there was method in this obscurity, believing that Plato wished the doctrines so expressed to be secret, esoteric, reserved for the cultured few; and that the plainer elements of his teaching were common, exoteric, public. Whatever the value of this opinion as applied to certain individual works of Plato, it cannot be accepted as true of Plato’s writings generally.

Doctrine: Plato tried to do two things : to reduce to a synthesis the doctrines of his predecessors, and to harmonize the opposed elements of these doctrines. To realize the first purpose he studied the philosophies of the ancients, and to achieve the second aim he invented his remarkable Theory of Ideas under the magic of which his system assumed a notable unity. We will treat of Plato’s philosophy in three ’’sections,” which deal in order with his Dialectic, Physics, and Ethics. i. Plato’s Dialectic Plato’s dialectic is not merely the art of correct reasoning (Logic), but it is also the explanation of the manner in which man’s soul rises from the things of sense to the things of mind, from the material to the immaterial, from things created to the increate, from opinion to the true and certain knowledge that is properly called science. Thus, as we shall see later, Plato’s dialectic includes matters treated by Aristotle in his metaphysics. Of the subjects discussed in Plato’s dialectic we consider : i—the Platonic Doctrine of Knowledge, and 2— Plato’s Theory of Ideas. i—Human Knowledge. Our senses grasp individual things, things that can and do change. But our understanding grasps things in an unchangeable and universal manner. To illustrate : suppose a person employs sense (sight) to grasp ten representations of the circle drawn on a blackboard. No two of the pictures are identical in size, color, location. But what the senses perceive is precisely size, color, location—things that can change (and which are changed or varied in the ten pictures) without the thing represented ceasing to be what it is, or changing in any way. The understanding perceives something changeless represented in the different pictures, something which makes each picture the representation of a circle, something which is identical in all ten of the pictured circles, and which must constitute every conceivable circle. In the understanding, then, there is a changeless representation of the circle as such, and not merely a representation of this or that circle as an individual picture. In other words, the understanding has a universal grasp of circle, a representation which expresses universally—i. e., without exception—what every circle must be if it is to be a circle at all. Briefly, the understanding has a universal idea of circle. In like manner, it has universal ideas, or essential representations, of other things. Now, where does the understanding get its universal ideas ? Socrates called the universal ideas by the name of concepts, and intimated that they were inborn in the understanding, having been stored there by the Creator (innatism), Plato, too, says ideas are inborn in men, but he explains that they were acquired by the understanding in a previous separate existence of the soul. Pie teaches that the soul existed before it was united to the body. It lived in a state where it directly or intuitively perceived Things-As-They-Are, and not mere exemplifications of things. In that state, for example, the soul did not merely perceive this or that individual circle, but it perceived Circle-In-Itself, a reality which all individual representations of the circle seen in bodily life merely participate. Again, for further example, the soul in its previous separate existence did not merely perceive a beautiful thing, but perceived Beauty-Itself, which the beautiful things of sense merely participate, or share and express in a limited way. Now the separate soul, favored with the clear and direct view of Change-less-Things-As-They-Are, fell into sin, and for sin was imprisoned in the body. And at the moment of this imprisonment the soul lost all its splendid knowledge, the vision of Things-As-They-Are was forgotten. Now, however, in bodily life, the senses present things to our knowledge, and the understanding is stirred to activity by sensation. The objects of sense participate and imperfectly express the Things-As-They-Are which the soul formerly knew, and naturally, therefore, sensation stimulates the understanding to remember the wonderful knowledge it lost when the soul was put into its body-prison. Hence, to know is to remember.

