Kant and His Successors

Article i. Kant and His Successors

a) Kant; b) Fichte; c) Schelling; d) Hegel;

e) Other Kantian Philosophers.

a) Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

Life: Immanuel Kant was born at Koenigsberg, Germany, and spent most of his life there. He studied mathematics, theology, and philosophy. From 1770 to 1796 he held the chair of philosophy at the University of Koenigsberg. He achieved great fame by his writings, especially by The Critique of Pure Reason, which appeared in 1781. He died convinced that he had discovered the true philosophy, and confidently predicted that posterity would acknowledge the truth of his doctrines.

Works: Kant wrote The Critique of Pure Reason; The Critique of Practical Reason; The Critique of the Faculty of Judgment.

Doctrine: The chief influences in the formation of Kant were Descartes, Wolff, and Hume ; Scholasticism he did not know at 330 all. Dissatisfied with Cartesianism, and roused to opposition by Hume’s idealism, he sought a new and true answer to the critical question, the question of the extent and validity of human knowledge. He asked, “What can we know with certainty?” The answer to that question reaches into two fields, viz., that of pure speculation and that of practical action. In other words, the question amounts to this: “What can we know with certainty (speculative question) ; and what have we to do and to expect as a result of our certain knowledge? (practical question).” Kant’s answer to the first part of this question is contained in The Critique of Pure Reason. His answer to the second part is contained in The Critique of Practical Reason. i. What can we know with certainty; of what can we have scientific knowledge? First, we must investigate the cognitive faculties. These are three : (1) sense, which gives (or seems to give) knowledge of the world around us. The function of sense is sensation : Kant calls sensation empirical intuition; (2) intellect, which pronounces judgment on empirical intuitions as agreeing or disagreeing; (3) reason, which argues to further conclusions from judgments. Now each of these faculties has a twofold element. One element is the intrinsic constitution of the faculty itself, and this is the formal element. The other is the object with which the faculty deals; it is extrinsic to the faculty, and is called the material element. To illustrate by analogy: Suppose you have a quaintly shaped bottle. Any liquid you pour into the bottle will conform its bulk to the shape of the bottle. The shape of the bottle may stand by analogy for the formal element (called a priori) of the knowing faculty (be it sense, intellect, or reason). The liquid stands for the material element (called a posteriori) of the knowing faculty. Now to deal with these three knowing faculties in some detail :

