The Idea of Being and Its Inferiors

Article 2. The Idea Being and Its Inferiors

a) How Ideas Apply to Inferiors b) How Being Applies to its Inferiors c) Characteristics of the Idea Being d) Principles Involved in the Idea Being

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a) How Ideas Apply to Inferiors

An idea is said to “apply” to its inferiors inasmuch as it is predicable of them, that is, inasmuch as it can be used as a predicate and affirmed of each inferior as of a subject. When, for example, the mind grasps the truth that an animal is a sentient thing (that is, a being equipped to gain knowledge by the use of a sense or of senses), the mind affirms within itself, makes pronouncement within itself, to this effect, “An animal is sentient.” Such a pronouncement is called a judgment; when a judgment is expressed in words or terms it is a proposition. In the example, the idea sentient (being) is used as a predicate; it is affirmed of animal as its subject or inferior. Thus we see what is meant by saying that an idea is predicable of its inferiors.

We have already seen that there are two chief modes or ways in which an idea applies to, or is predicable of, its inferiors. If the idea represents and expresses in the mind the essence of its inferiors as a complete thing, not adverting to possible essential distinctions and differences among the inferiors themselves, the idea is a specific idea (or species) and the inferiors constitute a specific group (or species). If, however, the idea represents in the mind the essence of its inferiors in a more general and incomplete way than the specific way, the idea is a generic idea (or genus) and the inferiors constitute a generic group (or genus). Both the idea and the realities to which it applies are known by these terms,—i. e., respectively, species and genus. And the very same terms are used in yet a third way: they are used to indicate the mode, the manner, the way, in which the idea applies to its inferiors. Thus the idea animal applies to its inferiors (brutes and men) as their genus, and we say that in this application the idea itself is a genus; we also say that the sum-total of all possible brutes and men constitute a genus. And now we learn that the manner in which the idea animal applies to all brutes and men is a generic mode or simply a genus.

Genus and species are, therefore, modes of predication; they indicate the ways in which ideas are applied to, or are predicable of, their respective inferiors. There are three other ways, in addition to genus and species, in which ideas apply. The five modes of predication are known as “The Predicables.” Of the Predicables, genus and species are the most important, but we must glance briefly at the other three:

1. When an idea expresses in the mind an essence which is the point of essential difference or distinction among the inferiors of a genus, the idea is called the specific difference of its inferiors. Thus the idea rational (being), predicated of man to distinguish him from brutes with which he has a common genus (viz., animal) is the specific difference of its inferiors, namely, of men.

2. When an idea expresses in the mind an essence which does not constitute the inferiors of which it is predicated, but which belongs to these inferiors by natural necessity when their constituting essence is complete and unhampered, it is called the property or the attribute of these inferiors. Thus the idea reasoning being (that is, being which actually has the use of reason) is predicable of man as his property or attribute. For when man’s essence is fully constituted, and not hampered or thwarted in any way whatever, he has, of necessity, the use of reason. Man is not constituted by the use of reason; man is man in complete essence (or species) even when he is an infant, or an imbecile, or unconscious, and cannot use reason. But when all obstacles to natural activity are removed,—obstacles such as immaturity, inexperience, bodily or mental defect, unconsciousness,—man must have the use of reason; this follows infallibly from his essence as man. Hence, when an idea expresses in the mind what follows by natural necessity from the fully constituted and unhampered essence of its inferiors, it is their property or attribute, and is so predicable of them.

3. When an idea expresses in the mind an essence which does not necessarily belong to the inferiors of which it is predicated, but may belong to them, it is called the accident of its inferiors. Thus the idea reading being (that is, being that can read, or being that is actually engaged in the action of reading) is predicable of man (its inferior) as an accident. Manifestly, man may be perfectly constituted in his essence and perfectly equipped with properties and still be unable to read; certainly, he is not actually engaged in reading, even when he can read, at all times and in all places. The point, however, is that man can be a reading being; the thing can happen. The predicate reading being is not necessarily applicable to man; neither is it necessarily inapplicable. It means what may, and again may not, be verified in men as its inferiors. Hence, when an idea expresses in the mind no part of the essence which constitutes its inferiors in their own proper being; when it expresses no essential mark of distinction among inferiors; when it expresses no natural consequent or sequel attendant upon its inferiors in their full and unhampered essence; when it expresses merely what may be (or may not be) found in its inferiors, it is the accident of these inferiors.*

