Man's Work
The morality of labor; the rights and duties of workers and employers; just wage, private property, and the principles underlying Catholic social teaching on economic life.
Labor has a twofold character: personal (the worker invests his personal energy, intelligence, and skill) and social (labor occurs within and for a community whose common life it sustains). From its personal character derive: the right to a just wage (sufficient to support the worker and his family in reasonable comfort — a demand of commutative justice), the right to private property (the fruit of his labour belongs to him), and the right to organise with fellow workers in defence of just conditions. From its social character derive: the duty to contribute honestly to the common enterprise and the social function of property (private property carries a social mortgage — it must serve not only the owner but the common good). Catholic social teaching (Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum, Pius XI's Quadragesimo Anno) provides the authoritative framework for applying these principles to modern industrial life.
a) Labor
Labor or work is man’s effort applied to production of goods. It is the effort of mind or body partially or wholly applied to the production of utilities. While the term labor is ordinarily used to denote hired labor, and sometimes manual or bodily labor, it really signifies the effort of the professional man (clergyman, lawyer, physician, surgeon, actor, journalist, business man) as well as that of the mechanic, the “day laborer,” and the farmer. All human effort unites in different proportions the activities of body (muscular effort), intellect (mental effort), and will (moral effort). And any human effort, no matter what proportion of muscle, mind, and will be involved, which tends partially or entirely to the production of goods, utilities, commodities, values, results—in a word, that can in any manner be translated into terms of dollars and cents—is labor or work. Labor is a means of attaining to man’s last end, and indeed, speaking generally, an indispensable means. For man’s faculties of body and mind were given him for the attainment of his last end; these faculties require the maintenance of bodily, mental, and moral life and effectiveness; and to this maintenance labor, or its fruit, is a direct means. To the Christian, labor is at once a penance and a blessing. It is a penalty imposed upon man for original sin; and it is a blessing, for, given original sin and its disastrous effect upon the intellect and will, man would quickly become the prey of inordinate passions, and so would come to moral ruin and the loss of his eternal last end, were he not occupied with the necessity of activity, of labor. That “the devil finds some mischief still for idle hands to do,” is an ancient saw; but one may dispense with the devil in this matter, and declare, as a postulate of reason and experience, that human nature, wounded by the Fall, finds in idleness the deep and full flowing spring of moral evil. Labor is man’s right and duty. Speaking generally, it is a necessary means to his last end, and therefore v/ his inalienable right. Speaking particularly, labor of some kind is the duty of each and all, for it is the opportunity of gaining merit for the life to come.
Further, labor is a solace, a source of interest and pleasure, of peace and happiness—at least for the man who undertakes it with willing spirit in imitation of Our Divine Lord. If labor be a thing productive of fruits that can be, in any manner whatever, translated into terms of dollars and cents, what of intellectual and spiritual labor? What of the hard study of the student? What of the continuous prayers of the contemplative? The student prepares himself, ordinarily speaking, for gainful occupation; and even the recluse, the finished scholar who studies and writes, pours out the wealth of his mind that takes shape in manuscripts and books, and is transferred and circulated among men by buying and selling. The contemplative, the rare soul called to “the better part,” wins countless favors for humanity; in example and through the fruits of active divine worship, such a soul keeps the world from forgetting the high principles of the Christian religion and morality which alone make labor possible among the mass of men to whom it is a hardship in itself, a thing that requires effort and perseverance. And from labor so encouraged come the goods of material wealth. Thus, there is a distinctly traceable relation between the highest and most spiritual occupation, and the labor that leads to material goods. Still, practically speaking, we need not go to such lengths to establish the justice of our definition of labor. In Ethics we consider labor chiefly in the sense that the term carries to the economist and the sociologist. We mean the work that is done, wholly or partially, for self-support or gain, by the professional man, the business man, the farmer, the mechanic, and the man who uses bodily effort on “a job.” In a word, we mean that which is done, wholly or partially, or in any manner, for a wage.