(1) Sense gives, or seems to give, knowledge of a bodily world around us. It somehow takes impressions from bodily things. But its action is its own (innate and a priori) in conformity to its intrinsic and natural constitution, and so it perceives things by qualifying them according to its nature, just as a bottle conforms the liquid contents to its own shape. Now the innate, a priori, intrinsic constitution of sense is characterized by two forms called space and time. Sense perceives things as occupying space and as occurring in time. But space and time are not anything outside the sense-faculty; they are the “shape” of the faculty, and whatever sense perceives (or receives into itself) must take that shape. There is indeed something real outside us, something which somehow stirs sense to act; this is the mere appearance of things (phenomena). Phenomena affect the sense-faculty much as a man affects a motor by cranking it; the impulse is given by phenomena, and then the “mental motor” goes on functioning in its own determinate way. It functions in the “grooves” of space and time. Its function results in a percept or empirical intuition. To sum up : The impression of phenomena, conditioned or qualified by space and time, causes the sense-faculty to produce empirical intuitions. The material element in sense-functions is phenomena; the formal element is found in two subjective forms, space and time. The two elements come together to form empirical intuitions, as already explained. To illustrate by analogy: I see green grass. This means that there is something real outside me, fitted with an appearance (phenomenon) which can stimulate my vision (i. e., sense of sight). My sense of sight, intrinsically conditioned by the a priori forms of space and time, gives me, here and now, an intuition (direct beholding) of something, which I call green and of something which I call grass. (2) Int el l ect takes the empirical intuitions of sense as the material element of its function. Just as the senses perceive phenomena, so intellect perceives relations of empirical intui-tions. The full fruitage of sense (i. e., phenomena perceived or received in a sense-qualified manner) is the material with which intellect deals. These empirical intuitions are taken into the intellect in a manner conformable to its constitution, its “shape.” Now the “shape” of the intellect is determined by twelve a priori forms. These twelve forms constitute the formal element of intellect, and are conveniently divided into four groups of three, as follows : Groups Individual Forms (i) quantity…unity, plurality, totality; (ii) quality…affirmation, negation, limitation; (iii) relation…substance-accident; cause-effect; actionpassion; (iv) modality… . .existence-non existence; possibility-impossibility ; necessity-contingency. For example: Intellect receives the empirical intuitions of “grass” and “green.” Receiving this into itself, running it through its forms, it produces the judgment, “This grass is green.” According to quantity the judgment has the form of totality; I perceive the sum-total of the blades of grass as green. (If I formed the judgment: “There are many blades of grass here,” the judgment would have the character of plurality on the score of quantity. Or, if I made the judgment “This is a blade of grass,” the judgment would have, on the head of quantity, the form of unity.) According to quality, my judgment is an affirmation. According to relation, my judgment is of the substance-accident kind. According to modality, my judgment is marked by the forms of existence and contingency. Thus every judgment receives its character from the a priori and innate forms of the intellect. Notice that the reality of the thing judged is not touched or perceived! Intellect has its own set and natural function; it “turns out” judgments; and these are “turned out” according to the forms, the “shape” of the intellect, as ingots are turned out in the shape of a mold. Now the judgment used here in illustration is a contingent judgment, as we have seen when discussing its modality. Such judgments are particular, they are of little value for scientific knowledge which requires universal and necessary judgments. But how can I make such judgments, when the materials of judging are furnished by the empirical intuitions of sense, which are always particular? How, for example, can I say that “All grass is green” when my empirical intuitions (upon which judgment is made) are only concerned with this grass? How can I say that “The angles of any triangle are equal to two right angles” when my empirical intuition of triangle is always concerned with this or that or these triangles, and never, by any possibility, with all possible triangles? Kant says that universal and necessary judgments are really made by the intellect, but he sees that the direct materials for these cannot be particular and contingent empirical intuitions. Therefore, he says they are a separate or special kind of judgments, and come entirely from the intellect and not from empirical intuitions. These universal and necessary judgments are called synthetic a priori judgments; and they alone make science possible. To understand all this more clearly, let us make a classification of judgments according to Kant’s mind : (A) Analytic Judgments.—A judgment of any kind may be expressed in a proposition, which is a formula of words having a subject, predicate, and copula. Now if the analysis of the subject reveals the predicate, then the judgment is analytic. That is to say, if I take the subject apart—analyze it—and find the predicate therein, the judgment is analytic. Thus “A is A” is an analytic judgment. Also, “A body is an extended being” is an analytic judgment. Such judgments add nothing to science; they tell nothing new,’ they consist in explicitly affirming what is already implicitly contained in the subject-idea. (B) Synthetic a Posteriori Judgments.—If the analysis of the subject does not reveal the predicate, and the latter is joined to the subject by reason of empirical intuition (sense knowledge), the judgment is synthetic (“pïit together”). Examples:

