The State

a) Meaning of the State

The State is a perfect natural union of families, established for their common temporal welfare under a definite government. There are different types of States, as there are different principles back of their functioning, and therefore some sociologists classify States as Pagan, Christian, Liberal (or materialistic or agnostic), and Socialistic. Again, States may be classified according to the structure or form of their governmerits as Aristocratic, Oligarchic, Monarchical, and Republican (or democratic). What the man in the street refers to as “a country” or “a people” or “a nation” is what we mean by a State. Here in our portion of America we have a group of States constituting one larger and federated State. When we speak of the State, and choose illustrations or point examples or indicate activities, with reference to our own country, we mean both the individual units of the United States and the Federal Union itself; the reference more often indicates the Union rather than the separate commonwealths. Speaking of the State in general, we refer to any definite group of individuals and families who dwell in a clearly defined territory and constitute a recognized body of citizenry under their established public authority. Thus, for example, Italy is a State; the United States of America is a State; France is a State; Portugal is a State, and so on through the lengthy litany of “countries” or “peoples with their respective governments.” And when we speak of activities of the State, we refer chiefly to governmental or civil functions in any State.—The examples here given of States are all modern States. Now, we must not imagine that the populating of the earth was a process accompanied by a swift and definite division of men into States as we know them to-day. In older days, there were other types of States. Ancient Greece had States that were but single cities. And all Europe was once practically a single State, ruled by an Imperator or Emperor, although it was made up of many peoples of different civil cultures, some of them only remotely connected with the central governing power, and many of them hardly conscious of their place and function in the great State or Empire of which they were a part. The State is a natural society. It is definitely required by man’s very nature. For men are moved by an impulse and urge of rational nature to form civil groups and establish governments: this is manifestly a requirement for achieving and maintaining the order, stability, peace, and harmony among men, which reason demands for a decent and properly human earthly existence. Rational nature does not dictate the precise form of government to be set up, and men may be ruled by an absolute monarch, a senate, an elected leader, a president, or other manager or ruler. Different forms of government are determined by differing circumstances and influences, but some workable form of government is always requisite. Thus, in saying that the State is a natural society, we indicate the necessity, manifest to rational nature, which brings men (families) into definite territorial units under their respective governments, however various in form those governments may be.

The State is a perfect society. That is to say, the State is complete in its own sphere, and does not depend for the discharge of its peculiar functions upon any other society. The State is thus distinguished from imperfect societies, which are not by nature fitted for complete independence, but exist and function in some sort of dependency. A municipality, a township, a county, a professional society, a labor union—these are imperfect societies, for, while they have their own officials and governing bodies, and make their own ordinances, rules, and regulations, they depend upon the larger and selfsufficing organization of the State itself in which they exist. A municipality or county does not maintain its identity without allegiance to any other social group; it does not claim to “have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do.” Even the essential social unit, the family, is an imperfect society, inasmuch as its function requires a certain guarantee of peace and order, of justice and protected rights, which it is unable to furnish for itself. The State is the only perfect natural society. There is but one other perfect society, and that is the supernatural society called the Church. The State exists for the common good or welfare of its members. It exists, first and foremost, for the temporal or earthly good of its citizens and

294. SOCIOLOGY families. But the temporal good of man is always strictly in line with his ultimate and eternal good, and hence that State falsifies its nature and function which ignores or denies in its rule the requirements of the natural moral law. No State which denies God, or refuses to recognize the human right of liberty of conscience, can truly serve the welfare— even the true temporal welfare—of its• members; and a State which attempts such a course, is no true State at all. Further, the State exists for the common temporal good of its members; it must function according to the requirements of distributive justice, not favoring one citizen or class of citizens above another. The State has a definite form of government. This, as we have seen, may be one of many possible forms. But what is the best form? There is no absolute and unconditioned answer to this question. States are stable institutions, yet they are of this world, and hence they are temporary and transitory; they rise and fall, they emerge and disappear. There is no determining what form of government is ever and always the best form. Sometimes and under some circumstances, one form appears the best; yet, under different circumstances or with people of different temperaments and aspirations, that same form would be less desirable. Relatively, that form of government is best which is most effectually suited for the requirements of a given people, at a given time, and under given circumstances and conditions.

