Metaphysics — Conclusions
The conclusions of Glenn's Ontology set out as numbered theses, following the order of the tract, with intra-scholastic disputes marked.
Tract: Ontology (Fundamental Metaphysics) · Paul J. Glenn · 1938 · 17 articles in three Books School: Thomist
What this tract is for
Ontology asks what can be said of anything whatever, precisely insofar as it is. Every other science studies some restricted class of being — bodies, minds, numbers, conduct. This one studies being as being, and so supplies the terms (being, act, potency, essence, substance, cause) that the other sciences use without examining. It is the last of the speculative sciences to be studied and the immediate preparation for Natural Theology.
The architecture
The tract moves in three steps, and the order is not incidental:
- Book I — What being is. The concept of being, how it is predicated, and its two primary real divisions: act/potency and essence/existence.
- Book II — What follows from being. The transcendental properties that belong to everything that is (unity, truth, goodness), then two properties that are most general but fall short of transcendental (beauty, perfection).
- Book III — How being divides. The ten categories, then beings considered in their causes.
Book I fixes the terms; Book II draws out what is entailed; Book III classifies and explains. Nothing in Book III can be assessed without Book I, because the categories are divisions of being and causality is the communication of act.
Book I — Being
1. Ontology is the science of being as being. Its material object is all real being; its formal object is ens qua ens — non-material real being in its most basic aspects. Sciences are distinguished by their formal objects, which is what separates ontology from natural philosophy. → Introduction
2. Being (ens) is “that which is or can be.” It is the first concept the intellect forms and the last into which analysis resolves anything. It is therefore indefinable in the strict sense, since there is no prior term to define it by. → B1 C1 A2 — The Idea of Being and Its Inferiors
3. Being is predicated analogically, not univocally or equivocally. Not univocally, since being is not a genus — it admits of no genus above it and no specific difference outside it. Not equivocally, since the word does not shift senses arbitrarily. It is predicated by analogy of intrinsic and proper proportion, and not merely by analogy of attribution — Glenn’s distinction being that analogy of proportion rests on a likeness or similitude between the analogues, while analogy of attribution rests on some other relation such as instrumentality, causality or manifestation. The analogy of being governs everything that follows. → B1 C1 A1, A2
4. Real being has, or can have, existence independently of the created mind; logical being (ens rationis) exists only in and through the mind’s activity. Negations, impossible objects, the relations among ideas, and ideas themselves as entities are all entia rationis. They are indispensable in logic and grammar and must not be mistaken for real being in metaphysical inquiry. → B1 C2 A1 — Real Being and Logical Being
5. Every finite being is composed of actuality and potentiality; God alone is actus purus. → B1 C2 A2 — Actuality and Potentiality
6. Three axioms follow: actuality and perfection are convertible; potency cannot actualize itself; whatever is moved is moved by another. These carry the whole weight of the argument from motion in Natural Theology. → B1 C2 A2
7. Becoming is the transit from potency to act, and substantial change requires prime matter as an unchanged substrate — otherwise the change would be annihilation followed by creation, not change. → B1 C2 A2
8. Real essences are knowable; Nominalism and Conceptualism fail. Two arguments: proper activities are rooted in and reveal essences (as a thing is, so it acts), and the denial presupposes essential knowledge of the mind in the act of denying that essential knowledge is possible. → B1 C2 A3 — Essence and Existence
9. In every creature, essence and existence are really distinct — the position of the majority of scholastic philosophers. ⚠ Disputed among scholastics — see below. Glenn’s supporting notes: the complete concept of a creature’s essence does not include its existence; creatures are contingent, so identifying essence with existence would make their existence necessary; and existence is participated by creatures rather than constitutive of them. → B1 C2 A3
10. In God alone are essence and existence identical. God is ipsum esse subsistens. This is the hinge on which the entire distinction between necessary and contingent being turns. → B1 C2 A3
Book II — The Properties of Being
11. Unity: omne ens est unum. Every being is undivided in itself (indivisum in se) and thereby distinct from every other (divisum a quolibet alio). Unity adds nothing to being; it is being under the aspect of indivision. → B2 C1 A1 — The Unity of Being
12. Bodily substances are individuated by materia signata — matter marked by quantity. ⚠ Disputed among scholastics — see below. Not by essence, since an essence is communicable to many and an individual by definition is not. Not by accidents, since individuality is substantial. A consequence: complete spiritual substances cannot be individuated within a species, so each angel is its own species. → B2 C1 A1
13. Truth: every being is ontologically true — necessarily known by, and conformable to, the Divine Intellect. Ontological truth is the adequation of things to the Divine Mind; logical truth the adequation of the creatural mind to things. → B2 C1 A2 — The Truth of Being
14. Ontological falsity is impossible. Error is always in the creatural judging mind, never in the essence of things. All truth roots ultimately in God as First Truth. → B2 C1 A2
15. Goodness: ens et bonum convertuntur. Being and the good are really identical and distinguished only logically — good is being considered as desirable, as answering an appetite. → B2 C1 A3 — The Goodness of Being
16. Evil is the privation of good, not a positive entity. Metaphysical evil is impossible outright; physical and moral evil are real but are in their essence non-being. The cause of evil is therefore deficient, not efficient — which is what permits evil in a world made by a good God without making God its cause. → B2 C1 A3