“This grass is green” ; “This land is flat.” Such judgments do not serve science, for, while they tell us something new, they are particular and contingent, and science requires necessary and universal truths. The simply synthetic judgment here described is fully characterized as synthetic a posteriori. (C) Synthetic a Priori Judgments.—When analysis of the subject does not reveal the predicate, and the latter is joined to the subject by no mere sensation reason, but by the intrinsic subjective power of intellect, independently of experience (a priori}, then the judgment is synthetic a priori. These judgments are universal and necessary; they tell something new, and hence constitute an advance in science. They make science possible. Examples of such judgment: “7 and 5 are 12”; “Whatever has a beginning has a cause”; “All radii of a circle are equal” ; “In bodily changes no quantity of matter perishes,” etc. These judgments are synthetic, because the predicate is not discovered by analyzing the subject; and they are a priori, because they are formed by the innate power of the intellect independently of sense experience. (3) Reason takes the judgments (called also “concepts”) of intellect as its material element. The formal element of Reason consists in three “Ideas” which condition reasoning just as space and time condition sensation, and as the twelve forms of intellect condition judgment. These three ideas which constitute the formal element of Reasoning are, (i) The Idea of the Self or Soul; (ii) The Idea of the Material World; (iii) The Idea of God. Are these things then only ideas? Do self, world, and God exist as mere formalities of Reason? Kant does not deny the real existence of these things. He does, however, deny that we can know their nature, or anything about their nature. Nature or essence of things is called Nou-menon (plural, Noúmeno), and Noumena really underly Phenomena, but all we know is Phenomena, and not even Phenomena in essential existence, but only inasmuch as Phenomena somehow impel sense to function. In the last analysis, all we know is our own mental states. Our knowledge goes on forming according to the construction and constitution of our faculties (sense, intellect, reason) after phenomena have given the impulse to sense. We reason or speculate on things according to the formalities or “shape” of the Reason, and thus all reasoning is conditioned or qualified by the a priori and innate background of ideas of God, the world, and self. To sum up: We have three knowing faculties, sense, intellect, reason. Each faculty has its own formalities (its “shape”) which condition all that it apprehends. The first impulse for exercising the knowing-function is given by phenomena or sensible appearances of things. From that point on the knowingfaculties have no contact with things external. In the ultimate view, therefore, all we know of things is phenomena, and we know these only inasmuch as they impress sense and give rise to empirical intuitions. Therefore, speculation on the nature or noumena of things is vain and useless ; we cannot know noúmeno; we know that they are, but we cannot know what they are. It follows that Metaphysics, which defines such things as essence, substance, subsistence, nature, cause, effect, spirit, body, matter, form, and all the other matters in its scope, is an illusory science, and no true science at all. Metaphysics as a science is impossible. It may be of service to give in schematic outline Kant’s theory of knowledge : Faculty Material EleFormal EleResulting ment ment Function I. Sense Phenomena Space and Time Empirical Intuitions 2. Intellect Empirical Intui12 forms or “Catego-Judgments tions ries” 3. Reason Judgments 3 ideas Reasoning ii. In The Critique of Practical Reason Kant declares that Practical Reason supplies to our needs what Pure Reason fails to make clear. Pure Reason, indeed, fails to give us the most important truths with which human knowledge is concerned. For instance, Pure Reason discovers nothing of the nature or origin of ditty. Practical Reason supplies the lack; it says in unconditional terms, “Do this”; “Avoid that.” I am more certain of this moral obligation than of anything I apprehend through the functioning of the knowing-faculties. I am more sure, for example, that I must avoid murder, than that I am hot or cold. That moral obligation binds me, that it comes from some authoritative seat within me, I am perfectly sure. I call this inner authority, whose commands are unconditional (i. e., categorical) and imperative, the Categorical Imperative. Granting the existence of the Categorical Imperative (and I am so sure of it that I must acknowledge its existence), I find that it involves fundamental truths about man and his destiny : (i) If I am subject to imperative command, I must be free to obey or disobey. Necessitated beings need no command or “law.” Therefore I must be free, i. e., I have free will. (2) If I freely obey, I am entitled to reward. If I disobey, I deserve punishment. The “law” of the Categorical Imperative must have sanctions, else it is illusory and meaningless, which I cannot admit. (3) But I can go on obeying, and am never through obeying. The Categorical Imperative does not cease its commands. If I perfect myself by obedience, I can go on through life without filling up the measure of obedience. The Categorical Imperative orders me to perfect obedience, but I cannot achieve perfect and full obedience in this brief life. Therefore, I must achieve obedience perfectly (and consequent holiness) in a life to come. In other words, the admission of the Categorical Imperative involves the admission of the immortality of the soul. (4) The Categorical Imperative is unquestionably a law. But a law presupposes a lawgiver. Being a law universal and unconditional, the Categorical Imperative demands a lawgiver supreme and perfect—God. Therefore the admission of the Categorical Imperative involves the admission of the exist ence of God. Thus Practical Reason gives certain knowledge which Pure Reason is powerless to give. Practical Reason informs me with certitude of moral duty, of the immortality of the soul, of free will, of sanctions in a life to come, of the existence of God. iii. Intermediate between Pure and Practical Reason is the Faculty of judging and appreciating the beautiful with its purpose and design. This is the Faculty of Judgment or Aesthetic Appreciation. The use of this faculty gives a more striking and attractive presentation of the beauty of moral goodness than Practical Reason can give.