b) Associations
Association is the active gathering together of men to form a society. Here, we do not speak of the natural association inseparable from the family and from the human race (human society) as such; nor do we mean by association the formation of the natural and perfect society called the State, nor the higher perfect society called the Church. We mean the coming together of men to form a private society for the better achievement of private ends. Thus we have associations that are religious, such as a sodality; political, such as a party committee, or a party itself; scientific, such as a society for research ; industrial, such as a labor union; commercial, such as a board of trade; literary, such as a study circle or debating club; etc. To form associations with his fellows for the better achievement of lawful ends that the associates as individuals could not achieve, or could not achieve readily, is the right of man, and a natural right. For man is inclined by nature towards the orderly development of his faculties, and to realize this natural disposition he needs to conjoin his powers with those of others in association distinct from domestic and civil society. Such association masses and focuses the powers and the efforts of individuals; it coordinates, combines, intensifies, and directs these efforts for the achieving of a lawful end. Thus the end is achievable, and readily achievable, by the conjoined work of the associates, whereas, though a lawful good towards which each may, or even must, strive, it would not be so achievable by individual and separate effort. Hence, association is often a better means to a lawful end than individual effort; just as “two heads are better than one,” and just as ten hands will lift a greater weight than two. Now, man has a natural right to achieve lawful ends; hence he has the natural right to the use of the means, and of the better means, to that achievement. It follows that the right of association is a natural right. Again: as a single person requires the union of head and hands and tools to accomplish a piece of work, and as he has the natural right to combine these things in the production of the work, so, by a true parity, Tom and Dick and Harry may unite to achieve a certain end, and they have the natural right so to unite; and in uniting they constitute a moral person, a single moral personality, which has rights that are not to be limited more than those of physical persons. Now, if men may lawfully unite in association for the achievement of a lawful end, workers may so unite. And thus “professional associations” may lawfully exist. Of such associations, the more important for Ethics (as being the most common, and as presenting the most obvious field of application for matters of right) exist among industrial workers, and are known as “labor unions”, or, collectively, as “organized labor.” With such associations we shall deal in brief detail. Workers are not machines, not tools, not workhorses. They are men. As men they have rights to goods of soul, of body, and of fortune. They have duties too: duties to God, to self, to fellowmen. When these facts or their implications are ignored by those that have the control of the means of production (capitalists and employers), an injustice is done, and this is an injustice against the natural law. So much is evident. Now, individual workmen are powerless to combat such injustice if it exists, and to prevent its existence if it threatens. Organized labor can resist or prevent such injustice. Hence organization of labor is lawful as a necessary means to protect natural rights. Labor unions must strive to obtain for workers that fulness of rounded human life, that orderly development of faculties, and seemly use thereof, that belong to individual men by right of nature. Therefore, the effort of such unions must be to secure to men true freedom in the making of wage contracts, and there is no true freedom when the worker has the alternative of accepting this sort of work, or wage, or working condition, or hours of work, or of •starving. Hence labor unions must seek to establish and maintain decency in work, justice in wages, humanity in the working schedule, sanitary conditions in the places of employment. In a word, labor unions must seek to fix the conditions of labor justly, so that the workman may be kept out of servitude, and may live free to do “all that may become a man,” neither attempting more, nor accepting less. Labor unions, like other moral and physical persons, must not exceed their rights. They must fulfill their duties. If labor unions are not used for lawful ends, they are abused. They must not, therefore, demand exorbitant returns for work, nor unreasonable hours, nor bring to naught their efforts for a just wage and decent living conditions by prosecuting accidental and trifling demands. Nor must they be too quick to employ coercive methods in gaining their just ends, but must reserve such methods (strikes, boycotts) as the last reluctant resort.
c) Wages
Wages are the price of work. Wages are the sum of money, or money equivalent, exchanged for a certain amount of work, or for a certain time of service. The nominal wage is the sum named in the wage contract; the real wage is the exchange value of this sum. In other words, the nominal wage is the face value of the money paid, and the real wage is the amount of goods this money will buy. Thus a man whose wage is ten dollars a day in 1930 has a much higher nominal wage than a man whose wage was five dollars a day in 1905; and still the latter’s real wage is the greater of the two, for one could procure more with five dollars in 1905 than with ten in 1930- Workman and employer agree on the wage to be paid; the workman gives his labor, in terms of products (piece work) or of time (day-work, monthly work, etc.), and the employer pays money. Thus between the employer and the laborer there is a contract made, and this contract is bilateral, since there is an obligation imposed by the contract upon both parties to it. Now, as we have seen, a true contract requires freedom in the parties. But if the workman is forced to accept the employer’s terms, or starve, he has no real freedom in the matter; and unless the terms offered are humanly liberal, an injustice is done to the worker. Out of this situation arises the question of a just wage. Certainly, the worker is entitled to justice; hence he is entitled to a just wage. J But what, precisely, is a just wage f If men were free to regard human labor as a material good to be disposed of like any commodity; if they were free to buy and sell it as they are free to buy and sell tools, or land, or domestic animals; then the matter of deciding upon the actual amount of a just wage would be comparatively simple. Men would simply look for the market value of labor and dispose of it at that price. Employers would grumble, “Labor is up to-day,” or would gleefully concede that, “Labor is down to something like a reasonable rate just now.” But labor is not merely a material commodity. It has in it something of the nature and dignity of man. It has a human element. It follows, therefore, that a wage contract, a contract in which labor is exchanged for money, must not be an agreement which turns a man into a chattel; it must not be an agreement to the detriment of a man with rights to life, to health, to good moral influences, to the performance of duties of vocation, such as the founding and supporting of a family, the provision for age and sickness in himself and in his dependents. In a word, the wage contract must be such as takes into account at least the minimum essentials of a proper, full, and rounded human life. A just wage is obviously not to be computed in figures; no nominal just wage can be fixed, for nothing is so variable as the exchange value of money. But something like a fixed requirement for a just wage may be established in real terms, i. e., in terms of what such a wage should be capable of providing. Certainly a just wage must be a living wage, i. e., such as will enable the recipient to live a decent and respectable, if frugal, life, and to pro- vide something for times of age, ill-health, or unemployment. Thus far we speak of a personal just wage. But what of a family wage, i. e., a wage sufficient for the founding, support, and rearing (education) of a family? Sound economists and ethicians are agreed that a family wage is a matter of moral obligation upon the employer, although some of the authorities base this obligation upon chanty, while others base it upon strict justice. The details of this matter must be worked out by the economist and the sociologist. Ethics lays down basic principles, but cannot discuss all the particulars that must be considered in the actual application of these principles. The elemental principles may be reduced to these: Justice must be done. Justice means giving to every man what is his due. The worker must be given, in the way of wages, what is his due. Now, certainly, it is just that the laborer be able to live in humanly decent circumstances, and to support those who belong to him, by the fruits of his work. In the matter of determining, at any time and in any circumstances, just what amount will meet the requirements of justice in the wage contract, recourse must be had to the consensus of opinion among wise, prudent, upright, and experienced men. And the Christian employer will not fail to meet in this matter the full demands of justice and the requirements of Christian charity as well.
