The Chief Types of Causes

A cause is anything that contributes, in any way and measure whatever, to the producing of a thing.

The thing produced by causes is called an effect. Between cause and effect there is a constant relation which, viewed from the standpoint of the cause, is causality, and viewed from the standpoint of the effect is dependency or contingency. That which is the effect of one cause may be the cause of a further effect. Indeed the world around us is a tissue of causes and effects. We distinguish cause and principle. A principle is that which gives rise to anything, or is its point of origin. Thus a cause is always a principle, for it is the point of origin of the effect and it gives rise to the effect. But some points of origin are merely startingpoints, and not effecting or producing sources. Thus, the dawn is the starting point, or principle, of the day, but dawn is not the cause of day. Thus a man’s convictions are the true source of his free conduct, but they are not the cause of his free conduct; this cause is his will; the convictions are principles but not cause?. Therefore, every cause is a principle, but not every principle is a cause. We distinguish cause and reason. A reason is that which contributes in any way to the understanding of a thing; it explains, whereas a cause produces. Everything that exists has reasons which explain it and account for it; but not everything that exists has its cause or causes. God has reasons, and we are to investigate them in our present study. But God has no causes, for He is the first Being, and not a Being consequent upon causes. Now, every cause is a reason; that is, when you know the cause of an effect, you have an explanation of the effect. But there are explanations other than causes; we explain and even demonstrate the existence of God but we do not assign causes to God. Therefore, every cause is a reason but not every reason is a cause. Fire is a reason for heat and is the cause of heat; heat is a reason for fire (that is, it manifests or explains the presence of fire) but heat is not the cause of fire; it is its effect. We distinguish cause and occasion. An occasion is some extrinsic circumstance or set of circumstances which may induce a cause to act. The sight of a priest or of a rosary in the hands of a little sodalist may lead an anti-clerical to curse and swear; what he sees is not the cause of the evil language, but its occasion. There is never an essential and intrinsic connection between the occasion and the cause which acts on occasion, but there is frequently a powerful, if extrinsic, influence exercised by occasion. For this reason we have the practical truisms: “He that loves danger shall perish in it”; “He who wills not to avoid occasions of sin, does not will to avoid sin”; “Tell me the company you keep, and I’ll tell you what you are,” and so on. b) INTRINSIC CAUSES

An intrinsic cause is one that is right in the effect, not external to it, but part and parcel with it.

There are two types of intrinsic cause, material cause and formal cause. 1. A material cause is the bodily matter out of which an object is made. Thus the material cause of a statue is wood or plaster or marble. It is manifest that spiritual things have no material cause, for they are not composed of matter. The material out of which a bodily thing is made is a true cause, for without it the effect would not be there. Without wood, plaster, marble, silver, or some other bodily substance, there could be no statue. And the production of the statue truly depended upon some suitable substance existing that could be carved or moulded into a statue. Indeed, this statue which I here look upon would not be this statue if any other matter but that precise matter which is in it were used in the making. Thus the matter, the material make-up, of any bodily substance has the nature of a true cause. Remember the definition of cause: that which contributes, in any manner or measure whatever, to the producing of a thing. Notice that the material of which a bodily object is made is right in that object; it is intrinsic to that object ; thus a material cause is an intrinsic cause. 2. A formal cause is that which constitutes an effect as the precise kind of thing it is, constitutes it formally or as such. Now, the precise kind of thing which the effect is, may mean the precise kind of substance or the precise kind of accidental being. Thus, in a silver statue, I distinguish that which makes this bodily substance the precise kind of substance it is, that is, silver, and I call this the substantial form or the substantial formal cause of the statue. Further, I distinguish in the statue that which makes this silver object the precise kind of thing it is in its accidental being, that is, in its shape and size and imagevalue, and so on; and each point of this kind is an accidental form of the statue, and its accidental formal cause. Notice that the statue would not be this precise thing (substantially) if any other substance than silver were used to make it; nor would it be precisely this identical thing if any accidental determinant or form were different, if, for instance, it were made of some other quantity of silver, or were smaller or larger or represented some other person than it now does. Thus, every single one of the determinants or forms (the one substantial form and the several accidental forms) makes its contribution to the effect I call this statue. Each of these forms is therefore a true cause. And notice that the forms or formal causes are right in the effect itself: the statue is silver; the statue is marked and determined by this weight, this size, this location, this shape, and so on. Therefore, a formal cause, whether substantial or accidental, is an intrinsic cause. To sum up. Intrinsic causes are thus distinguished: ’ Material