Remarks: Kant asserts that we cannot know things-in-themselves (noumena), but only appearances. This is a dogmatic statement; it is arbitrary without being authoritative. It is surely out of place in what purports to be a critical philosophy, and one indeed that was born of a sudden impulse of its author to cast aside “dogmatic dreams.” Again, dogmatically, Kant asserts that space and time are pure forms in the knowing subject: a gratuitous statement which may be gratuitously denied. Kant’s assertion that there are synthetic a priori judgments is simply not true. His examples of such judgments are either analytic or they are synthetic a posteriori. His statement that Reason has a natural endowment of three regulative ideas which determine its function and color the result, is obviously false. Kant contradicts himself : he denies the validity of reason ; yet he uses reason in developing his own system. Again, he tells us that we can know nothing of things-in-themselves (noumena), and by that very statement he implicitly teaches us something of the intrinsic nature of the mind. He denies the value of speculation or pure reasoning, and proceeds to use it copiously, applying the principle of causality (in the order of noumena) after denying its validity.

Finally, Kant’s doctrine leads to Skepticism, as reason shows it must, and as history shows it did. Any critical system which minimizes the relation between man’s understanding or sensation and the objective reality of things known, is a long step in the direction of universal skepticism. Notwithstanding its defects and absurdities, Kantianism has exerted an enormous influence upon philosophical thought since the beginning of the 19 century.

b) Johann Got t l ieb Ficht e (1762-1814), professor of philosophy at Jena and Berlin, tried to reduce Kantianism to a more unified and consistent system of philosophy. He saw that Kant inconsistently admitted the existence of Noumena while protesting that we can know nothing about them. Fichte denied Noumena, and declared that nothing exists except the Absolute Ego, the infinite and boundless Self. This is not the individual self realized in each conscious individual ; it is “I-ness” in general. It is essentially an activity, a striving. The Ego or Infinite Self is not a real being, but it is activity which results in realisation. The Ego realises itself, and becomes conscious of existence. This mysterious process is expressed in Fichte’s formula, “The Ego posits itself.” Having realized itself, the Ego finds its realizing-activity blocked by an impediment. The self-realizing process somehow meets with an obstacle in the fact that the realizing consciousness is aware of something not realizable as self, other than self. This the Ego posits as the not-Self—the world and all things in the world, including individual men or “empirical fegos.” All this is expressed in the formula, “The Ego posits the not-self.” Now the Ego (i. e., the Absolute Ego), inasmuch as it realizes the not-self (which does not have real existence outside the active realization process of the Absolute Ego), exercises intellect. Inasmuch as the Absolute Ego posits the not-self, it exercises choice or free will. Continuing to deal with the not-self by free and active intelligence, the Absolute Ego perceives that, after all, self and not-self are radically one. Fichte’s formula for this is, “The Ego com-posits the self and the not-self.” These operations of the active Absolute Ego in positing the self, positing the not-self, com-positing the self and not-self in a fundamental unity, are called a respectively, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Thus all cognition is subjective, and to exist and to know are the same thing. We limited men (“empirical egos,” or limited egos) experience what we call sensations, and judge that there are things about us which cause sensations, and that we have a body which feels sensations. Now all this is mere seeming; it is illusory. We are merely part of the not-self posited by the Absolute Ego (and we are, like all the not-self, ultimately and fundamentally one with the Absolute Ego), and the world of bodies is simply a projection of the actively intelligent Ego : it has no real existence. God is the Absolute Ego which realizes Itself in limited egos or individual men (by positing the not-self). Man, the empirical or limited ego, finds in his apparent bodiliness and in the apparent bodily world an impediment to the realization of his unity with the Absolute Ego. His belief that he will overcome this impediment and be merged perfectly in the Absolute Ego is faith. In his consciousness of the effort required to overcome this impediment lies duty and the whole notion of morality.