b) Origin of the State

The State is a natural society. Men naturally require it for decent and normal human existence. Hence the true origin of the State is found in man’s rational nature. When there were but few men on earth, the family-group was sufficient for man’s social and civil needs. But in the multitude of men and families, of cultures and trends, which characterize humanity as we know it now, each household is not sufficient unto itself for the purposes of human wellbeing. Man, since the Fall, is apt to be inhuman towards his brother man; individuals and families need guarantees of order and peace, and protection of rights. Families require food and clothing and shelter, and (especially in a well populated earth with its crowded cities and towns) there is further need of means of ready transportation, roadways, open waterways, means of communication such as postal service, etc. Obviously, individual families or households cannot supply all these necessaries for themselves. These and other instruments of human service require the cooperation of many families under the directing and unifying supervision of a central control; in a word, these human requirements demand the State. Nor will it do to say that man can manage to exist as an individual without these things; for man is, by his very nature, social. It follows that the institution which serves his social needs is a natural institution. The State is, therefore, a natural society; its origin is found in man’s very nature. There have been, in times past, teachers and leaders who stoutly maintained that the State is not a natural institution at all, but a wholly artificial one, founded by men as a mere convenience. Thus Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), an English philosopher, declared that man is by nature a savage and belligerent solitary, a self-willed and self-seeking individual, his hand ever against his brother man. “Man,” he said, “is a wolf to man; homo homini lupus” But the solitary life is a difficult life; it is not easy for the human wolf to find ready prey, to conquer it single-handed, and to keep it for his own use when procured. Nor is such a life peaceful, or suited to other than the man of wild and unconquerable spirit. Thus it came about that many men— weak, or lazy, or fatigued by the stern exactions of their natural way of existence—banded together for greater effectiveness in their work and for greater security in their achievements. This union of men in civil society was the expression of an implicit compact or contract, by the terms of which individual man surrendered many of his natural prerogatives, ceding his birthright for peace, effective action, and security. We of later days inherit the conditions and limitations imposed by the primordial social contract; we form States and set up governments, and we are under their absolute and unconditioned control. But this is not our natural way of life.—Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), French materialist, and John Locke (1632-1704), English philosopher, agree with Hobbes in the theory of social contract as the true explanation of the origin of the State, although they explain the formulation of the contract in different terms, have different opinions of its scope and obligation, and entertain different views about the desirability of returning to the primitive human state of individual freedom. The social contract theory is to-day almost universally regarded as a mere philosophical curiosity; it is recognized as a theory wholly gratuitous, divorced from solid historical fact. And rightly so. For there is no scrap of real historical evidence upon which it can rest and claim validity. The State is a primitive, constant, universally present phenomenon of human society; it has existed at all times among all sorts of men, alike only in their common nature; and it can have no explanation apart from that nature. For the rest, we have already seen that the State is a truly natural society, and needs no contract theory to explain it.

C) FUNCTION OF THE STATE From the fact that the State is a natural society, existing for the common welfare of its members, we gather a general impression of its function. The State is to serve its members; it is to do them good. It is not to own or possess them; to coerce them for whim or caprice or policy; to thwart or limit their natural and inalienable rights. The State is to do its members (families and individual citizens) good by protecting them in the possession and exercise of their rights, and by positively promoting their peace, prosperity, and happiness. Thus the State has a negative (protecting) function in seeing that human rights are not violated. It has also a positive (promoting) function in furthering the welfare of its members. In the exercise of either function, the State must observe justice and moderation, avoiding possessiveness and paternalism on the one hand, and callous indifference to the needs of its members on the other. To exercise its functions—both negative and positive—the State must have authority, and this, as we have seen, must be used in just moderation, being kept within due limits. We shall briefly study all these matters in a series of paragraphs.

