The State

a) Definition and Origin of the State

In earlier Chapters we have spoken frequently of the State or civil society, but there is need for a direct and summary discussion of the subject here. Aristotle defines the State as a perfect natural society. The definition may be amplified and expressed as follows: The State is a perfect natural union of families, established for their common temporal good under a definite government. To explain the definition. The State is a natural society, for men, by an impulse and urge of nature, form civil groups and establish governments. The State is a perfect society, for it requires no other society upon which it depends for its peculiar function; in its own sphere it is self-sufficient and independent. The State exists for the common temporal good of those that make it up, and these members are, first, families, and, secondly, the individuals that compose families; and the State is meant to serve its members in temporal and external things. On this score the State differs from the Church, which serves the eternal and spiritual interests of men. Finally, the State is constituted under a definite form of government, that is, the members of the State are under the same authority in civil matters (i. e., temporal and external matters) ; and this is only saying that the State is a society, for authority is essential to any society; and the State must therefore have authority and a seat of authority or government, whether this be in the form of monarchy, democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy, or any other governing power. The origin of the State is indicated in the definition we have given, for we have called the State a natural society. The State has its origin in the natural urge and impulse of rational man to form civil society and set up government; it is a requirement of reason for life in society. Those who deny this doctrine declare that man has established the convenience of civil society by free agreement, and that the State is not naturally necessary to man. The agreement, say these theorists, was a social contract or social compact made by primitive men for the sake of securing peace and security, and to this end they sacrificed, in the terms of the contract, the great freedom and advantages that were theirs in solitary life. The chief exponents of the social contract theory are Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), an English philosopher, and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), the French materialist, although these two philosophers are not entirely at one in their manner of explaining and defending the theory. It seems needless to enter upon a detailed refutation of the social contract theory here. Suffice it to say that it has no historical foundation whatever. Over against it as a mere theory stands the unquestionable fact of the existence of civil society; and this fact is a primitive, universal, and constant phenomenon among men. Now, a primitive, universal, and constant phenomenon existing among men who are different in every way except in their nature—for men are different in talent, in ability, in character, in tastes, in dispositions or temperament, not to mention the mere external differences which are so marked that no two men are precisely alike in all particular bodily features, not even in one such feature—such a phenomenon, we say, has no explanation except in the one changeless thing about man, that is, his nature. Hence we assert that civil society, i. e., the State, is natural to man, and that the tendency or impulse of men which brings the State into being is a tendency which expresses a requirement of rational nature for life in human society. Of course, the actual form of government is not a thing naturally necessary, but is chosen and established by agreement or arrangement on the part of men. If the individual forms of governing power (monarchy, democracy, etc.) were of natural necessity, then there would be but one form in all communities or countries. The question may be asked, “Which is the best form of government?” Aristotle, four centuries before Christ, and St. Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, have both declared that this question has no absolute answer; and we are unable to answer it absolutely to-day. The question has a conditioned or qualified answer, however, and it is this: that form of government is the best for any given people or time which is found best suited to achieve the ends of government (i. e., the external and temporal welfare of the governed, and, indirectly, the promotion of men towards their eternal last end) among that people at that time. We Americans are likely to declare that our republican form of government is the best; and it probably is—for us, and in the conditions that mark our time. But there are possible conditions and times in which our form of government could neither be established, nor, if established, be made effective. Hence we may not declare absolutely, i. e., apart from all conditions and qualifications, that our form of government is the best.