Summing up, we say: an idea is predicable of its inferiors as their genus, their species, their specific difference, their property or attribute, or their accident. In every judgment, in every predication of the mind, in every application of an idea to its inferiors, one of these five modes of predication will be verified simply or by analogy. These modes of predication (“The Predicables”) are manifestly not classes of things, they are merely the five modes or ways in which it is possible that an idea should apply to its inferiors.

The Predicables may be set forth and illustrated as follows:

1. Genus. Represents essence of inferiors incompletely. “The triangle is a plane figure.” “A plant is a bodily being.” “Man is an animal.”

2. Species. Represents essence of inferiors completely. “The triangle is a plane figure of three straight sides and three angles.” “A plant is a living, non-sentient, bodily being.” “Man is a rational animal.”

3. Specific Difference. Expresses essential distinction among inferiors. Indicates points by which species that have a common genus are differentiated. “A plant is non-sentient.” “Man is rational.”

4. Property or Attribute. Represents what belongs to inferiors by natural necessity once their constituting essence is perfect and unthwarted in operation. “A plant is a seed-bearing organism.” “Man is a walking and talking animal.”

5. Accident. Represents what can belong to inferiors, although this is no part of their essence, nor does it follow from the fact that their essence is constituted in integral perfection. “A plant is an ornamental thing.” “Men are interested in aeronautics.” “The day is rainy.”

b) How Being Applies to Its Inferiors

To begin with, there is manifestly no possibility of applying being to its inferiors as specific difference, property, or accident. For being is not that which differentiates things, but that in which all things are at one. Nor is being something that follows by natural necessity when an essence is perfectly constituted and unhampered in function; such essence is itself a being. Nor is being that which may be present to, or absent from, its inferiors; it is inevitably present to them.

Further, being cannot be the species of its inferiors. For the inferiors of being are all things, actual and possible, and if being were the species of these inferiors it would express their essence completely. In other words, all things would be identical in essence, which is manifestly not the case. If being were a species it would be contained within the scope of a genus, and there is no simpler concept than being which could even be imagined as such a genus.

It is left to consider whether being is the genus of its inferiors. We have said that in every application of an idea to its inferiors, that is, in every predication, one of the Predicables is verified either simply or by analogy. Now, as we have just seen, being is not, in any sense, the species, specific difference, property, or accident of its inferiors. Is being then a genus? A genus simply, no. A genus by analogy, yes. Strictly speaking, being is not a genus. But by analogy, or analogously, or analogically, being is a genus. This statement requires explanation, and before we can understand it we must know what analogy is. We pause upon this point for a few paragraphs.

Analogy is “a resemblance of relations.” It is the agreement or the resemblance of things in some points, or under some aspects, or in certain relations, although the things are otherwise different. An idea is analogous (or is used by analogy) when it applies to some inferiors in one sense, and to others in another sense, and yet holds a common point of connection or relation between these varying senses. What is true of the analogous idea is true also of the analogous term. For such a term applies to the things which it denotes in a manner not evenly and equally the same in all cases, and yet not entirely and unrelatedly different in any two cases. Thus the idea (and the term) seeing expresses, in its simple and literal sense, the action of beholding visible objects by looking at them with bodily eyes. Yet the same idea (and term) applies by analogy to the act of intellectual understanding. One says “I see” to express the beholding of a visible object. One also says “I see” when some puzzling matter is explained and understood. Manifestly, seeing with bodily eyes and seeing with the mind are essentially different acts. Yet there is a kind of resemblance, relation, or analogy between these two acts; each is the laying hold of something by knowledge, granted the one is sentient knowledge and the other is intellectual knowledge. Thus the idea (and the term) seeing applies to its inferiors (bodily action of beholding, and mental action of understanding) in a sense not entirely the same in both cases, and yet not absolutely and unrelatedly different. And this is the very definition of an idea or term used by analogy.

