Causes and Causality in General

Chapter II

Beings in Their Causes

The most important of relations is that of causality, that is, of the dependency of an effect upon its cause and of the necessity for finding adequate cause for existing effect. The recognition of this relation is a basic and indispensable requirement of reason in its work of interpreting the universe. Indeed, the principle of causality ranks close in importance to the first principles which are immediately derived from the concept of being. Philosophy, the highest achievement of unaided reason, is often described as “the science of ultimate causes.” Rerum cognoscere causas, to learn the causes of things; that is the function of the philosopher. We cannot know being thoroughly unless we view beings in their causes. In the present Chapter we seek to discharge this duty. The Chapter is divided into three Articles, as follows:

• Article 1. Causes and Causality in General
• Article 2. Intrinsic Causes
• Article 3. Extrinsic Causes

Article 1. Causes and Causality in General

a) Meaning of Principle　　b) Meaning of Cause　　c) Classification of Causes

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a) Meaning of Principle

We must define principle before we define cause, for cause stands to principle as species to genus, that is, a cause is a special kind of principle. Now a principle, in its widest meaning, is defined as that from which anything proceeds or takes its rise in any manner whatever.

There are many types of principles, but every one of them comes under the definition just given. There are, for example, intellectual and moral principles, that is, basic truths which serve to guide the mind to further knowledge, or the will to action. The axioms of geometry, for instance, are principles; in their guiding light the mathematician proceeds as he develops the whole of his science. The Ten Commandments are moral principles; they give directions which serve as the starting-point and the source of proper conduct.

In a material and literal way, a principle is simply a beginning, a starting-point, or a source. Thus the dawn is the principle (that is, the beginning) of the day; thus the mountain spring is the principle (that is, the source) of the dashing stream.

An important point about a principle is that it is prior, or has priority, to what proceeds from it. There are various types of priority, among which the following are important: (a) Priority of order: the point is prior to the line, and is the principle of the line. (b) Priority of time, called also priority of succession: dawn is prior to day; three o’clock is prior to four o’clock. (c) Priority of nature: the flame is prior to the illumination that comes from it, even though it is not prior in time. Flame and illumination come into existence at the same instant. (d) Priority of consequence: the working out of a theorem is prior to the proved conclusion; the conclusion proceeds from the demonstration and is its consequence.

A principle, then, in widest sense, is that from which anything proceeds, whether it has being therefrom, or is made thereof, or is known thereby. In a stricter sense, a principle is an entity (real or logical) which is distinct from, and prior to, and intimately connected with, that which proceeds from it.

b) Meaning of Cause

A cause, as we have said, is a special kind of principle. It is a principle by force of which a thing is produced. Whatever contributes, in any manner, to the producing of a thing, is a cause. We notice at once that a cause is always a principle; we must notice also that a principle is not always a cause. The point is the principle of the line, but not its cause, unless in the special view of a line as produced by the transit of a point through space. The dawn is the principle of day, but not its cause.

Particular points of difference between the wider concept (principle) and the narrower or more special (cause) are these: (a) Between a cause and what proceeds from it (effect) there must be a real distinction, whereas there is sometimes only a logical distinction between a principle and what proceeds from it. (b) Between a cause and its effect, there is an order of dependency; that is, effect depends on cause; such dependency is not always present in the case of what proceeds from a principle. (c) A cause is prior to its effect by a real priority, at least of nature if not of time. But a principle is often only logically prior to what proceeds from it.

A cause must be carefully distinguished from a reason, from an occasion, and from a condition.

1. A reason is that which, in any manner, contributes to the explanation or the understanding of a thing. Smoke informs me that there is fire; it explains or makes me understand the presence of fire; but it is not the cause of fire. Everything (finite and infinite, substantial and accidental) has its reason, but not everything has its cause. Infinite Being is uncaused; but it is not unknown or unexplained. Therefore, we have an important self-evident truth (called the principle of sufficient reason) which may be stated thus: nothing exists without a sufficient reason for its existing. But the principle of causality runs: nothing is produced without a cause (or sum of causes) adequate to produce it. Contrast the terms, exists and is produced. Every cause is a reason, but not every reason is a cause.

2. An occasion is that in the presence of which, or on the occurrence of which, something is done. Every occasion has something of the character of a reason; but not every reason is an occasion. Men are morally bound to avoid the occasions of sin. The occasions of sin, however, are not the causes of sin, for the cause of sin is the will of the sinner.