c) Fr iedr ich Wil hel m Joseph von Schelling (1775- 1854), professor at various German universities including those of Jena and Berlin, found Fichte’s doctrine unsatisfactory and self-contradictory. He argues that the notion of Ego involves that of non-Ego, and conversely the notion of nonEgo involves that of Ego. Therefore, above and before Ego and non-Ego, before being and knowing, there must be a cause of these things. This is The Absolute. In The Absolute, Ego and non-Ego are found identified ; and The Absolute may be described as “the identity of contraries.” The process of Ego and non-Ego from The Absolute occurs, as Fichte says, by thesis, antithesis, synthesis. The Absolute is not a reality in itself; it is pure potency, positing itself from eternity by necessary law. It is the principle of all knowledge, but cannot be proved or known except by internal intuition. This Absolute is God, who from eternity projects himself (thesis), posits himself as nature (antithesis), and resumes himself as spirit (synthesis). Man is the perfect union of spirit and nature; he is one with The Absolute; hence he is a visible expression of The Absolute : he is “God visible.” Man’s bodily part, or expression of The Absolute in matter, is an obstacle to be overcome that man may merge consciously with The Absolute. Hence the body is the cause of evil. Man has no free will. Original sin and the Redemption are explained in a mystical and rationalistic fashion. Christ was not God more than other men. After this life man will live again in the body. Schelling changed his philosophy five distinct times. What is given here represents fairly the more stable parts of his doctrine. He was a man susceptible of influence, and his changing doctrine shows the impress of theories propounded by many antecedent and contemporary philosophers.

d) Georg Wil hel m Fr iedr ich Hegel (1770-1831), professor of philosophy at Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin, declared that Schelling made The Absolute an intellect which understood nothing. He evolved a system of Absolute Idealism most difficult to understand, and impossible to abridge, for the system is expounded in one continuous chain of argument in which there are more than two hundred distinct steps. Besides, the system is variously interpreted. Hegel himself is said to have remarked that not more than a dozen of his contemporaries understood his philosophy. The following points of his doctrine are to be noticed :

( I ) Individual things are mere appearances. They do not really exist. (2) The one existent thing is the Idea, the universal concept. To think is to know. (3) The concept or thought so evolves itself (by the “triad” of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis) as to achieve concrete reality and still retain its universality. (4) The concept or idea or thought viewed in itself is “The Idea in Itself.” Viewed as evolved into concrete reality, it is “The Idea out of Itself.” Viewed as returned into itself and conscious of itself, it is “The Idea for Itself.” Notice the “triad” here. (5) The first concept is that of being; and this is a dynamic concept, not a static one, as Aristotle taught. It tends to pass “out of itself” and over to its contrary, to return enriched as the idea of becoming. The process is as follows : Being conceived simply, stripped of every quality and determination, is not conceived as different from nothing. Hence the category of mere being implies its opposite—nothing. Thus the idea is said to pass “out of itself” to its opposite. The ideas of being and nothing (or the one idea in different stages of development) are contradictory. Yet, in spite of their contradiction, they can be regarded as complementary; both are included in the idea of becoming. Thus being as an idea in itself (thesis) passes over to its opposite and out of itself (antithesis), then forward again to itself and for itself as becoming (synthesis). (6) The universal, the concept, the result of the original and universal thought is universal substance—God. This thought, or idea, evolving itself into the second stage (antithesis) is the world, and in the third stage (synthesis) it is made conscious of itself in human nature. God is the whole universe explained as logical concept. The rational alone is real, and the real is rational. The Absolute knows itself in knowing minds, just as these minds know themselves in knowing the Absolute (God).