In analogy of ideas or terms, it will be regularly found that the idea or term will apply in one instance in its simple and literal meaning, and in the other instances it will be used in related meanings. Now, the idea or term in its simple and literal meaning is called the primary analogue. The other instances, in which the idea or term applies by analogy, i. e., by related meaning (“resemblance of relations”), are secondary analogues. In the example already given, seeing in its simple and literal sense of bodily beholding is the primary analogue; seeing in its related sense of mentally understanding is the secondary analogue.

Sometimes the primary analogue is not expressed, but understood. Thus we may find analogy where an idea or a term is employed in a single application. For example, one may speak of “an angry sky.” The sky is called angry by reason of the relation it bears to “angry” in its simple and literal meaning, although this meaning is not expressed. The term “angry” is used only once, and yet it is apparent that it does not apply in this use in its simple and literal meaning. The primary analogue is understood, not expressed. Therefore we say that the phrase “an angry sky” is an analogy, or that the term “angry” is used by analogy, even though there is no expressed comparison or contrast of the one term in two uses.

Analogy is of two chief kinds, namely, analogy of proportion and analogy of attribution. When analogy is based upon likeness or similitude between the analogues, it is called analogy of proportion. When it is based upon some other relation than that of likeness or similitude, it is called analogy of attribution.

In analogy of proportion, the analogues bear comparison; there is a conceivable likeness between or among them; there is a proportion or sharing of the meaning of the primary to the secondary analogues; the analogues may be said to “look alike.” In analogy of attribution, the analogues do not “look alike,” but they are aligned in some such relation as instrumentality, causality, manifestation, etc., by reason of which the meaning of the primary analogue is attributed to the secondary.

In the example “an angry sky,” there is analogy of proportion, for there exists a conceivable resemblance between the lowering, frowning face of an angry man and dark and threatening clouds. Similarly, we discern analogy of proportion in the description of learning as “the light of the mind,” for there is a likeness between the service rendered by natural light to bodily vision and by learning to the mind; light to the eyes and learning to the mind serve, each in its own way, to make action possible.

On the other hand, we find in the expression “a murderous weapon” an analogy of attribution. Between the quality of being murderous,—which can be predicated literally only of a vicious human being,—and the weapon that could be used for murder, there is no likeness, but a relation of instrumentality; that is, the weapon may serve as the instrument used by a murderous man, and so (by relation of instrumentality) it has attributed to it what is properly predicable of the evil man who might use it. Again, the expression “a healthy color” is an analogy of attribution. Health which is manifested by a clear complexion is here attributed to the complexion itself. Let the student notice and identify the type of analogy to be found in each of the following phrases: “the rude, imperious surge”; “an ugly situation”; “the running sea”; “ghostly finger-tips of sleet”; “keep my memory green”; “Godless schools”; “a cruel edict”; “the head of the family.”

Now, we say that being applies to its inferiors as a genus by analogy, or as an analogical genus. This means that being is predicable of all things in a manner that is not always evenly and equally the same, nor, in any two cases, unrelatedly different. All things are beings, but not all things are beings in the same measure of rank, independence, or mode. God is His being; a created substance has its being; an accidental has in-being, inasmuch as it has being by virtue of its inherence in something else, as heat, for example, in hot water. Being is predicable of God necessarily, for God is self-existent and cannot be non-existent. But being is predicable of creatures contingently, for all creatures are contingent upon, or dependent upon, the Creator for their existence and indeed for their existibility. Thus it is manifest that, while being applies to all things, there is a measure of difference in the manner in which it applies to finite as contrasted with infinite, to necessary as contrasted with contingent, to substance as contrasted with accidental. In other words, being applies to its inferiors in a manner that is not ever and always the same in all cases, and yet is not entirely and unrelatedly different in any two cases. That is to say, being applies to its inferiors by analogy.