Cause. r substantial I F°rmal 1 accidental

C) Extrinsic Causes

An extrinsic cause is outside the effect, not part and parcel with it. There are two chief types of extrinsic cause, efficient cause and final cause. I. An efficient cause is a cause which by its own activity produces an effect. The sculptor who carved the statue is its efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is frequently subserved by instrumental causes, as the sculptor was served by the tools he used, and by the natural instruments of hands, fingers, muscles, sinews. The efficient cause is often also served by an exemplar-cause, that is, the model or pattern after which the work of the efficient cause is fashioned. Thus the sculptor (the efficient cause of the statue) was subserved not only by instruments (that is, instrumental causes) but by some model, image, or pattern, which he had physically before him as he worked, or at least pictured in his imagination (that is, an exemplar-cause}, and which served as his plan and his guide. Notice that both instruments and exemplar have their influence on the effect and make a distinct contribution to it; without these causes the finished statue would not exist, or it would not exist as the precise thing it is in every detail. Therefore, instruments and exemplar deserve the name of true causes. Notice further that the efficient cause, the instrumental causes, and the exemplar-cause, are things external to, or extrinsic to, the effect; they are not right in the effect itself; hence they are called extrinsic causes. 2, A final cause is the goal or end towards which the work of the efficient cause is directed in the active producing of the effect. Wherever we find efficient causation, we find some goal, some term, something aimed at, whether consciously or unconsciously. The lifeless forces of nature, such as wind and erosion, tend towards their effect by a natural drive or energy. In living things, in plants and animals, we notice an obvious tendency towards development, maturity, fruitfulness. But only an intelligent or understanding being (that is, only a rational being) is capable of setting a goal, proposing an end to itself, and working to attain it. And every rational creature does so set its goal in every free act, but always sets it (of necessity) in the direction of good to be attained; for towards the Supreme Good every creature is directed by the inmost requirements of its being. The ultimate goal, absolutely speaking, sought by man in every free act, is the supreme or highest good, and supreme happiness in the attainment of that good. But any proximate or remote goal which is not absolutely ultimate (and which is conceived of as a means to carry one in the direction of the ultimate goal) is freely chosen by man (that is, by the only bodily rational creature) in his deliberate activity. So we say, to illustrate our definition of final cause, that the sculptor must have had some reason for making the statue, something that drew him to the work of making it, something that made its making appear a good thing and led him to choose it freely. Perhaps it was money, perhaps love of art, perhaps a mere pleasant way to spend the time; but some purpose there must have been, else the statue never would have been produced. This purpose is the final cause of the statue. For man, a final cause is also a motive; it moves the human efficient cause to the free work of producing the effect. But for God, the final cause is not a motive, since God is in no wise influenced or moved, but chooses with supreme and wholly unswayed free choice. God has, in all His transient operations, a purpose, but no motive; for man, purpose is usually a pretty accurate synonym for motive. The final cause is manifestly extrinsic to the effect; it is something outside the effect itself, and something at which the effect is, so to speak, aimed and directed. To sum up. Extrinsic causes are distinguished thus: ’ instrumental Efficient subserved by exemplar

Cause. Final

Summary Of The Article

This brief Article has taught us the meaning of cause. We have defined cause, and have noticed how it is distinguished from principle, reason, and occasion, We have classified the chief types of causes as intrinsic to the effect (material and formal cause) and as extrinsic to the effect (efficient and final cause). In the subsequent study we shall find that God is the supreme Efficient and the last Final Cause of all creation.