i. State Authority.—Since the State must have authority (that is, a just moral power of exacting obedience to its ordinances) in order to exercise its functions, and since these functions are required by a natural necessity of man, it follows that the God who made man with the need of the State, is back of just State authority. In other words, the true authority of the State comes from God. Now, God does not contradict Himself; He does not establish an authority upon earth that shall contradict or contravene His own authority which directs men to their last end and destiny. Hence, true and just State authority can never be in conflict with the requirements of the natural law. To say that State authority comes from God simply means this: God has equipped his human children with the ability to meet their natural needs. Men are, therefore, capable of setting up governments, choosing presidents or kings, thus establishing a power which is needed and just, and which they themselves must obey. The just authority thus vested in the ruler or ruling body comes from God through the people to the ruler. But we do not maintain that the ruler, once established in place and power, is infallible or impeccable. The doctrine that “the king can do no wrong” is a false doctrine, antiCatholic in origin. The Catholic Church knows well that the king can do wrong, and it has often told him so in no unmistakable terms. Henry IV, shivering in the snows of Canossa, and bluff “Hing Hal” of England, trembling with baffled rage at the Pope’s refusal of divorce, are sufficiently pointed examples of what the Catholic Church thinks of the impeccability of kings. In saying that the authority vested in the head of the State comes from God, we indicate that God, through the people, justifies an established ruler in his place, and requires that the subjects obey him in all that is just and equitable, even at the cost of sacrifice for the common good. Nay, even injustice must sometimes be borne for the sake of general stability and peace; but, as we shall see, there are definite limits to State authority, and when it transgresses these grossly and tyrannously, it may be justly resisted and overthrown. The authority of the State (i. e.} civil authority) is exercised by the legislative and executive government: the legislative function of government is exercised in the framing of laws; the executive function is exercised in the applying and enforcing of laws. Now, a law is defined as an ordinance of reason promulgated for the common good by one who has charge of a society. It is an ordinance of reason; it must be reasonable; hence a law, to be a true law at all, must be just; it must contravene no higher law; it must be possible of fulfillment by ordinary human effort and good will; it must serve a real use; it must be relatively permanent, and not a fleeting or whimsical decree; it must be promulgated, that is, it must be brought duly and suitably to the attention and knowledge of those who are bound by it. Further, a law is for the common good (wherein it differs from a precept, which is an ordinance binding one or a group for their individual or private good) and is meant to protect and promote true liberty among the members of the State, not to impose needless restrictions and hardship upon them. Just laws do make exactions, but these are not hampering forces, they are truly liberating forces. In the same way, roadways and streets are limiting things, for a man may feel that he is hindered by them from taking a course across hill and dale; yet the finished roadway really makes it possible for a man to get freely and easily to his destination: the limiting character of the road is really a liberating thing. Laws are meant to insure the unhampered and unthwarted exercise of rights and of free human acts among all subjects. Now all just laws, all civil ordinances which meet the requirements of the definition of law, are expressions of just civil authority, which, ultimately, is from God. Civil laws are, if truly laws, interpretations and applications of the natural law. Hence, in general, civil laws are to be regarded as binding the conscience of citizens, as obligations which men have a duty to recognize and fulfil.

2. Limits of State Authority.—The State exists to be the safeguard of individual and family rights, and to be the effective servant of its members. It has thus a definite function to perform, and this function itself defines the limits or extent of its authority. Any use of civil power for purposes other than the welfare and happiness of the members of the State is an abuse, and not a lawful use, of State authority. The State must not interfere with the rights of families and individuals. Sometimes, indeed, it may intervene in family or personal affairs, but only when families or individuals are incapable of coping with a situation which imperatively demands settlement, and then only in so far as is truly requisite. And once such intervention has attained its end, the State must withdraw; for it has no claim to a permanent foothold within the domain of family or personal rights by reason of the fact that it has rendered a helpful service in that domain. Should the State intervene without necessity, or should it seek to make just intervention the excuse for holding a place in fields not its own, it would interfere with human rights, and interference is never tolerable. State interference is likely to be paternalism, and, if widespread and insistent, it may become tyranny. Nor must the State interfere with the rights of the Church. The realm of proper State activity is that of the temporal well-being of man. But the State must ultimately serve man’s eternal interests, which are the direct concern of the Church. Hence, the State falsifies its own function, and also violates justice, if it interferes with the supernatural function of the Church. That institution does not serve man in any lasting way, even temporally, which interferes with his spiritual activities and interests. In brief, the duty of the State is to safeguard and promote the rights of individuals, families, and the Church; its duty does not extend to unseemly dictation and unjust interference. The Declaration of American Independence very adequately states the limits of State authority in these words: “We hold… that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights… that to secure these ends governments are instituted among men… when any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it…

3. Negative Function of the State,—The State must protect the rights of its members. Hence, it must maintain peace and order, for without these the exercise of human rights in society is impossible. To this end the State must protect persons and property from harm and theft. It must define crimes and civil offences, and prescribe and apply definite punishment. It must define and prescribe forms for the exercise of contract rights and the exchange of property. Further, the State must preserve its integrity among States, and adopt means adequate to prevent unfair aggression or annexation. These and other more detailed activities constitute the protecting or negative function of the civil State.

