Reactions Against Kantianism

Article 2. Reactions Against Kantianism

a) Positivism; b) Materialism.

a) Posit ivism. Positivism takes as demonstrated that nothing but phenomena or appearances of things can be known, and it values only such phenomena as are perceivable by the external senses. Of such phenomena alone have we positive knowledge, and the structure of science must make the most of what the external senses offer it. Psychological introspection, or moral norms like the Categorical Imperative, have no positive, and hence no scientific value. Positive phenomena have, as the experience of the senses testifies, a complexity of sufficiently stable relations, and these can be observed and formulated as scientific laws. i. The older School of Positivism was founded by Auguste Comte (1798-1857). He says that history shows the evolution of science to have occurred in three stages: (1) The Theological Stage, in which the phenomena of the universe were explained by reference to the action of gods; (2) the Metaphysical Stage, in which philosophers discussed abstract entities and obscure general laws; (3) the Positive Stage, in which—the true limits of human powers being determined—■ positive facts are observed and their constant relations formulated as laws. The Positive Stage is the present and perfect stage of complete science. The classification of sciences, following the order of doctrine and increasing scope, gives us the following leading sciences : Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Sociology. Sociology is the greatest science, for it deals with Humanity, and Humanity is the only God there is. Comte’s pupil, Littré (1801-1881), followed his doctrine; and the Positivist “Church” was afterwards ruled by Laffitte. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), the English philosopher and economist, reduces even positive phenomena-to “permanent possibilities of sensation,” declaring that a natural and incurable illusion makes us accept them as real and existent. Mill tries to explain all psychological facts and phenomena as “associations of images” in the mind, the images being, so to speak, mere “atoms” of the mind, and not reliable representations of reality. This Associationism was also professed by Alexander Bain (1818-1904). Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893), philosopher and historian, divides sensations into external (strong) and internal (weak). External sensations are indeed illusory, as Mill teaches, but constitute a “true hallucination,” inasmuch as they remain normal and constant. Taine makes a valuable catalogue of psychological phenomena, but his interpretation of it is incomplete and very defective. ii. The more recent School of Positivists professes an applied Positivism not only in the domain of natural science, but also in history, sociology, pedagogy, and psychology. In the last-named science Positivism has come, in our days, to such prevalence that so-called Experimental or Empirical Psychology is the sole concern of many psychologists. Severed from Rational Psychology, this experimental science is a department of study almost useless and sterile. The more noted of the Experimental Psychologists are : Wilhelm Wundt; Oswald Kuelpe; A. Binet; P. Janet; Michotti; Titchener. Allied with the foregoing, but more concerned with the description and interpretation of psychological data than with “psychological measurements,” are Theodule Ribot ( 1839- 1916) and Jacques Delboeuf (1831-1896). Positivism has developed into the following forms or phases : (1) Psycho-Physiol ogical Par al l el ism, which denies the relation between bodily and spiritual phenomena, and teaches that these proceed in parallel series, or rather in a single series of which there are two aspects. Exponents of this theory are Fechner, Wundt, Jodi, Ebbinghaus, and many others. (2) Phenomenal ism acknowledges mere phenomena of mind, i. e., mere thoughts without a real mind from which these proceed. Hume and Renouvier are affected by this doctrine, and it is professed outright by Louis Weber in his work To Absolute Positivism Through Idealism, written in French, and published in 1903. (3) Pr agmatism holds that thought has only a practical value ; it is directed to action. The truth and moral goodness of thought—nay, the very essence of truth and goodness—is found in utility. If thought directs a useful action, that action is good and true— it is right morally and intellectually. That which “works” with reference to a given purpose is the true and the good thing in the circumstances. Truth and moral quality are therefore relative and dependent upon circumstance and intention. This doctrine was promulgated by Pierce in America in 1878, but its chief propagator was William James (1842- 1910), professor at Harvard. James’ theories have been accepted by Dewey and many other moderns. The relativity of truth was developed to further consequences by the Italians, Prezzolini, Calderoni, and Vailati, and in France by Bergson and Le Roy. Many American philosophers of our time have abandoned pure Pragmatism for Neo-Realism. (4) Neo-Real ism, although imperfectly purged of idealism, is yet a sane reaction against pure idealism or any of its cruder forms. Neo-Realism rejects the ego-centric theory of the idealists which limits the perception of the mind to its own modifications or states. It posits a perfect continuity between the psychic and the physical. Among the many Neo-Realists we choose for mention: William Montague; Frederick Woodbridge; Ralph Barton Perry; Walter Pitkin; Edward Spaulding.

b) Mat er ial ism. Materialism dogmatically asserts the existence of matter, and holds that all phenomena, even vital phenomena, can be explained in terms of material science (physics, chemistry, etc.) ; hence it denies the existence of anything spiritual. Materialism flourished in Europe in the 18 century, and at the beginning of the 19 it was taught in France by Pierre Jean Cabanis (1757-1808) and Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754- 1836), exponents of the Empiricism of Condillac. Following these philosophers there was a short period of spiritualistic reaction against Materialism; but about the middle of the 19 century it revived under the influence of rapidly developing natural science, especially physics and biology. Philosophers of this period again took up the problem of explaining all facts and phenomena by matter and local motion. Noted Materialists of the time were: i. Karl Moleschott (1822-1894); ii. Ludwig Buechner (1824-1898); iii. Karl Vogt (1817-1895); iv. Thomas Huxley (1825-1895); v. George Romanes (1848-1894); vi. Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919); vii. Felix Le Dantec (1869—1917)- Among the arguments used by modern Materialists prominence is given to that known as Evolution or Transformism of Living Species. In the 18 century Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and Jean Baptiste Robinet (1735-1820) taught a sort of evolutionistic monism, but offered no theory of the manner in which one species is changed into another. Such an explanation was offered by Jean Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) in his Philosophie Zoologique (1809). He asserted that the organism of a living thing takes on new and external elements in a very gradual but continuous manner, and, adapting itself to these new “parts” or elements of structure, is slowly changed into a new species. Charles Darwin (1809-1882) teaches a theory of natural selection, according to which the stronger individuals of a species survive the Struggle for Existence while the weaker perish (Survival of the Fittest) ; and these surviving individuals tend to a continuously improved condition of their kind by their power of adaptation to surroundings and conditions (natural variations). Transmitting their adaptations or variations to their progeny, new species are slowly formed. Darwin in his Descent of Man traces human origins back to brute life. The evolutionistic tendency which shows in the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest extends to the moral order, and the norm of morality is a natural tendency for that which is of utility or benefit to the species. Materialism makes the brain the organ of the understanding, and so makes all psychological functions depend on organic conditions. This phase of materialism was developed by the Phrenologists under the leadership of F. J. Gall (1758-1828), a German scientist. It was also insisted upon by those Criminologists (chief of whom was Cesare Lombroso, 1836-1909) who regard the criminal impulse as traceable to some organic defect. Following Lombroso, and deducing further doctrines from his postulates (such as the opinion that even talent or genius comes from organic defect or degeneration) were Enrico Ferri, Morselli, and Garofalo.