(7) Nature and spirit are thus mere manifestations of The Absolute. The Absolute is all, and all is ultimately The Absolute ; and The Absolute is infinite thinking activity. Therefore, Hegelianism is idealistic pantheism more intangible than that of Fichte or Schelling.

e) Ot her Kant ian Phil osopher s. i. Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), professor at Koenigsberg and Goettingen, reacted against Hegelianism and taught what he called a system of “Realism”—a name taken from the “realities” of which his doctrine treats. He says things do exist independently of the mind, and sensation makes us aware of them. Yet sensation, and concepts formed upon sensation, are faulty and contradictory. We sense phenomena, but we do not sense them as they are. What we call a thing (man, tree, hill, for example) is really a collection of “realities” which compenétrate one another at one point. Being is made up of a multitude of immutable “realities” (like Leibnitz’ monads’), each of which has its own proper nature. The mind is a single “reality,” but it grasps things as diverse because of its reactions with “realities” of different properties. Herbart is remembered in the field of pedagogics, a science which aroused his interest after he had had some conversation on the subject with Pestalozzi (1746-1827), the founder of a modern system of pedagogy. ii. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), professor at Berlin, explains the universe as “Will” unfolding and manifesting itself in individuals. The universal will produces the world as its phenomenon or expression, and in the world individual wills of living things produce their bodies as their phenomena. The world is evil and filled with pain, and the impulse or “will” to exist and to know is strong. Thus we are held by a strong force in the midst of pains. The best thing to do is to deny this will, weaken it, drive it out, and so be relieved of the pains of existence. Schopenhauer’s doctrine is, therefore, pessimism. iii. Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) substitutes “The Unconscious” for the blind and irrational “Will” of Schopenhauer. The Unconscious is gradually evolved into consciousness by its “Will” and “Idea” (knowledge). In the process it produces the world. The “Idea” in the Unconscious determines the essence of the world, while the “Will” gives it existence. Hartmann conserves the pessimism of Schopenhauer, although he differs from him in his doctrine on the manner of resisting and weakening the will for existence. iv. Rudolf Herman Lotze (1817-1881), professor at Goettingen, follows Herbart in his reaction against Hegelianism. He teaches a “monad doctrine” in explaining the world of realities. He admits the existence of a God distinct from the world, the creator of the cosmos, and divine determinant of the last end of the world. v. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900), professor at Basle, took up the “Will” theory of Schopenhauer, but, far from teaching that the will or impulse of existence and knowledge should be repressed, he declared that it must be given free and wholly unbridled reign. Might is right; strength is good; weakness is evil. The weak must be crushed in the imperious progress of the will of the strong. The race must cultivate the will-force until the “blond beast,” the Superman, has been generated. The whole purpose of the universe is the development of the Superman, and this purpose is served by the cultivation of ruthless power. Everything that makes for the repression of nature is evil, for it blocks the free movement of power, which will produce the Superman. Therefore, Christianity with its “slave morality” is to be overthrown; all religion, all social restraints, all nationalism must go down before the great wave of unrestricted force in which the universe is to realize its end and purpose. vi. Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) taught a system called Voluntarism. He says the soul is merely a collection of acts; that the so-called matter underlying physical realities is nonexistent, being a mere projection of a soul-act; that there is no relation or connection between the physical and the psychic (i. e., between soul-act and body-process), but each proceeds in its own way, although the two series of acts move in perfect parallels {Psycho-physical parallelism). Wundt established a “psychological laboratory” for experiment in the field of empirical or phenomenal psychology at Leipzig in 1878, upon the pattern of which many similar institutes have since been founded. vii. Friedrich Paulsen (1846-1908) traces all things to the action of a universal