Indecisive States of Mind

Ignorance

When the mind is in a negative state with regard to truth, it is said to be in ignorance of truth. Ignorance is defined as a lack of knowledge in a subject capable of possessing it. Ignorance may be a lack of knowledge which one ought to have, and may reasonably be expected to have, and then it indicates a real lack, a real privation in the subject; such ignorance is called privative ignorance. Thus, the ignom rance of legal procedure in a lawyer is privative ignorance; so also is the ignorance of the higher mathematics in a graduate of a college of engineering. On the other hand, ignorance may be a lack of knowledge which one’ is not reasonably expected to possess, and then it constitutes no real privation in the subject; such ignorance is called negative ignorance or nescience. Thus, the ignorance of legal procedure in one who has made no study of law is negative ignorance; so also is the ignorance of the higher mathematics in a farmer. From a moral standpoint, ignorance which is one’s own fault, that is, ignorance which due diligence would dispel, is called culpable or vincible ignorance. Ignorance which is not one’s own fault, and which proper diligence does not suffice to dispel, is called inculpable or invincible ignorance.

The causes of ignorance, in addition to one’s own mental limitations, are: want of attention, inept methods of study and instruction, lack of reflection.

Doubt

When the mind hesitates between contradictory judgments, unable to deliver either the one or the other as true, it is in the state of doubt. Doubt, unlike ignorance, involves the presence of some knowledge in the mind, granted that it is imperfect knowledge.

When one is wholly ignorant, one has no doubts (and no certitudes) about the matter in which the ignorance prevails.

The mind hesitates, stands undecided, is in doubt, for one of two reasons. Either there is an equal weight of value, of reasons, of argument, on each side, or there appears to be no good reason inviting judgment to either side. In this matter of doubt, the mind is aptly likened to the old-fashioned balancescale which stands level when there is an equal weight on either side, or no weight at all on either side. Now, when the mind is in doubt by reason of apparently equal arguments or reasons for each of two contradictory judgments, it is said to be in the state of positive doubt. When there appears no good argument or reason for deciding either way, the mind is said to be in the state of negative doubt. To illustrate: the executor of a will, finding among the effects of the deceased person a valuable piece of property, is in doubt whether it is paid for. On the one hand, the executor knows that the testator was an honest man, careful to pay debts promptly, exact in filing receipted bills. On the other hand, there is no record of payment for the property in question, and, while no disregarded bill for the article is to be found, the company from which it was procured have no record of payment. Here the executor is in the state of positive doubt. He is in doubt, because his mind stands hesitant between two contradictory judgments, viz., “The bill has been paid” and “The bill has not been paid.” He is in positive doubt, because sound reasons invite both the one judgment and the other. A further illustration: After hearing two politicians expound opposite views, an auditor may say, “Each of these men has a good argument”; he is in a state of positive doubt concerning the political views defended.

Another auditor may say, “Neither of these speakers has made any telling point”; he is in a state of negative doubt as to which political view to adopt.

With reference to the thing doubted, we distinguish speculative doubt and practical doubt. Speculative doubt is doubt of the truth or falsity of a proposition. Practical doubt is doubt as to whether one should act or refrain from acting, or should act in this way or that. Doubt as to which political view is sound, is speculative doubt. Doubt as to whether one should vote for this party or that, is practical doubt.

The man who says, “I don’t know what to think,” is in a state of speculative doubt. The man who says, “I don’t know what to do,” is in a state of practical doubt.

Doubt, whether speculative or practical, is called prudent when it is based upon honestly digested reasons. Doubt entertained by reason of mere scruple is imprudent doubt. One may prudently doubt most statements of politicians, knowing the breed. But to doubt an honest man’s word about a simple matter concerning which he has obviously clear and certain knowledge, and in which he could have no motive for misleading us, would be to doubt imprudently. Imprudent doubt is the mark of a light and insincere mind. Let a man make sure of the state of important affairs; let him give such honest and earnest attention to the motives of judgment as the occasion (the matter in question) calls for. Then his doubt cannot remain imprudent. Either it will disappear and give place to certainty, or it will endure as a prudent doubt.

Causes of doubt, among many that might be mentioned, are: the difficulty of getting at the truth in certain matters; the variety and weight of conflicting authorities; the multitude of diverse opinions current on certain subjects; lightness and inattention of mind that makes one satisfied to entertain imprudent doubts.

Later in our study we shall have occasion to investigate the doctrine of Rene Descartes (15961650), who taught a theory of universal methodic doubt. This theory maintains that the philosopher, as a matter of true philosophic method, must begin his inquiry by doubting all things except his own existence and his own thought. Upon the single foundation of his thinking existence, the philosopher is to build up the edifice of certain knowledge, doubting everything until it is proved by actual demonstration. Descartes’ name in its Latin form is Cartesius, and his theory nis sometimes called Cartesian Doubt as well as Methodic Doubt. We shall see that this is not a true philosophic theory at all.

We shall have occasion also, in a later chapter, to study the doctrine of Skepticism, which falsely maintains that man cannot achieve certitude in anything (or, at best, that he can have certitude in very few things), but must remain in doubt about most of the things which the normal mind accepts as positively certain.

Suspicion

Doubt is the state of the mind which stands squarely between two contradictories, hesitant but erect, leaning neither towards the one side nor towards the other. But when the mind begins, however slightly, to incline towards one of the contradictories, without definitely accepting it or rejecting the opposite judgment, it is in the state of suspicion.

Suspicion is a term of ill meaning in daily speech; it implies some poorly grounded thought of “guilt.” Of course, no such meaning attaches to the use of the term in philosophy. Here to suspect, to have suspicion, or to be in the state of suspicion, means to incline towards a judgment and away from its opposite, but without a definite decision. It is the state of the mind in its first impulse or movement towards resolving a doubt. It must be carefully noted that suspicion is not yet the pronouncement of judgment.

In suspicion the mind does not definitely leave one judgment and definitely pronounce a contradictory judgment. In doubt, the mind is balanced in indecision; in suspicion, the mind shows a tendency to “come off balance.”

Summary Of The Article

In this article we have studied the states of the mind that involve no definite judgment; we have called them indecisive states of the mind. The mind is indecisive, does not deliver positive judgment, either when it has no knowledge (as in the state of ignorance) or when its knowledge is imperfect and inclines it to opposed judgments (states of doubt and suspicion).