17. Beauty is a most general but not strictly transcendental property of being. ⚠ Glenn’s position; not universal among Thomists — see below. → B2 C2 A1 — The Beauty of Being
18. Beauty is apprehended by the intellect; the senses are its channels, not its judges. Five objective factors constitute it: integrity, fulness of being, variety, unity or harmony, and splendour. → B2 C2 A1
19. Art cannot be immoral or amoral. Since man’s final end is the measure of all human activity, and morality is itself supremely beautiful, art must positively support the moral law. → B2 C2 A1
20. Perfection is the fulness of being a nature requires. Pure perfections (perfectio simpliciter simplex — life, knowledge) involve no admixed imperfection and may be predicated of God; mixed perfections (walking, discursive reasoning) carry limitation in their very notion and may not. A perfection is present formally, virtually, or eminently — the last of the Infinite alone. This distinction is what makes analogical predication of God possible at all. → B2 C2 A2 — The Perfection of Being
Book III — The Classification of Being
21. The categories are modes of real being, not modes of thinking. They must be read off reality as experienced, not deduced from an analysis of concepts — against Kant and Hegel. → B3 C1 A1 — The Categories in General
22. Aristotle’s ten categories exhaust finite real being: substance, and the nine accidents — quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, place, time, posture, habit. → B3 C1 A1
23. Substance is a reality fitted to exist in itself and by itself. We have no intuitive knowledge of substance but a reliable derived knowledge of it — from consciousness of the permanent “I” beneath changing states, from the fact that accidents must inhere in something, and from reason. → B3 C1 A2 — Substance
24. Subsistence of the rational order is personality; only men and angels are persons. A supposit is a subsistent substance; personality is the subsistence, not the nature. → B3 C1 A2
25. Because personality is subsistence rather than nature, the Incarnation involves no contradiction — the divine Person of the Son assumed a human nature without assuming a human personality. (A metaphysical conclusion with direct dogmatic consequence — this is the point at which Ontology hands over to Christology.) → B3 C1 A2
26. Time is an ens rationis cum fundamento in re — duration measured by successive motion. It is distinguished from aeviternity (created immortal being) and eternity (God alone). → B3 C1 A3 — Certain Accidents
27. A cause is a principle by force of which a thing is produced — cause is species to principle as genus. The relation requires real distinction between cause and effect, true dependency, and priority at least of nature. → B3 C2 A1 — Causes and Causality in General
28. Cause must be distinguished from reason, occasion, and condition. Confusing these is the standard route into false causal claims: a reason explains and may cover uncaused being; an occasion is merely present; a condition is required but may be dispensable. → B3 C2 A1
29. There are four causes — material and formal (intrinsic), efficient and final (extrinsic) — with exemplar and instrumental as minor causes. → B3 C2 A1
30. Prime matter is pure potency: neither a definite kind of matter nor nothing at all. It cannot exist or act by itself and is knowable only by analogy with the matter of accidental change. → B3 C2 A2 — Intrinsic Causes
31. Creatures are true efficient causes. Against occasionalism (Malebranche), Hume’s sensism, and positivism: denying creatural efficiency destroys moral responsibility and undermines the possibility of science itself. → B3 C2 A3 — Extrinsic Causes
32. Omne agens agit propter finem — every agent acts towards an end, by an inner intrinsic finality, whether unknowing, sentient, or rational. → B3 C2 A3
33. The end is first in intention and last in execution; the final cause is the cause of causes. The final cause moves the efficient cause to act, and so is prior in the order of causality though last in the order of production. → B3 C2 A3
Disputed points
These are live questions within scholasticism. Glenn takes a position on each; a reader should know that a position is being taken.
| Question | Glenn’s position | The alternative |
|---|---|---|
| Essence and existence in creatures (Th. 9) | Really distinct — held by “the majority of scholastic philosophers” | A distinction of reason with a foundation in reality (distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re), also called virtual. Glenn attributes it to “some philosophers” and does not treat it as an error. He names no individual on either side. |
| Principle of individuation (Th. 12) | Materia signata — Aquinas’s, and, Glenn says, the most generally accepted | Scotus’s haecceitas, a formally distinct “this-ness.” Glenn explicitly declines to criticise Scotus and objects only to the current interpretation of the doctrine. |
| Status of beauty (Th. 17) | A most general property, not strictly transcendental | Many Thomists count beauty a transcendental alongside unity, truth and goodness. |
| Division of philosophy (Th. 1) | The Aristotelian division; Cosmology and Psychology belong to philosophical physics, not metaphysics | Wolff’s division, making Cosmology, Psychology and Theodicy branches of special metaphysics — which Glenn notes has been “adopted almost universally” since. |
Key terms
— ens · being, that which is or can be
— ens reale / ens rationis · real being / being of reason
— actus purus · pure actuality, God alone
— materia prima · prime matter, pure potency
— materia signata · matter marked by quantity
— ipsum esse subsistens · subsistent being itself
— suppositum · a subsistent substance
— perfectio simpliciter simplex · a pure perfection
— distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re · a distinction of reason grounded in reality
— finis operis / finis operantis · end of the act / end of the agent
Reading it properly
This page states conclusions. It does not prove them, and the proofs are the point — Glenn’s arguments for the real distinction (Th. 9) and against occasionalism (Th. 31) are the parts worth reading in full. Start with B1 C2 A2 (act and potency): almost everything later depends on it.