will-force, which manifests itself accidentally in the lower orders of bodies and culminates in consciousness in man. Man is the terminus of the will-evolution. Man’s personal soul has no individual liberty, and no immortality, for it is only an accident of the soul of the people, which in turn is an accident of the soul of the race, and this, finally, is an accident of the world-soul. The world-soul itself is merged in the Absolute or original will-forCe made conscious by developing itself in man. Sensation and intellection have no causal relation, and indeed no connection at all; they proceed in parallel series {Psycho-physical parallelism). This doctrine is reducible to an explanation of the universe by the development of the universal soul, and hence is called Pan-psychism. viii. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), an English philosopher, professes Agnosticism in the field of both scientific and religious knowledge. He says science deals with the Absolute; religious faith deals likewise with the Absolute. Religion and science differ only in the manner in which they treat of this same object. Now the Absolute is unknowable. Therefore let science not seek to determine the nature of the Absolute nor of any substance; its field is phenomena. Let religion lay down no dogmas, but let it concern itself with practice. For the rest, let science be positive; let its rules be as few as possible. Spencer defines science as a synthesis of things known. Fie makes the fundamental rule or law of science that of evolution, which he defines as the “transit from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.” This law he regards as of great worth in explaining the whole of philosophic truth, from world-origins up to the social relations of men. ix. Charles Renouvier (1815-1903), in his Neo-Criticism, which is modeled on the Criticism instituted by Kant, declares that we know only pure phenomena. Phenomena have representing force. The Ego or Self is but a collection of representations. The phenomena, however, appear in a certain constancy of order, and so the mind is enabled to formulate categories. All categories are reduced to Relation. Some relations are static (quantity, quality, position) and some are dynamic (succession, becoming, finality, causality). We have clear certitude only of phenomena here and now perceived, that is to say, it is of such phenomena that we have cogent certitude, inevitable certitude. We may have free or reasonable certitude of other things, viz., in cases where the intellect propounds a matter for belief, the heart inclines towards it, and the will adheres to it with certain grasp. By such certitude we have legitimate and reliable knowledge of such matters as have merited common belief. This common belief is in some instances universal, as, for example, in the matter of the existence of oneself (the ego) as permanent consciousness, and the existence of the external world; in some cases, however, the common belief is not perfectly common or universal, as, for instance, in the matter of liberty, or the existence of God. Even in such matters as these, one may have legitimate free certitude. But Renouvier thinks that, if one is to avoid contradiction, one must admit only a finite God. x. In Germany, about the mid-19 century, a “back to Kant” movement was started by Albert Lange (1828-1875). This movement is called Neo-Criticism. It branched in many and various directions, and we may leave the matter with a mere mention of prominent names associated with the movement : Hermann Helmholz (1821-1894); Johann Volkelt (born 1848) ; Alois Riehl (born 1844) ; Hermann Cohen (born 1842) ; Paul Natorp (born 1854) ; Ernst Cassirer (born 1874) ; Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) ; Heinrich Rickert (born 1863). xi. In France, and following the Neo-Criticism of Renouvier, were : Prat and Pillon, and Renouvier’s friend, Charles Secretan (1815-1895). Allied with these philosophers in some points of doctrine were: Victor Brochard; Victor Delbos (died 1915) ; L. D’Auriac. xii. In Italy, Kantian doctrines were propounded by Alfonso Testa (1814-1860); Carolo Cantoni (1840-1906); Felice Tocco (1845-1911) ; Giacomo Barzellotti (1844-1917) ; Francesco de Sarlo. Kantianism was employed by the following in the exposition of rationalistic and atheistic doctrine: Giuseppe Ferrari (1811-1876); “Ausonio Franchi” (1820-1895), that name being the nom de plume of Cristofero Bonavino. Of the Italian followers of Hegel we mention: Agosto Vera (1813- 1885); B. Spaventa (1817-1883); Pasquale d’Ercole (1831- 1916) ; Benedetto Croce (born 1866) ; Giovanni Gentile (born 1875) -