2—Theory of Ideas. The Things-As-They-Are which the soul knew by direct vision in its separate state before being joined to the body are Universal Ideas. These Ideas are not mere representations of things; they are things themselves; they are real, spiritual, subsistent entities. This, then, is the meaning of the word “idea” ; a real, subsistent, spiritual entity, existing objectively apart from the mind which grasps or knows it. In a secondary sense “idea” means the universal representation which exists in man’s mind as a result of beholding the real Idea in the previous separate existence of the soul, and of remembering it in bodily life. In the world of objective and subsistent real ideas the highest and most important idea is the idea of the Good—i. e., Goodness-Itself-Existing-As-A-Real-Spiritual-Substance. This Idea is identified by Plato with God, the Supreme Being, the Creator. ii. Plato’s Physics Physics deals with the bodily world around us. It treats directly of those changing things which the senses perceive. There is some world-stuff of which all bodily things are made, a kind of basis or substratum, which has been determined or formed into the material objects that make up what we know as the world. This basic substance is known as Platonic Prime Matter—a term that ought never be used without the proper adjective, for Prime Matter is a name usually employed to designate Aristotelean Prime Matter, a thing very different from the Platonic. Platonic Prime Matter is a determinate kind of bodily substance in itself ; whereas the Prime Matter of Aristotle is a wholly indeterminate part-principle of bodies. This world is the best world possible (optimism), for it was formed out of the world-stuff or Platonic Prime Matter by God (i. e., by the Subsistent Real Idea of the Good), and God could produce nothing inferior. But if it be the best world possible it must be alive (hylozoism), for life is better than non-life. Now if the world be alive, it must have a life principle, a soul; there exists, in consequence, a world-soul. The world-soul is seated in the very centre of the universe, but its activity penetrates all bodily substance. The fundamental elements of bodies are earth and fire, the one giving solidity to bodies, the other giving light and heat. Since, however, these two elements have nothing in common, they do not fuse or unite together; and for this reason God made two other substances to bring them into union, viz., air and water. The four elements—earth, fire, air, and water— united in variously proportioned mixtures under the action of the world-soul, make up the whole material universe. The elements themselves are composed of the primordial worldstuff (or Platonic Prime Matter) and are determined in being by God. The universe consists of seven major parts or planets, of which the earth is the central body; the other planets move about the earth in regular and perfect order (geocentric system). Plato does not say whether the earth has any motion. God—the Subsistent Real Idea of the Good—did not make the world directly, but indirectly through the action of subordinate powers which He had created. Plato speaks of a Demiurge, and some critics think that this was the chief of the subordinate powers ; but it is fairly certain that Plato’s Demiurge is only another name for God or The Good. God found in Himself the exemplars, or ideal patterns, according to which things were made ; that is to say, the Subsistent Idea of the Good contains all other ideas which are participated or imperfectly expressed in worldly realities. Man’s soul is the immediate product of God’s action, and the subordinate powers had no part in its making. Souls were created in determinate number in the beginning (pre-existence of souls). The soul is spiritual, rational, self-moving, immortal. Souls are joined to bodies in consequence of some sin, which they contracted by coming into contact with matter. Matter is the source of evil because it resists the action of God—i. e., the basic elements of earth and fire resist the action of God that would form them into bodies, and other elements had to be created to effect their union. Contact with matter was, therefore, a damaging thing for souls, and amounted to sin. On account of this sin, souls were joined with bodies, and reside in them as in prisons. The first human body was prepared by the powers subordinate to God; it was a male body, and from it emerged a female body and the bodies of brute animals. Thereafter bodies were prepared for souls by the process of generation. Soul and body are not united into a single human substance (substantial union), but the soul is in the body and controls it as a rower is in a boat and controls it (accidental union). The spiritual soul is the thinking principle in man, the elements of thought being supplied to it by recollection or remembrance, as already explained. Besides the spiritual soul there is a sensation-soul. There is also a third or “courageous” soul called thymos. It is not .clear whether Plato taught that there are three souls in man, or that there is but one soul with three distinct faculties or capacities for distinct kinds of activity. At all events, the sensationsoul and thymos are not described as immortal ; only the thinking, spiritual soul is deathless. If a man live well on earth his soul will go to a place of delights when death has liberated it from the prison of the body. If he live badly his soul will be united with a female body, and continue earthly existence. If evil be persisted in the soul will next be joined to the body of a brute, and eventually to that of a plant (transmigration or metempsychosis). Hopelessly vile souls will be banished to a place of torments; purified souls will join the souls of the just in the heavenly state. Sometimes Plato seems to teach the eternity of both « rewards and punishments in the future life, and sometimes he speaks as though all souls will eventually reach their original purity and be happy forever. Hi. Plato’s Ethics Plato’s Ethics may be conveniently divided into the ethics of the individual man and the ethics of society.