But what of the employer? Is he not entitled to a return, to a just profit, to his own “wages” in fact? Certainly, he is. Yet if he cannot obtain a due return without injustice to others, he has no alternative but to leave the ranks of employers and enter upon the state of an independent worker or of an employee.
d) Coercive Measures
Workers and employers alike have human rights. Sometimes these rights require defence. When there is no adequate defence except coercion, workers resort to strikes and boycotts, and employers to lockouts. We must say a brief word on each of these coercive measures. i. Strikes.—A strike is a cessation of work by agreement of the workers for the purpose of bettering the conditions of labor. A strike may be for the purpose of enforcing better wages, shorter hours of work, better working conditions, or all of these together. It is a lawful measure when used, under due conditions, for the defence or enforcement of the workers’ rights. The conditions requisite for a just strike are: (i) That it be the only available means of reaching a just settlement of the difficulties between employer and employees; (2) That the matter at stake be of an importance sufficient to warrant the hardship and damage that must be borne by the workers, the employers, the families of both, and the community at large; (3) That there be a reasonable hope of success in obtaining the good for which the strike is called. Hence a strike that is called for the purpose of bettering conditions that are already just; or a strike in violation of a just contract which the employer has not first violated; or a strike that means direct violation of the rights of others or of the community; or a strike that is too hastily undertaken where the matter might have been settled by arbitration; or a strike that is obviously hopeless to begin with, and is therefore not an apt means to the desired end—each of these is an unjust and an unlawful strike. Yet, as we have seen, when the requisite conditions are present, strikes are lawful; and the State has, therefore, no right to make a law prohibiting them. Still, the State, within the just limits of its authority, ought to interfere to punish or prevent the abuse of strikes. Thus the State may break up a strike that is becoming a menace to society. The State has the further duty of working out means to prevent the perpetual recurrence of strikes, and to this end it should create boards of arbitration before which employers and employees could adjust their relations with the secure hope of being justly dealt with. ii. Boycotts.—A boycott is a refusal to have business (or social) dealings with a certain person or institution. It is, when just, a moral force exercised upon a person (physical or moral) to bring the latter to the practice of justice, or, more accurately, to make him give up the practice of injustice. A boycott, to be just, must be directed against a true abuse, a truly unjust condition. It must be kept within the limits of justice and charity. It must be a means that is apt; a means that offers solid probability of success in the achievement of its end. It must be entirely without violence or the threat of violence. Like the strike, the boycott is to be regarded as a last resort, to be employed either when other available means have failed, or when there is obviously no other means available. iii. Lockouts.—A lockout is the refusal of an employer to furnish work to employees, and is used ► to suppress injustice on the part of workers. The employer, like the worker, may suffer injustice. The lockout is his last resource, just as the strike is that of the workers. And, under due conditions—-conditions which are, when duly adapted, essentially the same as those required for a just strike—the lockout is lawful. When unlawful, the lockout is a grave injustice against the workers and against the common good.
Summary of the Article
Our study of this Article has taught us the meaning of labor. We have learned that man has a right and a duty to labor, and we have seen that the fulfillment of this duty may be made a source of peace and happiness as well as of material goods.
We have discussed the natural right of men to associate for the furtherance of their common welfare. We have dealt in particular with the associations known as labor unions, and have considered their use and their abuse. We have defined wages, and have established the ethical principles involved in the subject, discussing in particular the matters of a personal living wage, a family living wage, a just wage in general, and the means of determining what a just wage is. Finally, we have considered the morality of the coercive measures adopted by employers or employees for obtaining just treatment. We have dealt briefly with the strike, the boycott, and the lockout.