b) THE EXTENT OF STATE AUTHORITY t Authority is essential to society; hence it is essential to civil society or the State. The nature of this authority is indicated by the ends which the society exists to achieve; and the same ends limit and define the extent to which such authority may be lawfully exercised. Now, the State exists to promote man’s material and temporal welfare. But material and temporal welfare itself is a good subordinated to the eternal and spiritual welfare of men. Hence the State in pursuing its ends must not contravene the higher good, the eternal interests of man. On the contrary, the State must, in its own sphere, render to men such service as may be helpful to them in the attainment of their last eternal end. The authority of the State comes from God. For, every natural requirement is created by the God who created nature; and the answer to such requirement is a thing divinely given. Now, civil society is a natural requirement of men, and is from God; and this requirement is met by authority in the State, and this, too, must be from God. But God does not work at cross purposes; He does not make State authority a thing to contradict His own eternal plan and providence. Hence State authority has very definite limits beyond which it cannot lawfully go. We have seen some of these limits in previous chapters, and notably in our discussion of the right to educate children. We are now to assert more generally the limits of the good and necessary thing called State authority. The State must not interfere with the rights of the individual or the family in matters strictly personal and private. It must not, therefore, interfere with the rights of parents to educate their children, nor with the conduct of the home, nor with the personal practices of any citizen, except in so far as it may (and should) accurately define what the natural law already requires in cases of a collision of rights (cf. Book I, Chap. I, Art. i, c). The State should protect, stimulate, and help its citizens in the proper exercise of human liberty. It should strive to remove obstacles which hamper the activity of liberty—such as war, excessive taxes, political dissensions. It should take repressive measures against violations of the rights of citizens; and, where the natural law is not definite, it should clearly define these rights. It should help individual liberty by doing for its citizens what they cannot do for themselves, as individuals or as groups: and thus the State should open and improve ports and canals; conduct public works such as im- proved means of transport on a large scale, model factories, etc.; promote technical instruction in all branches of industry; help necessary or useful individual efforts by generous subsidies; and so on. To do all this well, the State should exact a certain and equable sacrifice of money from all citizens (taxation). Our own American Declaration of Independence sets forth sound ethical doctrine in the matter of the due limitation of State authority: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these ends governments are instituted among ,v . t r , . men — . . that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it… . ” State authority, with noble ends and due limitations, comes from God. It resides in the people by the gift of God, and by them is conferred upon a chosen ruler. The ruler is responsible to God and to the people. God confers authority upon the whole people, not by any special act, but by creating them; for He creates them men, as free and rational agents who are to live together in human society, and the authority is a plain essential required by reason in these circumstances. Such being the character of State authority, it follows that the true laws which it enacts, i. e., laws that are ordinances of reason for the common good, laws that are just, honest, possible of observance, useful, permanent, and promulgated, are binding upon the conscience of men. Men cannot disregard such laws without moral guilt; for they are due enactments of authority which comes from God, and in so far they are particular expressions and applications of the Eternal Law, which is the Norm of Morality. When civil authority is abused, an injustice is committed against the members of the State. In this case the rulers—who are responsible to God and to the people, and who are in office to protect, inspire, and help the citizens of the community—falsify their trust, and become oppressors and tyrants. Redress in such circumstances cannot be had through courts that are the allies of tyrannous rulers. How are the people to obtain redress? By due resistance. Of course, if the tyranny is not extreme, prudence counsels a long and patient sufferance. But if, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, “a long train of abuses and usurpations … evinces a design to reduce them (i. e., the citizens) under absolute despotism,” then it is the right of the people to resist. In this case, the tyrannous government is an unjust aggressor, and resistance is the one lawful means of overcoming it. Notice that such resistance is not rebellion. Rebellion is an unjust aggression on the part of citizens against the State as duly constituted and established; and as such, rebellion is always a direct violation of the natural law. But resistance, even armed resistance, is justified selfdefence. As long as the State is not wholly corrupt, wholly faithless to its natural purpose of caring for the common material welfare of its people, it continues to be the State, and an attempt to overthrow it is rebellion, a thing always wrong. But when the State has become the oppressor of its citizens, when it has ceased to be in any sense an institution working for the welfare of the citizens, then it is the enemy and the aggressor of the citizens, and may be resisted, and lawfully resisted, even to the extent of war and bloodshed.

Summary of the Article

In this Article we have defined the State, and have determined its natural origin, rejecting the social contract theory as unsound. We have remarked upon forms of government, showing that there is no form that is absolutely the best, and that the relatively best form is that which is suited to the time, the place, and the people, in any given instance. We have shown that authority is necessary in the State. This means that the citizens must be governed; that there must be some form of established power in control. We have investigated the duties of the

State, and the limits to which the exercise of its authority may lawfully extend. We have shown the divine source of just State authority, and the binding force of true laws enacted by such authority. We have discussed the abuse of State authority, and the means of redress lawfully available to citizens under a despotism or tyranny. We have shown that resistance is justified in case of outright tyranny, while rebellion is always wrong and is opposed to the natural law.

a)Labor b)Associations c)Wages d)Coercive Measures