Essence and Existence

Article 3. Essence and Existence

a) Essence　　b) Existence　　c) Distinction Between Essence and Existence

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a) Essence

The essence of a thing is that which makes the thing what it is, constitutes it in basic reality, establishes it as a definitely specific kind of thing. If a reality is composed of distinct constituent parts, the enumeration of these parts defines the physical essence of the reality. Thus, “body and rational soul” defines the physical essence of man. If we consider an essence in the fundamental realities which explain it to the understanding mind, the enumeration of these realities or real aspects of the essence defines the metaphysical essence. Thus, “animality and rationality” defines the metaphysical essence of man, and we say man is “a rational animal.” In the metaphysical definition (which expresses the metaphysical essence) of man, we view the essence as the sum-total of “notes” or component ideas which enter into the concept or complete idea man; we do not view the essence as the sum of physical parts which constitute any individual man in rerum natura. Man’s body and soul are his constituent physical parts; these are parts which make up any individual man in rerum natura; the parts are distinct and even separable, and indeed they are separated when a man dies. But the “notes” of the idea man (i. e., being, subsistent, bodily, living, sentient, rational,—the first five of which are summed up as animal) are not physical parts; they are metaphysical parts, or, as they are generally called, metaphysical grades. They are distinct notes but they are in no wise separable parts. They express realities in man, and are no mere mental figments or groundless views of diverse aspects of man; but they are not separable realities in the human essence. These notes baffle mere physical division, partition, or separation; as parts of the essence man they are metaphysical. They express the essence man in a more completely abstract way than does the physical definition of this essence.

We have seen in another place that essences are marked by necessity and changelessness. If, for example, the essence man is truly expressed in the physical definition, “Man is a creature composed of body and soul,” or, metaphysically, in the definition, “Man is a rational animal,” it is manifest that, to be man, a being must consist of these elements. This explains what is meant by saying that essences are necessary. And what is necessarily so is changelessly so, eternally so, indivisibly so. For a man to be a man, he must have the essence man, invariably, always, completely. For a circle to be a circle, it must have the essence circle, changelessly, eternally, entirely. Otherwise these beings are not man and circle at all. Hence we justly declare that the characteristics of essences, considered in the abstract, are these four: necessity, changelessness, eternity, indivisibility. And when we come to know an essence, when we grasp it in concept or idea, we have laid hold of something necessary, changeless, eternal, indivisible. When, for example, I know what circle means, I can define its essence, and my definition expresses what it must be to be circle at all; the definition expresses not only what a circle now is or happens to be, but what a circle is, has ever been, must ever changelessly remain, without division or break in its essential unity.

There have been philosophers who taught that essences are not knowable, that our knowledge of things cannot go beyond some grasp of externals, that our ideas are only mental names applied to things or mental forms turned out by the mind without reference to fundamental reality. So the Nominalists and the Conceptualists have taught. We cannot accept Nominalism or Conceptualism. For, omitting the argument,—which might well be forcibly elaborated,—that the Nominalists and Conceptualists assume an essential knowledge of the mind in their attempt to prove that it cannot have essential knowledge of anything, we present positive evidence for the fact that we can and do know the real essences of many things. Not of all, indeed, but of many. Life inevitably makes us aware of the real relation of cause and effect; we cannot help noticing how certain properties and activities stand related to realities as effects to their causes.

Now, when we know proper effects, we know something essential about the causes whence these effects proceed. When, for example, we notice that a plant grows, that an animal is sentient, that a man can reason and exercise acts of choice, we know something about the real essence of plant, of animal, and of man. The growth of a plant,—a constant and proper phenomenon,—tells us something about the real essence of the plant: it is a thing which grows. Similarly, the proper activities of animal and of man tell us much about the real essences which exercise these activities. Properties are so many indicators or indexes of essences. As a thing is, it must act, for its proper activity is rooted in its being. When we know all there is to know about the proper activity of a reality, we know all there is to know about the essence of that reality. All men define realities and recognize essential distinctions among them. Now, a definition is the expression of the real essence of a reality, and essential distinctions involve knowledge of the essences distinguished. Our ideas truly represent essences, and the Nominalist and Conceptualist theories fall before the unanswerable actuality of experience and the nature of human reasoning. A full discussion of the trans-subjective value of our ideas is found in that part of philosophy which is called Criteriology.