4. Positive Function of the State.—The State must further the well-being and happiness of its members. Hence it must promote industry and trade by due regulation, furnishing a coinage and standards of measurement; it must establish suitable navigation laws and set up a proper scale of customs on imports. The State must promote the fruitful labor of citizens, and so must render them facilities for the production and disposal of goods: roadways, waterways, other means of transportation; gas and electric power; postal service, telegraphs, telephones, radio. The State must look after the healthful and hygienic conditions in which citizens live and labor, and so must require decent “sanitation.” It must promote and foster education. It must take care of those who cannot care for themselves—the poor, the aged, the incapacitated, the physically and mentally unfit. Further, the State must look after the general and common possessions and resources, cultivating forests, keeping waters supplied with fish, and so on. Among the positive services which the State is to render its members is that of justified intervention. For sometimes the State is justified in intervening in private affairs. Rugged individualism, which makes the State a mere police-power, is not a sane State policy; nor is that economic system known as State Socialism, which would make the State the absolute owner and controller of all public utilities, a sound theory of State function. Limited and justified intervention on the part of the State is the safest and most reasonable doctrine in this matter. The State has the right and the duty of intervening to supply to its members that which they must have and which individual or organized effort among them cannot adequately provide. Thus the State rightly intervenes to prevent industrial accidents, to compel employers to install requisite safetydevices in shops and factories and to adopt measures that will insure just compensation to disabled workers. Again, the State should intervene to demand the establishing of health-insurance for employees, and to have public clinics and dispensaries set up to take care of families and citizens who have need of them. Further, the State must look after those who would suffer neglect and deprivation of their natural rights, if the civil power and public funds did not provide for them—orphaned and abandoned children, dependent widows, the aged, the feebleminded and insane, the destitute, invalids unprovided with proper care, and others. For in all these cases, individual or organized effort among the members of the State is inadequate; the State must act to prevent or to alleviate what otherwise would constitute an intolerable social evil. Yet in all instances, especially in those of a private rather than an industrial nature, the State must intervene, not interfere. Where private enterprise and interest (especially among relatives, friends, and neighbors of the sick, the poor, the deficient) can supply what is required, or can be made to do so, the State must not insist upon supplanting such care with its own devices. Social order and balance is a human thing; it is not to be made a rigid matter of card-index accuracy and business-office detail in order to suit a cold and formal State policy. Therefore, when kindliness and neighborliness work at least passably well to maintain the social order, State intervention would be State interference; and interference is never justified. The principle of limited and justified State intervention may be stated in the following terms: the State has the right and the duty of intervening to aid the efforts of its members only when an evil condition of affairs affects or threatens a notable number of families or citizens, and no other agency can deal adequately with the situation. For, be it ever carefully remembered, the State is the servant of its members; it exists to help its members, not to possess them and to put their activities under arbitrary rules. Members of the State ( families first; and, secondarily, individual citizens and residents) must guard themselves against two false and socially harmful attitudes towards the State. On the one hand, they must never regard themselves as the slaves or bondmen, the goods and chattels, of the State, nor must they submit to such State activity as would induce this attitude of mind in the rising generation. On the other hand, the members must not regard the State as an institution established to support them, to look after them with paternal care, and to relieve them of personal responsibility and effort in the struggle with social and industrial evils. In other words, members of the State must neither submit supinely to paternalism on the part of civil authority, nor must they think to cure all social ills, real and imagined, by the enactment of laws and appeals to State authority for intervention.

Summary of the Article

In this Article we have defined the State, and have indicated its character as a natural society, perfect in its own sphere, established with its definite form of government, to protect and promote the well-being of its members, who are, first, families, and, secondarily, individual persons. We have found that the State has its origin in man’s natural and normal needs, and not in some form of primeval social contract. We have defined State authority, have seen where its limits lie, and have explained what is meant by the negative and the positive func