Granted that being applies to its inferiors by analogy, we may ask why we call being a genus by analogy, or an analogical genus. We do so, because being, in its application, more closely resembles a genus than any other of the Predicables. For being applies to its inferiors in such a way as to express an essence that is truly in them all, yet it does not express this essence completely, with all its implications; nor does it differentiate the really different essences to which it applies. In this, being “acts like a genus.” Still, a genus, taken strictly and simply, does not apply at all to the essential differences among its inferiors, but to the one essential point which they hold in common. But, as being, all points are common; being applies to its inferiors and to all reality about them, even to their points of essential difference, for these points are truly things or beings. Being, therefore, is somewhat like a genus and somewhat unlike a genus. We might call it, in the ordinary sense of the casual expression, “a sort of genus,” or “a genus of sorts.” In more accurate terminology, we call it a genus by analogy or an analogical genus.

There is here, indeed, a twofold analogy. The name genus is applied by analogy to being inasmuch as being in its function as a predicable idea is somewhat like and somewhat unlike a genus. And there is analogy in the actual application or predication of being to its inferiors, taken severally. In other words, there is analogy in the use of the name genus when applied to being; and there is analogy in the use of the idea and term being when applied to its inferiors. It may now be asked: does being apply to its inferiors by analogy of proportion or by analogy of attribution? Most authors say that being applies to its inferiors by analogy of intrinsic attribution. For, in analogy of attribution, if the basis of the analogy (the relation on which it is founded) is intrinsic to the analogues, we have intrinsic attribution. Thus, for example, if we speak (somewhat ungrammatically) of “healthy food,” we have an analogy of attribution in which health, which is literally predicable of living bodies and notably of man, is attributed to the food which is the cause and support of health. Yet, while health is really in the healthy man (i. e., intrinsic to the healthy man), it is also causally intrinsic to that which produces and supports health, namely, good food. Thus, in the expression “healthy food,” we have an analogy of intrinsic attribution. But when the basis of analogy is intrinsic to the primary analogue and extrinsic to the secondary, we have analogy of extrinsic attribution. Thus, for example, when we speak of “a healthy color,” we attribute health to that which does not have health properly speaking, like a healthy man; nor does it have health causally, like good food; it does not have health in any sense, but merely manifests health, or is a sign of health, and is the effect of health. Thus we have here an analogy of extrinsic attribution. Now, while all things thinkable have being in a true and intrinsic sense, they do not have being in the same measure of equality, mode, completeness, independence. Yet in each case their respective being is their own; it is something intrinsic in everything to which the idea and term being can apply. Hence being applies to its inferiors by intrinsic analogy.

But we here leave the commoner opinion, or, to be exact, the commoner terminology,—for the doctrine is not really a matter of dispute,—and declare that, while being applies to its inferiors by analogy, and by intrinsic analogy, it does not apply by attribution but by proportion. For, although there can be no question of mere physical resemblance among the inferiors of being, this idea connotes something truly, if incompletely, identical in all inferiors. It is not that being is attributed to anything; for anything existible is being, granted that all beings are not equally necessary, equally independent, equally actual, equally important. The being of a substance is its being, its own status with respect to existibility; the being of an accidental is its being, its status with respect to existibility. And so, even though a substance can exist itself, while an accidental cannot, ordinarily, exist except as the mark or characteristic of a substance, still being is referred to substance and to accidental in the same meaning. Therefore, although it is quite true that being is predicated of its inferiors by analogy, it seems illogical to say that it is merely attributed to some inferiors as secondary analogues. Rather it seems just to say that being applies to all inferiors by an analogy of intrinsic and proper proportion. Between the analogues there is a real resemblance, a real and proper sharing of the meaning of being.