3. A condition is that which is required (by nature, by agreement, or by bias of mind) before a thing is done. A condition is more or less readily dispensable. If it is indispensable it is called a conditio sine qua non, that is, “a condition without the fulfillment of which (a certain thing) will not (be done).” Usually a condition bears the character, directly or indirectly, of a reason; but not every reason is a condition. Cause, reason, and condition may concur or even overlap without, however, becoming identified.

A cause, to repeat, is that which contributes, in any manner whatever, to the producing of a thing. Stress the word producing. A cause looks to products. And the thing produced by a cause is called its effect. Between cause and effect exists the relation called causality. For true causality to exist there must be: a real distinction between cause and effect; a true dependence of effect upon cause; a priority of time or of nature in the cause when viewed in conjunction with its effect.

c) Classification of Causes

We here present Aristotle’s catalogue of ultimate causes. We shall list the four major causes, and we shall mention certain minor causes. Before taking up the definition of these causes, we shall consider them as presented in a concrete example.

Suppose we have before us an ivory crucifix. It is a contingent thing, as all finite realities are. It is contingent upon, or dependent upon, the causes that produced it. For it is a produced reality; it is an effect. A study of this crucifix has the following to tell us about its causes.

First, this crucifix is made of a substance called ivory. This substance has made a contribution to the effect, for without it the crucifix would not be here. The material out of which this bodily object is made is its material cause. The material cause has place in every substantial bodily effect. Spiritual creatures have their causes, but they have no material cause, since there is no bodiliness about them. The material cause is called an internal or an intrinsic cause, since it is right in the effect, it is part and parcel with the effect.

Secondly, the crucifix has been given a definite form or shape or image-value. The outer form, the shape, the image, of the crucifix has a lot to do with its being just what it is. Yet the outer form of the crucifix is an accidental thing, not substantial. The substance of which the crucifix is made would be this same substance if it were differently carved or shaped. But, as a fact, it is this determinate kind of substance that makes the crucifix, and no other; there is a substantial determinant (that is, form) of this effect as well as an accidental one; and any determinant of an effect has the character of cause. Therefore, in this crucifix, we notice an accidental formal cause (which gives it its shape, image-value) and a substantial formal cause (which makes it a reality in this substance, and no other). The formal cause, like the material cause, is internal or intrinsic.

Thirdly, this crucifix had a maker. Someone carved the bit of ivory into this particular form. The maker of a thing, the being by whose physical activity the thing is produced, is the efficient cause of the effect. This is the third in the list of major causes. Two minor causes subserve the efficient cause: (a) The exemplar-cause, that is, the model, pattern, or image which guided the artist’s activity in carving the crucifix. (b) The instrumental causes, that is, the hands and tools used by the artist; these make action physically possible. The efficient cause is external to the effect; the efficient cause (the man who made the crucifix) is not part and parcel with the crucifix itself. Hence the efficient cause is listed as an external or extrinsic cause.

Fourthly, the maker did not produce the crucifix aimlessly or without any reason whatever. There must have been something that served him as a reason, a goal, a purpose, an end-in-view, as he set about the work. This reason, end-in-view, purpose, aim, or goal, which the efficient cause has in producing the effect, is called the final cause of the efficient activity and of the effect itself. The term comes from the Latin finis “end” (in the sense of purpose). The final cause is not a minor, but a major cause. It accounts for the whole action and the effect of the whole action. The final cause is, in creatures, an extrinsic cause. The purpose of the artist is not part and parcel with the crucifix; you cannot know for certain, from an examination of the crucifix itself, just what the final cause of the artist was.

We may sum up the results of our study of the crucifix as an effect in the following schema of causes:

	Cause	Sub-type
Extrinsic	Efficient	subserved by: exemplar; instrumental
Extrinsic	Final
Intrinsic	Formal	Substantial; Accidental
Intrinsic	Material

Summary of the Article

This Article has shown us the meaning of principle, and has given us detailed knowledge of the requirement of priority which belongs to a principle. It has shown us various types of principle. Among these types we distinguished one which stands to principle as species to genus, and this is cause. We have defined cause, and have seen wherein it is distinguished from reason, occasion, and condition. We have learned that causality is the relation existing between cause and effect. We have classified causes according to Aristotle’s list of four major causes, viz., material, formal, efficient, final. We have considered certain minor causes. We have seen that the major causes themselves fall into two classes, viz., intrinsic and extrinsic causes.