b) Existence

Existence is that which actualizes an essence and sets it outside its causes as a thing produced. Of course, we speak here of the existence of finite or creatural things. The infinite essence of God involves, and is identified with, all perfections in boundless degree. Hence the essence of God involves the perfection of infinite existence. God is self-existent; He is essentially existent; He is ipsum esse subsistens, “subsistent (hence, existent) Being itself.” But creatures are caused beings; they are produced; their existence is bestowed on them and received by them; they are not identical with their existence. It is very easy to see that there is a clear mental or logical distinction between that which exists (essence) and that whereby it exists (existence). We must now take up the question of this distinction to discover whether it is more than a logical one, to find whether it is, in fact, a real distinction.

c) Distinction Between Essence and Existence

For centuries there has been a notable controversy among scholastic philosophers about the nature of the distinction between the essence and the existence of a finite reality. The question is not concerned with metaphysical essences. All, of course, recognize the fact that if a man, for instance, is to exist at all he must exist as a rational animal; this metaphysical essence (“animality plus rationality”) is manifestly not really identified with actual existence; it is a requirement for the existence of such an essence, but it is an abstract essence, viewed in itself or as such by the mind. The question is concerned with the actual physical essence and the actual existence of an existing creature. It inquires, for example, whether there is a real distinction or only a logical distinction between the actual, existing physical essence (body-and-soul composite) of John Jones who stands here before us, and the actual existence of John Jones. Are the actual essence and the actual existence of this man two distinct realities, or are they only two aspects of the one reality?

Some philosophers say that the distinction in question is logical and not real. They say that the essence and the existence of an actual creature are only two aspects of one thing. They willingly admit that there is ground and basis for this mental or logical distinction, inasmuch as an essence can be thought of without its existing, and the aspects of essence and existence in an actual creature are real enough as aspects or views. And therefore these philosophers declare that, while there is only a logical or mental distinction between the essence and the existence of an actual creature, this distinction is grounded in reality. To put the doctrine in technical terms, they say that the distinction is a distinction of reason with a basis in reality, or, in the well known Latin phrase, distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re. This distinction is sometimes referred to as a virtual distinction. (Cf. Book Second, Chap. I, Art. 1, d.)

Opposed to the doctrine of mental distinction only stand the majority of scholastic philosophers, declaring that the distinction in question is a real one. Now, a real distinction is a distinction as between thing and thing; it is not merely a distinction between different aspects of one thing. It is not here asserted that the essence and the existence of a creature are separate or separable things; it is not suggested that an essence can be actual without existing, or that the existence of a creature can have its being apart from the creature which exists. For it is manifest that existence is the actualization and the actuality of an essence; it sets the essence among actual things. What the present doctrine maintains is that, in a creature, essence and existence are two realities which constitute the creature in its being; that essence and existence are two real principles which, independently of the created mind, combine, as really distinct things, to make the creature an existing essence.

We might spend much time upon this question, weighing argument against argument, and setting points against rebuttals, but it will suffice to say that the weight of authority and of cogent reasoning appears to be on the side of those who assert the real distinction. By way of support for this statement we may set down a few brief notes.

1. There is a real distinction between two things when one of them is not included or comprised in the complete concept of the other. Now, the concept of the essence of a creature can be quite complete without involving the notion of that creature’s actual existence.

2. Creatures are contingent; they have no intrinsic necessity for existence; they are brought into existence; existence is conferred on them by the action of their producing causes. Now, if existence be identified with essence in a creature, then there is a necessary connection between these two principles. But this is contrary to our whole idea of contingency in creatures.

3. Substantial creatures are a) matter, b) form, or c) a composite of matter and form. Prime matter is pure potentiality; it is indeed an essence, though incomplete, but it cannot have existence by itself. A material substantial form is likewise an essence, though incomplete; but it cannot have existence by itself. A non-material substantial form (the human soul) can exist completely, yet it is incomplete specifically or essentially. The composite of matter and form (that is, a complete actual bodily essence) cannot be identified with its own existence, since it is a compound of parts which are not, respectively, identified with their own existence.

4. There is a real distinction between what a thing is in its basic constitution and that which it participates or shares. Now, existence is rightly said to be shared to creatures; creatures have existence, not as their basic constitution in whole or in part, but as something which they participate, something shared unto them.

Summary of the Article

In this Article we have learned the meaning of essence and existence. We have distinguished physical essence and metaphysical essence. We have shown that the characteristics of essence, considered in the abstract, are necessity, changelessness, eternity, indivisibility. We have shown that knowledge of real essences is possible to man, and that the doctrines which deny this truth, notably Nominalism and Conceptualism, are inadmissible. We have briefly set forth the terms of the ancient controversy about the nature of the distinction between the essence and the existence of an existing creature, and we have favored the doctrine which asserts a real distinction, and not merely a logical distinction, between creatural essence and existence.