The essence being is found formally, or as such, in all inferiors of the idea being. It is found primarily and independently (of causes) in God alone, the First, the Uncaused, the Necessary Being; secondarily and dependently (on causes), it is found in creatures. Among creatures, being is found primarily in substances, and secondarily in accidentals or, as they are technically called, accidents. Thus, in cold water, both the substance water and the accident coldness are things or beings. But the substance has being in itself; it exists itself, whereas the accident has being and exists, not in itself, but as the modification or qualification or mark of the substance. Being is intrinsic to both the substance and the accident, but is predicated of the two things by analogy inasmuch as their essential mode of being is not the same; the one has being substantially, the other accidentally.

c) Characteristics of the Idea Being

1. The idea being is the most abstract idea. In Logic and Psychology we learn that the idea is formed by a process called abstraction (Cf. Art. I, a, of this Chapter). By abstraction we rise from the sentient knowledge of individual and concrete objects to the concept or idea or intellectual grasp of essence as such. We “abstract the essence out” by prescinding from all that limits an object to concreteness and singularity. Now, this refining-out process has reached its ultimate stage when there is only one indivisible note remaining in the mind’s grasp of essence,—the note of thing, of something, of being. This idea is manifestly the most abstract of all ideas.

2. The idea being is the most simple idea. The term simple means uncompounded, non-composed, not resolvable into parts or notes. An idea is simple when it is not made up of other ideas. The idea being is absolutely simple; it consists of a single and indivisible note. The approximate synonyms of being (such as reality, something, etc.) are also simple, but they may be viewed as having certain implications (thus reality may suggest a being that is more than mental or logical; something may suggest a being among other beings, and so may indicate some-*other-*thing), whereas the pure concept of being is without such implications. Hence, we rightly declare that the idea being is the most simple of all ideas.

3. The idea being is the most common idea. That is common which is shared equally among a plurality. That is most common which is shared equally among all things. Now, there is nothing conceivable to which the idea being does not apply; it is shared unto all reality, to all thinkable things. All things, actual and possible, finite and infinite, substantial and accidental; all classifications and differentiations of things; all aspects and viewpoints and phases of things, have this in common that they are things or beings. In this common point of being, all things meet. Therefore, being is the most common of ideas.

4. The idea of being is perfectly transcendental. This idea transcends all classes and distinctions of things, and applies to all. Nay, it is super-transcendental, for it applies not only to all real being (that is, to all things existible in nature) but to non-real or logical being.

5. The idea being is the most indeterminate idea. Determinateness or exactness in delimitation is a matter of notes, of essential or individual determinants. A picture in its first sketchy outline is not determinate; each stroke of the artist’s pencil or brush is a new delimitation, and, line by line, the image is limited or made exact until it represents only one person or object or scene. The more the picture is “composed,” the more details that are drawn in, the less it can represent a plurality of things, the less “common” it is, and the more “individual” it becomes. So, in a sense, is the case with ideas. The more notes in the comprehension of an idea, the fewer the objects of which it is predicable. Logicians express this truth in their axiom, “The more notes in the comprehension of an idea, the narrower is the extension of that idea; and the fewer notes in the comprehension of an idea, the wider (and the more indeterminate) is the extension of that idea.” Now, the idea being is simple; it consists of a single note. Hence its comprehension is all-embracing; it is the most indeterminate of ideas.

6. The idea being is the first idea. It is first in the order of intellectual knowledge (called the logical order) for nothing can be thought of except as a thing or a being. It is first in the order of time (called the chronological order) for in coming to know anything we must first conceive it as a thing or being. This does not mean that infants advert reflexly to their idea of being as the first idea they have formed; as a matter of fact, they do not. It means that the idea being is implicitly present in every idea formed by any human individual from the very first movement of intellect.

7. The idea being is the intellectual signature of the image of God. On this point Mr. Eric Gill has a significant word to say in his Beauty Looks After Herself (p. 75): “What places him (man) as lord of creation is not his cleverness or ingenuity, not his power of ratiocination, not even his perseverance or his courage. His claim to superiority is based solely on his power of contemplation; he alone of all terrestrial creatures is able to recognize being…

d) Principles Involved in the Idea Being

By the term principle we mean, in this present instance, a basic and guiding truth which becomes self-evident when we study the idea being. As the idea being is the first and the fundamental idea, so the principles, or intellectual truths, involved in this idea are the first and the fundamental guides of the mind, and they are the solid basis of all human certitude. These principles are self-evident; they are axiomatic. Like the axioms of geometry, they are so manifest that it seems silly to stress them; yet, like the axioms of geometry, they must be noticed and stressed before any progress can be made in the science to which they refer. And the science to which the principles involved in the idea being refer is the science of philosophy, the science which embraces all human knowledge in its deepest roots. These principles are called immediate principles or principles immediately evident, since there is no need, and indeed no possibility, of a medium (i. e., another idea, thought, or principle) through which one might gain evidence for their truth; they are self-evident.

