Falsity

Nature and Kinds of Falsity

Falsity is the opposite of truth. When the mind and its object are brought into conjunction by judgment, conformity or agreement constitutes truth, lack of conformity constitutes falsity. Truth is the conformity of thought and thing; falsity is the lack of conformity of thought and thing.

Falsity is classified according to the truth to which it stands opposed. As we have distinguished ontological, logical, and moral truth, so we now distinguish ontological, logical, and moral falsity.

1. Ontological falsity (metaphysical or essential falsity) does not really exist, as we have already seen. Things are what they are, and they have a necessary relation of conformity with the accurate knowledge of what they are. Such accurate knowledge exists, primarily and of necessity, in the Divine Mind; secondarily, it exists in the rightly knowing created mind. Therefore, there is no ontological falsity properly so called. But we do speak of things as false, and so we seem to indicate the existence of ontological falsity. This, however, is but a manner of speaking. The falsity is not in things, but in the judgment of mind which pronounces the things other than they are. Still, in the things that are called false there iois usually a resemblance or relation to the other things for which incautious judgment may mistake them.

For this reason the term false is applied (by metaphor) to the things themselves. So it comes that we have a metaphorical or figurative ontological falsity.

But, as we shall see, the falsity is really logical, not ontological, for it is always, in fact or in occasion, the falsity of judgment. Thus, we may speak of false money, of a false face, of a false heart, of false conduct, of false teeth and whiskers. But false money, false whiskers, false teeth, are not really false; they are what they are; they are not really money, teeth, or whiskers at all. But these things resemble money, teeth, and whiskers, and by reason of this resemblance they give occasion to the precipitate mind of making false judgments about them, that is, of judging them to be true money, real teeth, and genuine whiskers. Thus the falsity (in fact or in occasion) is in the judgment, not in the things, and is, therefore, logical falsity. Again, false conduct is called false because it is deceiving, calculated to lead the observer to a false judgment about the person exhibiting such conduct. Here again the falsity is logical, not ontological. The expression, “a false heart,” indicates merely a treacherous disposition, a sly and hypocritical mode of action, which amounts to “false conduct,” and may lead one to u mistaken judgment. One who has relied upon a person and then finds that person unreliable, may declare that the person has “a false heart,” but must admit that the falsity lies in his own judgment of the person. In a word, wherever ontological falsity appears to exist, it can be known by a little investigation to be logical falsity, and not ontological, except by figure of speech. 2. Logical falsity (falsity of thought, conceptual falsity, mistakenness, error) is the lack of conformity of mind with object, of thought with thing, of judgment with the thing judged. As logical truth is found in judgment, and only imperfectly and inchoatively in the idea or concept, so logical falsity is found in the judgment, and not in the idea. This kind of falsity is sometimes called conceptual, but this name is justified only by extending, as some do, the meaning of the term concept, and making it equivalent rather to judgment than to idea. In casual speech we often use the word idea (and its synonym, notion) in a loose manner to signify knowledge, judgment, opinion, or even the intention of the will.

Thus we say, “You have a wrong idea of this matter,” or “Let me give you the correct notion of our procedure,” or “I had an idea that he would come,” or “He had the notion of going abroad.” Now, this loose use of terms must not distract the student of Criteriology, nor keep him from understanding the terms of his science in their strict technical sense. Ideas have neither truth nor falsity in a perfect manner; logical truth and logical falsity are predicable of the judgment. Ideas may sometimes be called false in a figurative sense, inasmuch as they are either the occasion or the result of fallacious judgment. z. Moral falsity (falsity of speech, untruthfulness, mendacity, lie) is the lack of conformity of thought and its objective expression. It is the disagreement existing between the knowledge of the speaker and his serious statement. We have already-seen that the study of moral truth and falsity belongs to Ethics and not to Criteriology.

Degrees of Falsity

In discussing the degrees of logical truth, we found that, formally or considered as such, truth admits of no degrees. We also found that truth, considered materially and subjectively, may be said to have degrees, inasmuch as the field of knowledge spreads more and more widely before the mind, and inasmuch as the mind may learn things more clearly and judge them more unhesitatingly.

Now, in the matter of logical falsity; we assert that formally, as well as materially and subjectively, there are degrees. Falsity is a lack of conformity between the judgment and its object; it is a failure to “measure up”; it is an inequality. Now, all inequality admits of degrees. To have a yard of cloth, one must have thirty-six inches of cloth, no less. But to fail to have a yard of cloth, one may have any number of inches, from one to thirty-five. In a word, there are no degrees in the yard itself and as such; it is a yard or it is not: but there are degrees in the measure by which one falls short of a yard. So with truth and falsity in their formal aspect. Thus truth as such admits of no degrees, whereas falsity as such does.

Falsity also admits of degrees when considered materially or in content, or, perhaps we had better say, in extent. For fewer or more points or notes about the object may be falsely judged. And subjectively (that is, with reference to the judging-subject) falsity admits of degrees, for a greater or lesser number of influences may induce the false judgment.

Thus, the man who thinks than an Indulgence is a pardon of sin, is in error; he makes a false judgment.

But the man who thinks that an Indulgence is a pardon for past sin and also a permission to commit sin, is more widely in error; materially, his judgment is false to a greater degree than the judgment of the first man. And the man who holds either of these opinions by mere hearsay is less deeply in error than the man who has let himself be solidly convinced of the error by reading and study of anti-Catholic writings and by studious attention to bigoted lecturers; subjectively the latter individual is in error to a greater degree than the former.

Summary Of The Article

In this very brief article we have contrasted truth and falsity. We have classified falsity, and have no TRUTH found that there is no real, but only metaphorical, ontological falsity. We have found that logical and moral falsity can really exist. Focussing our attention upon logical falsity, we have discerned the possibility of degrees, and have shown that formally, as well as materially and subjectively, there are degrees of logical falsity.