1— Individual Ethics. The will chooses what the understanding proposes to it as good. But the understanding is clouded by sensuality and cannot always avoid mistaken judgment in the matter of good and evil. Sin is therefore inevitable. Yet the will is free; for it freely fell into the primal sin which caused its union with the body, and hence it is responsible “in cause” for the inevitable sins committed in the flesh. Happiness is the end which man seeks to attain. Happiness is not found in the things which merely serve man’s use (utilitarianism), nor in the pleasures of this earthly life (hedonism), but in making the soul like to God by the contemplation / of the Idea of the Good and by the exercise of virtues. Plato ! discusses virtues ably, and may be said to outline the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

2— Social Ethics. The State (civil society) takes its character from its members. Harmony among the members makes a stable State. The greatest harmony prevails when each citizen performs the office for which his physical and mental powers best fit him. There are three main classes of citizens : (i) Philosophers, whose duty it is to rule, to make and execute laws. These constitute the head of the social organism.

(2) Soldiers, whose duty is the defence of the State. They are the heart of the social organism. (3) The Populace—merchants, farmers, slaves, and others—who furnish the material goods necessary for all citizens. These constitute the arms, legs, and trunk of the social organism. The duty of citizens is to preserve harmony, and so to serve the State. Education must discover the abilities of each child, and fit him for the office he is qualified to hold. For this reason the State has the right and duty of directing education. As to the form of government in the State, the best is the aristocratic, or rather sophocratic, in which a few wise men (or even one) hold the place of power. The second-best form of government is timocracy, or military rule. Bad forms of government are oligarchy—the domination of the State by a few families— democracy, or popular rule, and tyranny, the rule of one man unfitted for the responsibilities of single rule.

Remarks: Plato’s doctrine exhibits throughout an exaggerated dualism, i. e., the holding of two combined or closely related things in separation. We find such dualism in his doctrine of human knowledge, for he minimizes the relation between sensation and understanding, and denies that the intellect can rise from the individual data of sense to the representation of essences (ideas). Plato extends his dualism to physics, and teaches that man’s soul and body are not in substantial, but only in accidental, union. Even in the ethical doctrine of Plato a sort of dualism is distinguished, for he teaches that the soul must strive for liberation from the body-prison to become like God. In Social Ethics Plato gives to the State the character of a human organism, and this leads him to regard individual men as mere members of a greater and superior body. Hence, as members of the human body do not exist for themselves alone but for the weal of the entire body, so individual citizens do not exist for themselves merely, but for the welfare of the State. This doctrine is false and pernicious. While individual men have duties and must make many and often great personal sacrifices for the benefit of life in civil society, it must never be forgotten that the State is the servant of its citizens ; that the individual image of God is the more important thing, and the State the less important. For the rest, we merely remark that Plato’s doctrine of the pre-existence of souls and his Theory of Ideas are gratuitous assumptions made for the purpose of explaining away certain difficulties which face the man who seeks to understand the universe. These doctrines show the fertile fancy of the poet, but they do not exhibit the penetration of the philosopher. Perhaps Plato’s best service to philosophy was his stand on the changeless character of science.

b) The Academies.

1— The Old Academy, Plato’s School, did not long maintain its proper character, for the death of the master brought many changes. Plato’s doctrine of God, of the World of Subsistent Real Ideas, and of the world of sense, was too subtle for his intellectual grandchildren and was but vaguely understood. The Academians came to regard everything as numbers after the fashion of the old Pythagoreans; and God was more or less perfectly identified with the bodily world (pantheism). The germ of both these departures was latent in Plato’s own philosophy, with its numbered Ideas, its numbered souls, its harmonious universe, and its world-soul. The chief philosophers of the old Academy were Speusippus, Xenocrates, Heraclides of Pontus, Philip of Opus, and Crantor.

2— The Middl e Academy flourished in the late 4 century B. c., and showed a tendency towards absolute skepticism, i. e., the belief that man can have no certain knowledge of anything nor even a probability. Its chief representative was Arcesilaus (316-241 b. c.).

3— The Thir d Academy flourished at a later period, and taught a doctrine of mitigated or moderate skepticism, allow ing that man may achieve probability, but denying the possibility of absolute certainty in anything. The chief representative of the Third Academy was Carneades (about 210—129 b. c.).

4—The New Academy flourished in the 2 and 1 centuries B. c. and professed a doctrine which is a mélange of Platonism, Aristoteleanism, and Stoicism. Its chief representatives were Philo of Larissa and Antiochus.

Remark: Only the Old Academy and the Middle Academy have a right to be mentioned here. The other Academies belong to later periods in the History of Philosophy. But, since their importance is not great, they are mentioned here for the purpose of avoiding confusing reference later on.