1. The Principle of Contradiction.—The term contradiction means complete and perfect opposition. Between black and white we have opposition, but it is not complete, since there are many things of which color is predicable which are neither black nor white; the two opposed ideas (and terms) do not exhaust the possibilities. Therefore, since contradiction is complete and perfect opposition, we know that the opposition between the ideas and terms black and white is not contradiction. It is contrariety; the ideas and terms are contraries, but not contradictories. The contradictory of black is not-black. Everything thinkable of which color is predicable is either black or it is not-black. The ideas (and terms) perfectly exhaust the possibilities. We say that the ideas (and terms) black and not-black are contradictories, or that they express a contradiction. Since the contradictories are perfectly opposed, they block each other out; thus a thing that is entirely black cannot be also entirely white. Now, when we look at the idea being we are really forced to consider it against a background; we contrast it with not-being or nothingness. Thus we see being contrasted with its contradictory. And the mind understands at once that being and not-being block each other out, and also exhaust the possibilities. Inasmuch as the ideas being and not-being block each other out, we understand that “being is not and cannot be not-being,” or that “being cannot be and not-be at the same time and in the same sense.” This is the Principle of Contradiction. It is usually expressed in this formula: “A thing cannot be existent and non-existent at the same time and in the same way.”

2. The Principle of Excluded Middle.—Since being and not-being are contradictories, they not only block each other out (as expressed in the Principle of Contradiction), but they exhaust the possibilities. Nothing is thinkable which is neither being nor not-being. There is, in a word, no middle ground, no no-man’s-land, between these opposed ideas. That is what is meant by the phrase “excluded middle.” The Principle of Excluded Middle may be expressed thus: “A thing either is or it is not; it is either a being or it is not-being; between being and not-being there is no middle ground.”

3. The Principle of Identity.—Since there is no middle ground between being and not-being, it is at once apparent that what has being is itself and nothing else. A thing that has being is identical with itself; it is what it is. This self-evident truth derives, like the other principles here noticed, from the very idea of being.

4. The Principle of Difference.—This principle is the complement of the foregoing Principle of Identity. For, manifestly, if a thing is what it is, it is not what it is not; it differs from, or is distinct from, all things other than itself. The Principle of Identity says, “A thing is what it is.” The Principle of Difference adds, “And it is nothing else; it is distinct from all else.” Often these two principles are combined, and are called The Principle of Identity and Difference. The Principle of Difference is also called The Principle of Distinction.

Summary of the Article

In this Article we have discussed the application or predication of ideas; and we have discerned the modes (called The Predicables) in which an idea may be predicated of its inferiors or subjects. We have listed the Predicables (Genus, Species, Specific Difference, Property or Attribute, and Accident) and have found that the idea being soars above this classification and is therefore a transcendental idea or concept. In application to inferiors, the idea being is likened to a genus, but is not simply and literally a genus; it is a genus by analogy or an analogical genus. We have made a study of analogy, and have found that being applies to inferiors by analogy of intrinsic and proper proportion, and not merely by an analogy of attribution. We have studied the most notable characteristics of the idea being, and have found that it is the most abstract, the most common, the most simple, the most transcendental, the most indeterminate of ideas; that it is the first idea in the order of thought (the logical order) and in the order of time (the chronological order). We have discovered and stated the self-evident first principles involved in the idea being, viz., The Principle of Contradiction, The Principle of Excluded Middle, The Principle of Identity, The Principle of Difference or Distinction.